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Men and women occupy very different sectors of the labor market and women 
continue to be disadvantaged by this segregation in prestige, pay and power. Much 
research has examined how segregation is reproduced by discrimination and coercion, but 
as such actions become increasingly culturally illegitimate, we must begin to ask why 
gender inequality persists in the face of its illegitimacy. This project examines how two 
culturally-informed, individually-held sets of beliefs, gender schemas (beliefs about the 
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appropriate roles and ―essential natures‖ of men and women) and self-conceptions 
(gendered beliefs about the self) inspire decision-making that reproduces occupational 
gender segregation. Using 5-year longitudinal panel data of students from four 
institutions (MIT, Olin, Smith and UMass), I study how gender schemas and self-
conceptions influence students‘ major selection and their career decisions 18 months after 
graduation. This project theorizes a phenomenon I call ―the self-expressive edge of sex 
segregation,‖ the reproduction of occupational sex segregation through the 
individualistic, self-reflective, yet culturally-informed decisions of social actors. This 
dissertation shows, first of all, that gender schemas and self-conceptions are indeed co-
constructed: our most individualistic beliefs—who we think we are as people—are 
informed by our adherence to cultural beliefs about gender. These culturally-informed 
self-conceptions not only help direct the distribution of men and women into already-
segregated college majors and career fields, they help to reproduce the cultural sex-typing 
of such fields as ―masculine‖ and ―feminine‖ domains. As I show with a case study of 
engineering students, these individual-level beliefs can also interact with professional 
cultures in such a way that segregation is reproduced in the very process of learning to be 
a professional. In these mechanisms of sex segregation, cultural gender beliefs act 
through self-conceptions to influence career decisions. This cloaking of gendered career 
decision-making in individualistic self-expression may be particularly resistant to social 
change, as undermining individuals‘ self-expressive freedoms would be a culturally 
unacceptable method to reduce gender inequality.  
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Conceptions in College Major Selection and Career Launch  
 
 
 
Chapter 1—Introduction 
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―For every woman who worked as a doctor between 1998 and 2000,…83 women held 
clerical jobs, 15 operated factory machines, 14 were sales clerks, 10 were nurses’ aides, 
and 6 served food.‖ (Padavic & Reskin 2001, p. 74).  
 
The bifurcation of individuals in society by gender is striking—and stunningly 
enduring.  The United States has made great strides in advancing the position of women 
over the last century.  Women can now vote, control their fertility, and are legally 
allowed to enter any educational and most occupational fields they desire.  Social 
attitudes about women‘s roles have also changed: most Americans now believe that 
women should work outside the home if they wish to, even if they are mothers to young 
or school-aged children (Charles & Cech 2010; Kane 2000).  Once the women‘s 
movement and second-wave feminism of the 1960s and 70s was in full swing and gender 
discrimination in employment and education became formally illegal, many women 
moved into previously male-dominated arenas.  Between 1950 and 1985, women became 
doctors, lawyers and scientists in record numbers (England 2010).  The general 
assumption was that gender inequality in all forms was slowly but surely on its way out 
(Johnson 1998). 
 But, by the end of the 1980s, this desegregation had lost its momentum. Women‘s 
entrance into previously male-dominated fields slowed through the 1990s, and the gender 
wage gap stopped narrowing in the 1990s (Cotter et al. 2011, England 2010).  In order to 
attain gender parity in all occupations, 52% of men or women would have to change jobs 
(Cotter et al. 2006). This segregation is the most consequential factor in economic gender 
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inequality more generally and disadvantages women in prestige, pay, and power (Jarell & 
Stanley 2004).   The puzzle that motivates this project is, decades after legal mandates 
for equality of opportunity and outcome, and cultural shifts that encourage gender equity, 
why is occupational sex segregation in the United States so resilient?     
 Today, most of the legal restrictions to men‘s and women‘s participation in all 
corners of the labor market have been removed, and broadly-held cultural attitudes favor 
them doing so.  I argue that the endurance of occupational sex segregation—one of the 
hallmarks of the stalled revolution—is reproduced most effectively through social 
processes that are neither coercive nor discriminatory. Rather, occupational sex 
segregation is reproduced in large part by the voluntary, self-expressive decisions of men 
and women.  This self-expression is not as agentic as ideologies of individualism might 
lead us to believe, however—it is inextricably tangled up in the fabric of the gender 
structure.  
As I explain in this chapter, scholars understand many of  the institutional and 
interactional level processes that reproduce inequality through discrimination, exclusion, 
and stereotyping, but we know much less about the role of individual decision-making in 
occupational sex segregation, and how that decision-making is informed by cultural 
gender ideologies.  Although self-expression is culturally exalted as the ideal motivator 
for career decisions in many post-industrial countries like the U.S. (Inglehart 1997), we 
lack a theoretical language for talking about these gendered self-expressive career 
decisions.  The purpose of this dissertation is to develop such a theory and test it by first 
showing that self-understandings are co-constructed with gender beliefs, and then 
        4 
 
 
 
demonstrating how the expression of those gendered self-understandings reproduces sex 
segregation through inter- and intra-occupational mechanisms.  
 I examine self-expressive career decisions as an example of the cultural 
reproduction of inequality at the individual level—how people‘s internalization of 
cultural structures informs how they interpret and shape their own lives.  The beliefs that 
people hold and the cultural processes they engage in affect how they treat others and 
how structures and institutions are organized. Cultural beliefs also influence how people 
come to understand themselves, and how they organize their lives around those self-
understandings.  This project explores how cultural beliefs interact with social-
psychological career decision-making processes to reproduce occupational sex 
segregation. 
 The overarching mechanism I study is what I call the self-expressive edge of sex 
segregation: the reproduction of occupational sex segregation through deeply personal, 
self-reflective—yet culturally-informed—decisions of social actors.  This dissertation 
investigates the co-construction of cultural gender beliefs and self-conceptions among a 
longitudinal panel of young men and women, and how these culturally-informed self-
conceptions, in turn, inform their decisions about college majors and career launch.  This 
stage in the life course is ideal for studying these processes because it is a time when self-
expressive career decision-making is both most expected and most possible.  Higher 
education is culturally understood as a vehicle for self-realization and expression, and the 
highly diversified college curricula in the U.S. was designed to maximize such self-
expression (Charles 2011a, 2011b).  This structural flexibility for self-expressive 
decision-making is unmatched in the labor force.  However, I am also interested in the 
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extent to which self-expression influences career decisions at career launch, once 
respondents have the structural constraints of a college degree certification.  
I use a 5-year panel of over 700 students from four U.S. institutions: the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Franklin W. Olin College of 
Engineering (Olin), Smith College (Smith), and the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst (UMass).  I follow students from their freshman year in college through their 
graduation and 18 months into their career launch.  These data are part of a National 
Science Foundation-funded project called ―FuturePaths‖ (PIs: Carroll Seron and Susan 
Silbey).
 1
 
 This chapter situates my approach in the context of existing explanations of 
occupational sex segregation at the institutional, interactional, and individual levels, and 
then introduces my theoretical framework.  I then theorize the self-expressive edge of sex 
segregation and discuss my sample.  I end by laying out my empirical approach to 
investigating this process, reviewing my findings, and foreshadowing their theoretical 
and policy implications.   
1.1 Occupational Sex Segregation
2
 
                                                 
1
 ―FuturePaths: Developing Diverse Leadership for Engineering‖ was funded by the National Science 
Foundation under Grants No. 0240817, 0241337, 0609628, and 0503351 (PI‘s: Carroll Seron and Susan 
Silbey).  Work for this project was supported by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement 
Grant (#1029668). Pre-dissertation work, especially on issues of professional socialization, was funded by 
a UC Labor and Employment Research Fund Pre-Dissertation Grant (reference # 07-T-LERF-06-0086).  
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the UC Labor and 
Employment Research Fund. I thank Carroll Seron and Susan Silbey for allowing me to use these data for 
my project. 
2
 In the book manuscript, I will likely extract this literature review from chapter 1 and make it a stand-alone 
chapter.  This will make the introduction flow more smoothly, introduce my project more quickly, and be 
more reader-friendly to a more general audience.  See Appendix 3 for the proposed chapters of what will be 
my book manuscript. 
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 Occupational sex segregation refers to the differential distribution of men and 
women across occupations, places of work, and jobs (Padavic & Reskin 2002).  This 
segregation has consequences: men end up in jobs that are, on average, better-paying, 
more powerful, and more prestigious than the jobs that women enter.  Sex segregation 
exists across occupations (women and men work in different fields), across firms or 
establishments (women and men work in different sectors or types of organizations), and 
across jobs (women and men perform different work activities within the same firm).  
Although job and firm-level segregation is substantial (see Peterson & Morgan 1995; 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2003), and within-occupation segregation is important but 
comparatively less well understood (Cech 2011; Leahey 2007, Leahey et al. 2009), the 
most consequential segregation for prestige, salary and power is the distribution of men 
and women into different occupations (Kim & Sakamoto 2008; Mouw & Kalleberg 
2010).  These dimensions of segregation are more clearly represented as a distinction 
between vertical or horizontal sex segregation.  Vertical segregation is where men are 
concentrated in higher-status and/or better-paid positions within each field or task; 
horizontal segregation is where men and women complete different types of tasks or 
roles (Charles & Bradley 2002). While vertical sex segregation had decreased slightly 
since the introduction of legislation such as Title IX and the Civil Rights Act, horizontal 
segregation remains strong in the U.S. (Charles & Grusky 2004; Padavic & Reskin 2002). 
There is, of course, a vertical component to occupational sex segregation between higher 
and lower status occupations, and female-dominated occupations are disproportionately 
represented among those with lower-status. While the factors I investigate could 
influence all levels of segregation, my primary interest and empirical focus is on 
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horizontal segregation, how men and women end up in substantively different 
occupations.   
An important contributor to occupational sex segregation is men‘s and women‘s 
segregation into male- and female-dominated college majors (Charles & Bradley 2002).  
As with segregation in the workforce, the desegregation of college majors slowed after 
the 1980s.  The dissimilarity index of college majors has hovered around 19% since the 
mid-1990s (Gerber & Cheung 2008).  College major and occupational sex segregation 
are reproduced by many of the same mechanisms (Jacobs 1989).  While much of the sex 
segregation literature focuses on occupations, I note literature that addresses sex 
segregation in higher education in particular where appropriate.  I review the literature on 
sex segregation in college majors in more depth in the beginning of chapter 3. 
 I am primarily concerned with sex segregation as it is manifested in high-skilled 
professional occupations and the educational preparation for those occupations.  Low-
skilled and manual work is highly sex-segregated and did not experience the levels of 
desegregation that high-skilled occupations enjoyed in the 1960s and 1970s.  Paula 
England (2010) argues that this is because women who had the potential to increase their 
earnings also might have had the opportunity to enter into higher-status, female-
dominated occupations. As such, fewer women became plumbers and mechanics in the 
1970s and 1980s as those who became lawyers and doctors (England 2010).  I largely 
agree with this structural argument and I recognize that workers in low-skilled jobs face 
tremendous constraints in their choice of employment.  But, I do expect that, to the extent 
that they have any degrees of freedom in their employment decisions, there may be a self-
expressive component to employment choices even among the working class.  This study, 
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however, focuses on men and women who are expected to enter—or remain firmly 
embedded in—the middle class. 
Is it Biology? 
 Perhaps the most widespread explanation for occupational sex segregation in U.S. 
popular consciousness is that such segregation is our innate biological destiny.  Gender is 
seen as synonymous with ―sex,‖ the anatomical distinction between ―male‖ and ―female‖ 
bodies, and anatomical differences are thought to be indicative of many other biological 
and neurological differences between women and men.  These differences are believed to 
translate into discrepancies in men‘s and women‘s ―innate‖ abilities and intuition.  This 
gender=sex paradigm posits the explanation for gender inequality in intrinsic, 
unchanging, biological differences between men and women (Epstein 2007).
3
  
As psychologist Cordeilia Fine puts it, ―the sheer complexity of the brain lends 
itself beautifully to over-interpretation and precipitous conclusions‖ (2010, p. xxviii).  
Brain researchers have searched for biological sex differences in the lateralization of the 
brain, the sizes of men‘s and women‘s left and right hemispheres, and in the ways that 
men and women use different parts of their brains (Hurst 2003; Kimmel 2008).  Such 
research assumes that small observed brain differences explain the divergence in men‘s 
and women‘s career outcome.  Neurologist Simon Baron-Cohen, for example, concluded 
that the differences he identified in boy‘s and girl‘s manipulation of geometric shapes and 
                                                 
3 Shulamith Firestone (1970), for instance, theorized that all social inequality stems from an inherently 
unequal power distribution in men‘s and women‘s bodies. On average, male bodies are larger and stronger 
than female bodies. Females throughout history have been ―at the mercy‖ of their biology as they get 
saddled with childbearing/childrearing responsibilities and depend on males for their physical survival. 
Whether or not Firestone‘s theory is an adequate representation of the earliest development of a gendered 
division of labor, she draws a clean causal connection between prehistoric living conditions and modern 
division of labor. 
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their interactions with toys signaled important cognitive differences that translate into 
different occupational abilities and preferences (2003).   
 Essentialist explanations of occupational sex segregation have long been 
criticized.
 4
  Yu Xie and Kimberlee Shauman (2003) for example argue that the following 
two premises must hold true for occupational sex segregation to be primarily biological: 
(1) the neurological sex differences must exist net of social differences, and (2) such 
differences must actually matter for people‘s abilities to be successful in occupations.  
Regarding the first, the difficulty comes in disentangling any actually-existing biological 
differences from gendered socialization and life experiences.  As with all societies, 
anatomical categorization is accompanied by differences in treatment: men and women 
have been treated differently their entire lives, so they are likely to have developed 
slightly different brain structures over time (Fine 2010).
5
  In order to be able to test 
whether neurological differences exist net of experiences in the social world, scientists 
would have to study pre-socialized infants.  But, the socialization of children begins the 
moment the baby‘s sex is known—often times en utero (Valian 1999).   
 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that such differences would have any effects on 
men‘s and women‘s success as nurses, pharmacists, or accountants.  Success in an 
occupation requires a complex and diverse set of abilities learned over the course of years 
of education and training (Xie & Shauman 2003). 
                                                 
4 ―A 2006 report from the National Academy of Sciences found that after an exhaustive review of the 
scientific literature, including studies of brain structure and function, it could find no evidence of any 
significant biological factors causing the underrepresentation of women in science and mathematics‖ 
(Epstein 2007, pp. 8-9). 
5
 Fine states: ―We can‘t understand the gender differences in male and female minds—the minds that are 
the source of our thoughts, feelings, abilities, motivations, and behavior—without understanding how 
psychologically permeable is the skull that separates the mind from the sociocultural context in which it 
operates‖ (Fine 2010, p. xxiv). 
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 Despite the controversy surrounding the ―brain‖ question, the fact that many 
people believe gender differences to be biological is enough to help sustain these 
differences.  The very cultural perpetuation of these biological explanations reinforces 
sex segregation—and the inequalities that accompany it—by casting segregation as a 
―natural‖ and ―ageless‖ occurrence.  Those who benefit from keeping the gender 
hierarchy intact can invoke these biological explanations as ―proof‖ of the legitimacy and 
intractability of that hierarchy—a move made prominently by Harvard University 
president Larry Summers in 2005.
6
 As Cynthia Epstein (2007) put it, ―there would not be 
a firm basis for the subordinate condition of females were there not a widespread belief, 
rooted in folk culture, in their essential difference from males in ability and emotion‖ (p. 
17)… ―no society or subgroup leaves social sorting to natural processes‖ (p. 4).  
Social Science Theories of Occupational Sex Segregation 
 Social science research, in contrast, addresses the myriad ways that occupational 
sex segregation is reproduced by the entrenched and enduring social and cultural 
distinctions between men and women. Broadly, these factors can be grouped into three 
categories: institutional-level factors, interactional-level factors, and individual-level 
factors (see Table 1.1).  I borrow this categorization from Barbara Risman‘s 
conceptualization of the gender structure (2004).  I prefer this categorization over the 
more popular ―supply-side‖ versus ―demand-side‖ distinction because of the latter‘s 
connection to classical economics and its implicit assumption that the two sides are 
mutually exclusive. These factors are all interconnected and continually reinforce one 
                                                 
6
 Summers said, ―so, my best guess, to provoke you, of what‘s behind all of this [discrepancy in the 
retention patterns of women and men in high-end engineering and science fields] is that…in the special 
case of science and engineering, these are issues of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability of 
aptitude.‖  (http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php, retrieved 9/13/2010).  
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another.  Cognitive biases, for example, buttress organizational-level practices and 
structures.  This project, along with other research, demonstrates that workers‘ career 
choices and the biases, discrimination, and cultural beliefs that exist in the environments 
in which workers make these decisions, are inextricably linked.  Although I discuss them 
separately and focus on the interaction between one particular institutional-level factor 
(i.e. cultural structures) and on individual-level factor (i.e. self-expression), I recognize 
these as parts of a larger, interconnected gender structure. 
Institutional –level factors 
 Institutional-level factors of occupational sex segregation are those that reproduce 
sex segregation throughout the labor market.  The most widespread institutional-level 
factors are the legal regulations and policies that promote or undermine sex segregation.  
The legal advancements of women in the twentieth century were accompanied by marked 
increases in education, literacy, employment, and rights to property ownership.  The 
women‘s movement of the 1960s and early 1970s spurred several important legal 
advancements: the 1963 Equal Pay Act required employers pay to equitable wages for the 
same work, regardless of sex; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) prohibited 
employer discrimination; the 1968 Executive Order 11246 established affirmative action 
plans for hiring women and minorities; and Title IX in 1972 prohibited sex 
discrimination in all aspects of educational programs funded by the government (Bartlett 
et al., 2002; Epstein, 1988; Lorber, 2001). Women flooded into higher education and the 
professions after Title IX (McAfee, 1984). In 1970, 43% of women worked, 29% worked 
full time; in 2001, 74% of women worked and 42% of women worked full time (Hurst, 
2003). This legislation makes gender bias formally illegal, but it works from the premise 
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that gender inequality is solely derived from the malicious intent of corporate, 
governmental, or educational decision-makers. As decades of gender scholarship has 
shown, gender inequality is reproduced in more ways than through direct discriminatory 
treatment.  
 This legislation formally allowed women to enter any occupational or educational 
field they wished, and protected them from overt ―first generation‖ discrimination 
(Prokos & Padavic 2005; Sturm 2001).  Legislative precedence are only now beginning 
to be set for how to deal with ―second-generation‖ discrimination, such as those against 
employed women who choose to become mothers (Williams 2000).   
But just because women and men could pursue any degree or occupation they 
wished does not mean that cultural beliefs dictated that they should.  Cultural beliefs 
about the appropriateness of women‘s and men‘s entrance into other-sex-typed college 
majors or jobs have become less entrenched in recent decades (Kane 2000), but such 
beliefs still feature prominently in the cultural mechanisms of segregation within 
professions, organizations, interactions, and, as I will show in this dissertation, in 
individual, self-expressive choices.   
 Of particular importance is the cultural ideology of ―separate but equal‖ outcomes 
for men and women (Charles & Bradley 2002, 2009).  Cultural ideologies of essentialism 
discussed above portray men and women as fundamentally different and differently 
capable at different tasks and therefore ―naturally‖ suited for different types of  academic 
degrees and jobs (Fenstermaker & West 2002; Ridgeway 2006). Similarly, the 
―egalitarian essentialism‖ frame combines the feminist rhetoric of equality of choice and 
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opportunity with support for intensive mothering (Cotter et al. 2011).
7
  These prominent 
cultural frames require the legal protections of women‘s rights of opportunity to all 
educational and occupational pathways, but exalt men‘s and women‘s rights to freely 
choose their career paths and to make their own decisions about whether to remain in the 
workforce after having children.  These separate but equal beliefs, furthermore, do not 
challenge the deeply-held cultural stereotyping of male-typed and female-typed 
occupations, nor do they challenge the devaluation of female-typed domains.  
 The third institutional-level factor in occupational sex segregation are labor-
market processes.  Scholars have argued that, overall, men fight for or are assigned to the 
best, most prestigious jobs, leaving the rest for women (particularly women of color).  
This theory of queuing (Reskin & Roos 1990) attempts to explain the sorting of women 
and men across the labor market.  While sorting based on pay and prestige may account 
for some sex segregation, and men and women are over- and under-represented, 
respectively, in the most prestigious and highly-paid occupations, there is only a weak 
correlation between the socioeconomic status of each occupation and the representation 
of women therein.  Sex segregation, in other words, is not entirely based on 
socioeconomic occupational rankings (Charles & Grusky 2004).   
 Furthermore, the very movement of women (and occasionally men) into heavily 
male- or female-dominated fields can tilt the gender balance of these fields. Feminization 
is the process by which some academic fields or occupations move from being male-
dominated or gender-neutral to female-dominated.  In this process, the relative prestige 
and pay of the occupation declines.  There are many examples of feminization, especially 
                                                 
7
 Messner (2009) calls this ―soft essentialism.‖ 
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in the service sector (e.g. telephone operators and bank tellers) where women crowded 
when the doors of the labor market were open to them in the 1960s and 1970s, but a 
scarce few have masculinized.  One example is computer programming:  ―Women were 
hired as computer programmers in the 1940s because the work seemed to resemble 
simple clerical tasks. In fact, however, programming demanded complex skills in abstract 
logic, mathematics, electrical circuitry, and machinery…Once programming was 
recognized as ―intellectually demanding,‖ it became attractive to men. (Baca Zinn 2000, 
pg. 17).‖  
Once fields have feminized (or masculinized), they become culturally typed 
female or male, and attract entrants accordingly.  This transformation is relatively rare, 
however (Charles & Grusky 2004).  More often, majors and occupations underwent a 
slight up-tick in the representation of women in the 1960s through the 1980s (England 
2010) and then stabilized.  Similarly, some previously male-dominated academic majors 
such as business and biology became gender-neutral but have not completely feminized 
(Jacobs 1995). 
Organizations, as gendered spaces, also help to reproduce occupational sex 
segregation.  Joan Acker describes work organizations as ―inequality regimes:‖ 
interlocking practices and processes that reproduce inequality in the workplace (Acker 
2006). These inequality regimes mean differential power and control over organizational 
resources and unequal opportunities for employment, promotion, remuneration, respect 
and interesting work. Charles Tilly provides some insights into how inequality (through 
―categorical distinctions‖) becomes institutionalized in organizations. His argument can 
be summarized as follows: when critical agents are faced with paired and unequal 
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categories of people at ―crucial organizational boundaries,‖ exclusion and opportunity 
hoarding arises. These practices are reinforced through processes of isomorphism. As 
people work in, pass through, or are ―processed‖ by these organizations, they receive 
different and unequal preparation for performance in new organizations (Tilly 1998).   
 Organizational practices of hiring can reproduce sex segregation when opaque or 
closed recruitment processes are used, as organizations that use such practices are less 
likely to reach diverse audiences of potential employees (Reskin 2000).  Discriminatory 
organizational practices of promotion, furthermore, can create ―glass ceilings,‖ 
preventing women from reaching leadership positions (Cotter et al. 2001).  Informal 
networks and ―boys clubs‖ can also limit women‘s advancement opportunities (Blair-Loy 
2001; Podolny & Baron 1997, Roth 2006). 
 Furthermore, the arrangement of time and lack of flexibility within organizations 
can make it more challenging for women—who are often burdened with a ―second shift‖ 
at home (Hochschild 1997)—to remain in their current workplaces or to advance 
(Bianchi & Milkie 2010).  Similarly, organizational-level cultural structures can 
disadvantage women.  For example, the work devotion schema—the cultural mandate 
that employees show ultimate dedication to their careers and organization—can conflict 
with other cultural mandates women experience (e.g. the family devotion schema) and 
force women to make a choice between their families and their careers (Blair-Loy 2003).  
Such schemas can also be the basis of discrimination against women (especially mothers) 
who are believed to lack such dedication. Cultural ideologies of the ―ideal worker‖ as 
having stereotypically masculine characteristics further disadvantage women (Barnett 
2004).   
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 While these organizational cultures and practices most directly reproduce vertical 
sex segregation, they can also affect horizontal segregation, to the extent that women and 
men are pushed out of or leave certain organizational circumstances, or seek 
organizational arrangements that are part of other occupations.  
Beyond organizations, professional and occupational-level factors can reproduce 
sex segregation. In particular, professional cultures can influence what subfields and 
work activities men and women end up in within the professions‘ boundaries.  Due to 
their nurturance and perpetuation by intra-professional processes of jurisdiction, closure, 
professional socialization, professional cultures provide the meaning systems and 
valuation hierarchies about professional work (Abbott 1998; Becker et al. 1961).
8
  
Professional cultures are important to the reproduction of occupational sex segregation 
because these cultures are not benign.  The belief systems that give meaning to the tasks 
and expertise within a profession‘s boarders can have built within them biases about who 
is best suited to carry out those tasks and expertise.  Elsewhere, I call these professional 
competence schemas, the seemingly-objective cultural models about professional 
competence held by profession members (Cech 2011).  These schemas can influence 
teachers‘, employers‘ and co-workers‘ judgments of women‘s competence, and they can 
also affect men‘s and women‘s assessments of their own abilities in ways that reproduce 
gender inequality within these professions.  Exclusionary ideologies can also be 
embedded in the cultural myths, humor and tales of origin of a profession, such as lore 
                                                 
8
 Non-professional occupations (e.g. truck drivers and hairdressers) may have cultures that help to 
reproduce segregation, but this is a site for further research.   
        17 
 
 
 
about ―founding fathers,‖ or within a profession‘s norms of social interaction, such as the 
bravado typical of a surgical theater.  
These professional cultures can influence not only who is considered appropriate 
for particular subfields and work activities—which is the basis for hiring and promotion 
biases—but also what subfields and work activities men and women see themselves as 
skills at and appropriate for (Cech 2011).  Chapter 5 provides a more detailed discussion 
of the role or professional culture in educational and occupational sex segregation.  
Interactional-level factors 
 
 At the interactional level, teachers, employers, classmates, and co-workers treat 
men and women differently and reward them unequally, which can lead to biased hiring, 
promotion, and allocation of work tasks. Cognitive biases can affect how young men and 
women are treated in their educational experiences, and by their peers, colleagues, and 
potential and actual employers.  Cognitive biases are sub-conscious or pre-conscious 
processes whereby people immediately categorize individuals as ―women‖ or ―men,‖ and 
as  result, make different assumptions about them, associate them with different realms of 
the social world, interact with them differently, and expect different things from them 
(Ridgeway 2006).  The assumptions, explanations, etc. that accompany this 
categorization are connected to broadly-held cultural beliefs about gender, such as the 
distinguishing characteristics of masculinity and femininity or norms of behavior for men 
and women (Ridgeway & Correll 2004).  Individuals carry these biases with them into 
every social context (Ridgeway et al. 2009).   
 The cognitive differentiation between women and men is the foundation for 
differential treatment and expectations of men and women (and boys and girls) from their 
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earliest educational experiences to their day-to-day workplace encounters.  This is 
demonstrated by a popular riddle:  A father and son are in a car together and have an 
accident.  The father is killed and the son is rushed to the hospital.  A surgeon is called in 
to perform an operation.  After looking at the boy‘s face, the surgeon exclaimed, ―I can‘t 
operate on this boy, he‘s my son!‖  Who is the surgeon? (Padavic & Reskin 2002).  The 
story is a riddle (perhaps less so today than in the 1970s when it was popular) precisely 
because of the expectation that most surgeons are men.  The expectations that the 
practitioners of male-dominated fields are men and those of female-dominated fields are 
women biases both people‘s expectations of who will fill those roles and what 
occupations individual men and women are likely to enter.  Thus, cognitive bias can 
inform how men and women are treated in their educational experiences and in the 
workplace. Men and women also recognize that they are held accountable to these 
established cultural scripts about men‘s and women‘s appropriateness for certain 
academic majors and occupations (Fenstermaker & West 2002; West & Zimmerman 
1987).  They may thus choose gender-typical educational or occupational paths in the 
expectation that doing otherwise would lead to social sanctions (Charles 2011a). 
These cognitive biases have particular sway in organizations. The first way this 
can happen is through statistical discrimination (Bielby & Baron 1986), where a woman 
is discriminated against because, for example, her potential employer believes she is 
likely to have a child and leave the workforce, and thus would be a poor investment of 
company training time.  Additionally, biases about women‘s and men‘s abilities to 
balance family and work responsibilities can lead to motherhood penalties (and 
fatherhood bonuses) (Budig & England 2001; Correll et al. 2007).  Although these 
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penalties and bonuses have been shown primary for wages, they also likely affect 
promotions and assignments to leadership positions.   
Processes of othering and marginalization are also common.  Extra-work social 
events such as ―after work drinks‖ have important consequences for women‘s inclusion 
in the work negotiations that happen in non-work social events (Blair-Loy 2001).  This 
marginalization can also occur in higher education, where women in male-dominated 
fields experience ―chilly climates,‖ being left out of classroom discussions, lab groups, 
etc. (Allison et al. 1982; Epstein 1993; National Academy of Science 2007).   
 Interactional-level factors help determine what college majors and occupations 
men and women are expected to enter, what kinds of jobs they are encouraged into or 
turned away from, and how they are treated once there.  These interactional-level 
differences are important in determining whether or not people experience 
discrimination, and they are interwoven with the institutional factors described above and 
the individual-level factors described below. 
Individual-level factors 
 
 Individual-level factors of sex segregation encompass the processes that affect 
men‘s and women‘s decision-making about their own college degrees and careers.  One 
of the most popular individual-level explanations for occupational sex segregation is 
human capital theory.  Economist Gary Becker (1993) argued that women obtain 
different levels of occupational success than men because they choose to invest less in 
―human capital:‖ formal education, long work hours, geographical moves, postponement 
of gratification, networking, etc. Human capital theory argues that women occupy 
different sectors of the labor market than men because they choose to invest less in the 
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capital necessary for success in male-dominated fields. Factors that they assume to 
influence women‘s choices are their presumed desires to have and raise children, their 
desires for less stressful occupations, and their desire to put their families ahead of their 
careers. Motivated by their future roles as childrearers, so the theory goes, women prefer 
occupations with lower costs to labor market withdrawal so their salaries don‘t ―atrophy‖ 
(Mincer & Polachek 1974; Okamoto & England 1999). Thus, any occupational sex 
segregation is due to the net effect of individual women‘s choices (Becker 1993; Bielby 
1991).  Relating to higher education specifically, Polachek (1981) and other argue that 
women prefer college majors that are connected to occupations with higher earnings right 
out of college and have flatter earnings profiles over time.   
Human capital theory and other rational actor theories of sex segregation have 
come under attack from both sociologists (c.f. Blau & Ferber 1986; England 1982, 1984; 
Okamoto & England 1999; Reskin, 2000, 2003) and economists (D'Amico, 1987), but its 
cost-benefit framework still holds tremendous sway in the business world (Polachek & 
Siebert, 1994). These approaches are flawed on several accounts.  First, they assume that 
men and women make fully-informed decisions about their education and employment in 
an effort to maximize their lifetime earnings.  But men and women never have perfect 
information about their career decisions, and even if they did, most people‘s goals are 
much more complex than simply earning the most amount of money possible in their 
lifetime (England 1984).  Additionally, married women are not more likely to work in 
female-dominated fields than single women (England, Chassie & McCormek 1982) and 
female-dominated fields are not more flexible than male-dominated fields (Glass 1990).  
In other words, it is unlikely that educational and occupational sex segregation is driven 
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by men and women making such calculated decisions for the sole purpose of maximizing 
their long-term income. 
 Other social science research argues that men and women choose occupational 
paths depending on whether they believe those paths will be consistent with their existing 
or expected roles (Eccles 1987).  It is consistent with the ―egalitarian essentialism‖ frame 
that still expects intensive motherhood (Cotter et al. 2011).  While this explanation has its 
roots in the same neoclassical economic theory that gave rise to human capital theory, 
this role expectation explanations emphasizes the culture foundations of these roles, 
rather than the rational calculation of long-term benefits and costs.  For example, the 
family plans explanation suggests that women who value their future roles as mothers 
and spouses are likely to resolve existing or expected work-family conflicts in favor of 
those family plans Thus, women choose less male-dominated college majors and 
occupations (Eccles 1987, Eccles et al. 1984; Frome et al. 2006).  Such role expectations 
may influence whether women and men decide to remain in certain occupational fields, 
but they are unlikely to explain why women do not enter male-dominated majors or 
occupations in the first place: my colleagues and I found that women‘s family plans were 
not related to their persistence in an engineering degree or their plans to enter the 
engineering workforce (Cech et al. 2011).  Much less is known about how men‘s 
anticipated and actual roles influence their selection of occupations (Glass 1990).  Our 
research found that men with strong family plans were actually less likely to intend to 
persist in engineering than women with similar family plans.  
 These role expectancy theories are based on the same flawed assumption that 
male-dominated fields are somehow less flexible than female-dominated fields.  
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However, college major and career decision-making is prefaced on far more than men‘s 
and women‘s family plans, and not everyone knows their family plans with any certainty, 
or knows which fields will be flexible when they are making crucial career decisions. 
 The first literature to really address the issue of gendered choices outside of 
women‘s expected family responsibilities is the socialization literature. These scholars 
study the socialization of boys and girls into different tastes and interests, which are 
supposed to lead them to be interested in different tasks and occupations in adulthood 
(Chodorow 1978, 1995; Risman 1998). The assumption is that a boy is socialized to play 
with trucks and so becomes a car mechanic; a girl is socialized to play with dolls and so 
becomes a nursery school teacher (Barone 2011).  Although this socialization literature is 
important in explaining gendered preferences in activities at a young age, there is not 
necessarily a direct causal connection between childhood interests or aspirations and 
adult careers (Jacobs 1989).  This socialization can inform what boys and girls think they 
like and are good at, but it is likely most important for fostering men‘s and women‘s 
desires to fit into socially-acceptable roles rather than planting in boys and girls the seeds 
of their future career aspirations.
9
 
 Of more immediate importance to men‘s and women‘s career decisions is the 
gendered notions men and women have of their skills and abilities.  Recent social 
psychological literature on gendered self-assessments has shown the results of 
internalizing the cognitive biases discussed above.  Shelley Correll (2001, 2004) shows 
                                                 
9 Like essentialist explanations, socialization rhetoric seems to have a certain cultural prominence in 
popular explanations for career decisions.  I may find that men and women in this sample tell self-
expressive stories about their college major and career launch decisions that include reference to having 
certain interests in their childhood.  Many engineering students I interviewed in a past project (Cech 2007) 
explained that, even as kids, they ―liked to take things apart.‖   
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that young women and men internalize the cognitive biases that men are better at math 
than women. Young women, net of math skills and performance, are less confident in 
their math abilities than men.  Correll finds that women and men make decisions about 
their college majors based upon gendered notions of what they think they are good at.  
 The socialization literature attempts to explain men‘s and women‘s career 
decisions by tracing their interests far back to their process of learning what it means to 
be a gendered member of society.  Certainly a few of these interests endure, but they are 
not enough to explain the vastly different choices men and women make in college major 
selection, for example. The research on gendered self-assessment, on the other hand, is 
important to the extent that men and women pursue majors and occupations they think 
they would be good at, but perceived skill is by no means a sufficient condition for career 
decision-making. 
 Perhaps because sociologists and social psychologists fear ―blaming the victim‖ 
for occupational sex segregation or developing too agentic a theory of occupational sex 
segregation, we have little understanding of the effects of men‘s and women‘s own self-
beliefs and preferences on the decisions they make about their careers.  Although they are 
upheld as deeply individualistic and agentic, these decisions are fundamentally social 
because they are embedded within the same cultural beliefs and assumptions that 
influence how people treat others. We lack a language and theory to talk about how men 
and women actually make individualistic career decisions—how gender is constructed 
with what women and men consciously take into account when they are deciding on 
occupational paths, not just what may creep in through their subconscious.   
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While the institutional and interactional-level processes above mean that people 
are never fully free to make career decision on their own, fully-agentic career decisions 
are upheld as the ideal.  No one wants to be told what to do and what to be when they 
grow up (Bellah et al. 1985).  Individual career decisions are, however, never made 
outside the influence of social forces. 
 A central tenet of career decision-making in twenty-first century U.S. is self-
expression: the selection of career paths based on self-reflective decisions about who 
individuals ―think they are‖ and how they can best realize such expression.  Because 
selves are gendered (Ridgeway 2006), existing gender theory would vaguely expect the 
outcomes of such self-expression to be gendered as well, but we as of yet do not have a 
theory to explain the specific mechanisms by which gendered self-expression leads to sex 
segregated career outcomes.  The purpose of this dissertation is to develop such a theory 
and test it by first showing that self-understandings are gendered and then demonstrating 
how expression of those gendered self-understandings reproduces sex segregation. 
 I will make several caveats before introducing my theory of self-expressive career 
decisions.  The first is that, by focusing on ―choices,‖ I do not mean to say that these 
choices are somehow outside the realm of the gender structure, or are not heavily 
constrained. On the contrary, I will show that they are deeply embedded within that 
structure.  Second, I am not intending to disregard institutional and interactional-level 
mechanisms of the reproduction of occupational sex segregation:  men and women face 
tremendous constraints on their occupational paths and discrimination is very much a 
reality in the modern labor force.  However, to the extent that men and women have any 
degrees of freedom in their decisions about how to earn a living, (freedom exemplified in 
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the long list of academic majors available at most universities) self-expression should 
matter.  Obviously, the freedom for middle-class, college-going men and women to make 
self-expressive career decisions is greater than for men and women who are constrained 
to low-paid, low-skilled work.  I study here the career choices of that former group.  
While I make no claims to the generalizability of these findings to the employment 
decisions of low-income, working class men and women, the tremendous cultural value 
put on self-expression may mean that even working class workers may use self-
expression as a metric for decision-making within those constraints. I hope that this may 
be explored among a less privileged sample of men and women to test whether external 
constraints completely overwhelm any ability for self-expressive decision-making, or 
whether there are instances when, given the choice between two equally low-paid and 
low-skilled jobs, men and women make choices about which work ―fits‖ them best, and 
thus reproduces occupational sex segregation.   
 Finally, there remains tremendous vertical segregation—and some horizontal 
segregation—by race/ethnicity (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a).  African-American, Native 
American, and Hispanic men and women are less likely to occupy the top rungs of 
organizational hierarchies, and they also tend to be under-represented in traditionally 
male-dominated fields such as science and engineering (Maume 1999; Tomaskovic-
Devey 1993b).  I control for the race/ethnicity of respondents in all of my models and 
comment on important differences I find, but my sample does not allow for systematic 
analysis of racial or ethnic differences in the role of gendered self-expression in the 
reproduction of horizontal segregation.  I provide discussions when I find racial/ethnic 
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differences in these gender patterns and provide a brief overview of these trends in the 
conclusion. 
1.2 The Self-Expressive Edge of Sex Segregation 
 
 The answer to the question, ―what do you want to be when you grow up‖ is 
increasingly expected to be met with a self-expressive answer.  To the extent possible, the 
expression of individuality is a central factor in career decision-making (Cotter et al. 
2011).  The increased existential security of post-industrial societies allows diversion 
from strictly economic motivations for employment, at least for a privileged minority 
(Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  The increased importance of career 
counseling and occupational assessment tests all suggest the cultural value of careers that 
not only support individuals financially, but fulfill them and fit with their values.  This 
self-expression is not simply desired—it is expected (Charles & Bradley 2009). 
Recent literature has begun to argue that the resilience of occupational sex 
segregation is due in part to self-expressive processes. Maria Charles and Karen Bradley 
(2009) argue that many men and women make career decisions along still-popular 
essentialist notions of gendered tasks.  Men and women may ―indulge‖ their gendered 
selves in their career choices, seeking self-fulfillment and to be part of occupations that 
are extensions of themselves (Charles & Bradley 2009).  They argue that, because selves 
are gendered, and because young people feel pressure from cultural expectations that men 
and women are suited for different social positions, that this self-expression helps 
reproduce sex segregation.  Certain economic and cultural contexts, furthermore, provide 
more latitude for the ―indulgence‖ of one‘s gender in one‘s decision-making than others.  
Advanced industrialized nations like the U.S. that have strong ideologies of self-
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expression have more latitude for such indulgence, which helps explain the greater 
occupational sex segregation in those nations.  This important work suggests that the 
indulgence of gendered self-beliefs reproduces sex segregation and identifies the 
economic and cultural contexts under which such a process is most likely to operate.  
However, because Charles and Bradley analyze differences by nation, they cannot show 
this ―indulgence‖ in action at the individual-level, nor do they empirically connect such 
self-expression to cultural gender beliefs. 
 My project takes off from this foundation to empirically establish the co-
construction of cultural gender beliefs and the self-understandings on which self-
expression is based, and specify inter- and intra-occupational mechanisms by which self-
expressive decisions reproduce occupational sex segregation.  Using over-time, 
multidimensional measures of self-conceptions, gender beliefs, and college major and 
career launch outcomes, I am able to study the variation among men and women as well 
as between them, and watch these mechanisms unfold over time.  
 Central to my theoretical framework is that self-expression encompasses actions 
that are thought to express one‘s self-concept.10 The object of self-expression is rarely 
one‘s group identity (Lthough that sometimes happens), since the ―cult of the individual‖ 
has long superseded group membership as Americans‘ defining identity feature 
(Durkheim [1983] 1994).  Rather, the individual has become the pinnacle element of 
social life, and self-expression is expression of that individualism.  A person‘s notion of 
his or her individualism is what social psychologists call self-conceptions, the beliefs we 
                                                 
10 This summer, I will analyze the qualitative FuturePaths data to understand how respondents actually 
make self-expressive decisions—what they actually reflect on and take into account. This analysis will give 
me a much more refined notion of what this self-expression looks like from the perspective of the 
individual.  
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hold about ourselves as experiencing, functioning, unique individuals within a deeply 
individualistic culture (S. Epstein 1973, Gecas 1982).   
 Such self-conceptions are, of course, deeply gendered.  Gendered self-conceptions 
arise out of initial socialization and are constantly re-created and reinforced through daily 
enactment and sanctions (West & Zimmerman 1987).  As I argue in the next chapter, 
these self-conceptions do not necessarily appear gendered, however. They just appear 
individualistic.  To point out the gendering of someone‘s self-conceptions would be seen 
as a violation of the entitlement to his or her ―own bit of space‖ in which to be an 
individual (Bellah et al. 1985), 76).  Thus, the gendering of self-conceptions gets cloaked 
by the very notion of what it means to define men‘s and women‘s own individualism that 
is guarded by a fortress of cultural beliefs that are at the heart of what it means to be an 
American (Bellah et al. 1985). 
In order to more fully understand the reproduction of occupational sex 
segregation, we need to account for how people think they are making career decisions. It 
is not enough to show that these career decisions are self-expressive.  We must also 
understand whether and how the self-conceptions that are the foundations of this self-
expression are gendered—not only whether they are different between men and women, 
but how they are influenced by cultural gender beliefs.  Understanding how self-
conceptions respond to –and are crafted out of—cultural gender beliefs breaks us free 
from the need to connect these conceptions to childhood socialization experiences and 
allows us to watch how self-conceptions change over the lifecourse and how, in turn, 
affect career decisions over time.   
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 I argue here that this gendered self-expression becomes a driving factor in the 
gendering of career decisions—especially among young college-educated men and 
women.  Frank and Meyer (2001) argue that ―specialized identity claims‖ (such as ―man‖ 
or ―woman‖) have tended to become absorbed into general notions of individuality.  In 
other words, gender becomes in many ways a fulfillment of individualism (Meyer & 
Jepperson, 2000).   ―It becomes increasingly hard for a person with the identity of 
‗woman‘ to say she plays the role of ‗housewife‘ because that‘s ‗what women do.‘  
Invoking the woman-mother identity-role matrix is illegitimate.  The preferred 
accounting depicts the woman as a sovereign individual person with a taste for 
domesticity: ‗That‘s what I choose to do‘‖ (Frank & Meyer, 2001, p. 91). 
The cloaking of gendered decision-making in individualistic self-expression has 
serious consequences for the reproduction of gender inequality in general—and for the 
reproduction of sex segregation in higher education specifically.  If it is no longer 
legitimate to claim that ―I am choosing this major because I am a man,‖ and instead it is 
legitimate to claim ―I choose this major because it suits me,‖ then an enormous amount of 
gendered decision-making becomes encoded as individualistic self-expression.  There is 
little indication that the sex-typing which produces these gendered aspirations have 
declined (Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, & Lueptow, 2001), just that they have recently 
become encoded as personal indulgences of self-conceptions. 
 There is another trick to this encoding process: it is one thing to argue against 
gender-essentialist notions of majors ―women do‖ or ―men do.‖ It is quite another to 
challenge someone‘s individualistic claim that a certain major is ―what suits‖ him or her:  
―We believe in the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the individual.  Anything that would 
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violate our right to think for ourselves, make our own decisions, live our lives as we see 
fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious.‖ (Bellah et al. 1985, p. 142).  Thus, it 
becomes illegitimate to challenge one‘s self-conceptions because of the ―sacredness‖ of 
the individual.  Although it is a site that has tremendous influence in the reproduction of 
sex segregation, the indulgence of self-conceptions is effectively culturally off-limits as a 
site for addressing and reducing gender inequality.  
 Therefore, I argue that a key mechanism by which sex segregation is reproduced 
is that gendered self-beliefs become encoded in individualistic self-conceptions, 
legitimated, and are resultantly off-limits to policy regulation and feminist social action.  
However, this mechanism in the reproduction of sex segregation is particularly resistant 
to change.  It is culturally illegitimate to either challenge people‘s beliefs about 
themselves or to reduce their self-expressive freedoms.  I call this the self-expressive 
edge of sex-segregation. 
 This approach also sheds light on a broader theoretical question in the gender 
literature—how is the gendered self and the gendered structure co-constructed? This 
project joins the turn in inequality literature of theorizing gender as enacted on an 
everyday basis, with the possibility of alteration at every application (Fenstermaker & 
West 2002; West & Zimmerman 1987). Gender scholars explain the intractability of the 
gender structure in spite of this continual re-enactment by arguing that gender is 
structuring not just at the macro level but also organizes social practices at the 
interactional level and ―selves‖ at the individual level (Ridgeway & Correll 2004; 
Ridgeway et al. 2009). Seeing gender as structured enactment is, in essence, a particular 
case of the relationship between agency and structure (Blair-Loy 2003; Risman 1998).  A 
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key aspect to understanding the power of gender as a social structure, then, is 
understanding the co-construction of the gender structure and the gendered individual—
an aspect that is thus far under-theorized and under-researched.
11
 
 But how is the gender structure inculcated into the gendered individual, such that 
the gendered individual reproduces the gender structure through his or her everyday 
actions?  I follow other cultural sociologists (e.g. Alexander & Smith 2003; Bourdieu 
1984; Hays 1994; Lamont 2000) in arguing that macro, meso, and micro-level 
mechanisms of culture instill ideologies of superiority, inferiority, and difference into 
patterned behaviors and cognition.  I theorize and test mechanisms through which beliefs 
about the gender structure can influence perceptions of oneself (prescription, 
extrapolation and biological fatalism) and processes by which self-conceptions may 
influence one‘s gender schemas (reinforcement and subversion).  
With this co-construction identified, I then examine how these cultural structures, 
ingrained at the individual level, reproduce unequal structures.  I use several self-
conceptions—I am ―feminine‖ (vs. ―masculine), ―unsystematic‖ (vs. ―systematic‖) and 
―people-oriented‖ (vs. ―things-oriented‖)—to predict whether respondents choose male- 
or female-dominated majors. I capture sex segregation with a measure of respondents‘ 
sex segregation scores, the percent women in respondents‘ degree field. 
 College majors are an important determinant of sex-segregation, but the relative 
freedom of movement across majors means it is much less costly for men and women to 
change fields for self-expressive reasons than once they are in the workforce. The case of 
                                                 
11
 This approach might be a way to think about a ―gender habitus,‖ the ways that preferences and tastes of 
men and women reproduce inequities between them.  I may develop this argument in the book manuscript. 
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greater consequence to the reproduction of occupational sex-segregation is whether self-
conceptions actually influence men‘s and women‘s choice of male-dominated or female-
dominated fields at career launch.  I thus examine how self-conceptions predict men‘s 
and women‘s career launch decisions net of their college degrees. 
  Beyond these processes, intra-field cultural factors may also influence the ways in 
which gendered self-conceptions lead to persistence in or attrition from individual fields. 
As a case study of the intra-field cultural processes of sex-segregation, I focus on a 
subsample of engineering students. I examine the ways in which gender schemas and 
self-conceptions filter their development of gendered professional identities, and how 
those gendered professional identities, in turn, lead to differential persistence in the field 
of engineering.  I next describe the data I use in detail and preview my results in the 
chapters that follow. 
 This dissertation tells a story about mechanisms—the processes by which self-
conceptions are co-constructed with gender schemas and how these gendered self-
conceptions, in turn, reproduce or undermine sex segregation in college majors and 
occupations.  To illuminate these mechanisms, I examine the effects of several self-
conceptions: ―I am feminine,‖ ―unsystematic,‖ and ―people-oriented.‖  These serve as 
useful exemplars of self-conceptions and if my data allowed, I could have substituted 
many other self-conceptions (e.g. ―I am nurturing‖ or ―I am aggressive‖) in this analysis.  
While each of these self-conceptions is substantively important in its own right, I am 
more interested in the ability of these self-conception measures to illustrate the 
mechanisms I am hypothesizing. 
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1.3 Sample  
 
Data 
 
 This project relies on longitudinal panel data collected from four US institutions 
of higher education: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Franklin W. 
Olin College of Engineering (Olin), Smith College (Smith), and the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst (UMass).  These schools are described in detail below.  These 
data are part of an NSF-funded project called ―FuturePaths,‖ which surveyed a cohort of 
students at each institution once a year for five years, tracking them whether they 
remained in school, changed majors, or left college altogether.   
Longitudinal panel data are best suited for identification of intra-individual 
change, and inter-individual similarities or differences in that change (whether 
individuals change in similar or different ways), for analysis of interrelationships between 
behavioral change (whether certain changes are correlated with each other), and for 
analysis of causes or determinants of intra-individual change (why individuals change 
from one period to another)   (Baltes and Nesselroade 1979).  These data are thus well-
suited for documenting intra-individual changes in self-conceptions and gender schemas 
over time, the inter-individual differences in those changes, and examining the structural 
and cultural effects of self-conceptions and gender schemas on occupational sex 
segregation. 
 The survey data contain many different dimensions of my individual-level 
measures of interest (self-conceptions, gender schemas, and provisional identity 
measures) and detailed majors and career-launch data.  The longitudinal nature of this 
study makes it ideal to examine changes in self-conceptions and gender schemas, career 
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plans, and professional identity over time.  Although the selection of schools is not 
random (and likely unrepresentative of the population of colleges in the US), I will use 
the contexts of these schools to my advantage.   
The majority of my analysis will use yearly survey data collected through online 
surveys administered to the students via e-mail (The students received between $25-50 
for completion of each survey).  Significant attempts were made to sustain the response 
rate.  The incentives were structured to taper off after intervals of 24 hours, 72 hours, and 
one week.   Non-responders were sent no fewer than four e-mail reminders over a six-
week period.  Regardless of the previous years‘ response status, the entire cohort was 
invited to participate in each year‘s survey round.  See Table 1.1 below for survey 
retention rates. 
Description of Institutions Included in Sample 
MIT:  
Founded in 1865 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT is among the most elite 
programs in undergraduate education.  As of 2008, it had 4,156 undergraduate students
12
 
(30% women). The majority of students are located in engineering (60%) and science (27%) 
and the institution defines its curriculum in terms of its excellence in science and research.  
For most of the twentieth century, MIT's undergraduate student body, although not formally 
restricted, was nonetheless predominantly male.  Since 1970, the institute has made a 
concerted effort to diversify its student population by gender and race.  ―The mission of MIT 
                                                 
12
 Detailed enrollment data: http://web.mit.edu/facts/enrollment.html 
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is to advance knowledge and educate students in science, technology, and other areas of 
scholarship that will best serve the nation and the world in the 21st century.‖13  
University of Massachusetts, Amherst: 
  Founded in 1863 in the town of Amherst, the University of Massachusetts is 
representative of the public (usually land grant) universities that graduate the majority of 
college students in the United States.
14
   Housed at the flagship campus for the state, the 
UMass offers both graduate and undergraduate degree programs in the standard varieties of 
science, engineering, liberal arts and social sciences curricula.  UMass house an overall 
undergraduate student body of 20,540 (52% female)
15
 and offers 90 areas of undergraduate 
study.   Like MIT, UMass has developed programs to respond to the under-representation of 
women in male-dominated majors. It has developed various internship opportunities, 
mentoring programs, awards, and other forms of outreach to ensure the retention and 
graduation of a more diverse student body.  
Smith College: 
 Smith, founded in 1871 near Springfield, Massachusetts, has historically had success 
at producing women leaders with a commitment to social service.  It also has a strong record 
in promoting women in male-dominated fields.  Smith has an undergraduate enrollment of 
2,600 students.
16
  As the first all-women engineering program, Smith‘s Picker Engineering 
Program seeks to enhance the presence of women in engineering by its focus on engineering 
as "a liberal art and as a profession in service to humanity.‖ The Picker program integrates 
engineering education into Smith's liberal arts curriculum to produce what the college 
                                                 
13
 Retrieved from MIT‘s website: http://web.mit.edu/aboutmit/ 
14
 Retrieved from UMass‘ website: http://www.umass.edu/umhome/about/ 
15
 Detailed enrollment data: http://umass.edu/oapa/publications/factsheets/ 
16
 Detailed enrollment data: http://www.smith.edu/about_justthefacts.php  
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believes will be an innovative program of socially responsible leaders for the engineering 
profession.  
Franklin Olin School of Engineering: 
 Founded just outside of Boston in 2002 as the first stand-alone, independent 
engineering college in nearly a half century, Olin College of Engineering is attempting to 
revolutionize engineering by addressing one of its most persistent problems: the unattractive 
and disabling image of engineers (Astin 1997).  Through a model of hands-on, project-
oriented, collaborative education, Olin hopes to produce a new generation of leaders who 
have learned to harmonize engineering with entrepreneurship.  All of its 300 undergraduate 
students (40% women) take courses in a variety of engineering specialties as well as generic 
engineering, design, various sciences and humanities.  Every student receives a four-year, 
full-tuition scholarship.  Mission statement: ―Olin College prepares students to become 
exemplary engineering innovators who recognize needs, design solutions, and engage in 
creative enterprises for the good of the world.‖17 
 While these schools provide an illuminating cross-section of the types of 
institutions in the US (private research university, single-sex liberal arts, public land-
grant, small elite engineering college), as a group they are not necessarily representative 
of the US college population as a whole.  Others, (e.g. Jacobs) have conducted excellent 
analyses of national trends in sex segregation using representative samples.  In contrast, 
this project attempts to identify mechanisms by which gendered beliefs influence major 
selection and choice of occupation using detailed attitudinal measures and longitudinal 
                                                 
17
 Retrieved from Olin‘s website: http://www.olin.edu/about_olin/overview.asp 
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panel data, with the hope that the mechanisms identified here can be investigated in later 
research using national samples.  
 All four schools are located in Massachusetts, which helps to provide regional 
homogeneity.  Despite the schools‘ geographic proximity, there are several ways the 
student body in each school might differ.  I expect the students at MIT and Smith (private 
schools) to come from wealthier socio-economic backgrounds than those at UMass.  Olin 
students received full tuition, so the SES of their students is likely determined by social 
capital, not purely economic, considerations.  Smith students, as attendees of a single-sex 
college known for its social activism and gender egalitarian ideals, are likely more 
politically liberal than students at the other schools.  Olin students, as part of an 
engineering-only school, are likely more politically conservative (as engineering students 
are generally more politically conservative than students in other majors [Astin 1993]).  
While this variation presents many challenges for my empirical analysis, it also allows 
me to investigate how these processes operate within different organizational contexts. 
 Table 1.1 presents the response and retention rates for the sample.  The entire 
freshman classes at MIT, Olin, and Smith, along with 332 randomly-selected UMass 
freshman, were invited to participate in the study, with an overall response rate of 
35.8%.
18
  The size of the response rates indicates that there may be systematic bias in 
initial response rate.  Following Blair-Loy and Wharton (2002) and others, I conducted a 
systematic analysis of my sample to determine the likelihood of non-response bias 
(Winship & Mare, 1992).  Response bias analyses run between the sample and the 2003 
                                                 
18 Students entered the panel in a two-step process: first, students were invited to participate, and then the 
survey was distributed.  Students who took the first survey were included in the panel. 
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population data at each school show that the sample marginally over-represents Asian 
students at MIT (p=.08) and marginally under-represents African-American students at 
UMass (p=.09).  No other gender or race/ethnicity differences were found. 
1.4 Overview of Approach and Findings 
 
 The central purpose of this project is to identify individual-level, self-expressive 
mechanisms that reproduce occupational sex segregation.  Broadly, I argue that the 
expression of gendered self-conceptions reproduces sex segregation by influencing men‘s 
and women‘s career decisions.  Chapter 2 begins by theorizing self-conceptions in a more 
sociological way and how they are co-constructed with gender schemas.  I conceptualize 
gender schemas and self-conceptions in the context of social-psychological literature and 
theorize and empirically investigates the relationships between these two individual-level 
beliefs. Specifically, I analyze the relationships between perceptions of oneself as 
―feminine‖ or ―masculine‖ and several dimensions of gender schemas: gender role beliefs 
(e.g. ―a wife should take her husband‘s name at marriage‖), conceptions of their gender 
category (e.g. ―other members of my same sex are emotional‖), and essentialist beliefs 
(e.g. ―some jobs are better suited for men than women‖). Using structural equation 
modeling (SEM) with latent variables, I determine whether respondents‘ gender schemas 
in year 2 predict their perceptions of themselves as feminine in year 5. I find that gender 
schemas influence respondents‘ self-conceptions through processes of prescription, 
extrapolation and biological fatalism, and self-conceptions influence gender schemas 
through reinforcement and subversion. These results indicate that the gendered individual 
and individual-level beliefs about the gender structure are indeed co-constructed: 
respondents‘ beliefs about themselves are informed by their cultural beliefs about gender, 
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and their understandings of the gender structure are also influenced by their self-
perceptions.  
 In chapters 3 and 4, I ask whether these culturally-informed self-conceptions 
actually influence career decisions-making in ways that reproduce occupational sex 
segregation.  Using three measures of self-conceptions (I am ―feminine,‖ ―unsystematic,‖ 
and ―people-oriented‖), I find that self-conceptions predict whether respondents make 
decisions that reinforce their fields of study as masculine and feminine domains. 
Furthermore, self-conceptions influence whether respondents change into more male- or 
female-dominated majors, and are also related to the likelihood of choosing some degrees 
over others. 
 In chapter 4, I analyze how these three self-conceptions are related to the percent 
women in respondents‘ career launch field 18 months after they have graduated. I also 
run models controlling for the extent of sex-segregation in respondents‘ degrees to 
determine whether these beliefs have an effect over and above respondents‘ previous 
career decisions. I find that self-conceptions predict the sex-segregation of respondents‘ 
career launch fields, even net of the structural constraints imposed by their degree 
credentials. These culturally-informed self-conceptions not only lead respondents to 
reproduce the demographic sex-segregation of their career launch fields, but also help 
reproduce the cultural sex-typing of male- and female-dominated fields as ―masculine‖ 
and ―feminine‖ domains.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 paint a broad picture of the effects of self-conceptions on the 
individual-level reproduction of occupational sex-segregation.  In chapter 5, I argue that 
self-conceptions reproduce sex segregation by filtering professional identities.  Among a 
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subsample of engineers, I measure professional identity development by tracking two sets 
of measures over time: what they personally find important (e.g. ―creating or managing 
technology‖) and what they value in their concept of a successful career (e.g. 
―understanding how people use machines‖). I find that women‘s self-conceptions 
influence their development of less traditional engineering identities than men, and these 
gendered professional identities lead women to be less likely than men to continue in an 
engineering degree or to remain in this male-dominated field after graduation. 
Chapter 6 reviews these findings and suggests their implications for sociological 
theory and policy. This project shows how our most individualistic beliefs—who we 
think we are as people—is informed by our adherence to cultural beliefs about gender. 
These culturally-informed self-conceptions help direct the distribution of men and 
women into already-segregated college majors and career fields, and help to reproduce 
the cultural sex-typing of such fields as ―masculine‖ and ―feminine.‖ As shown with a 
case study of engineering students, these individual-level beliefs can also interact with 
professional cultures in such a way that segregation is reproduced in the very process of 
learning to be a professional. In these mechanisms of sex segregation, cultural gender 
beliefs act through self-conceptions to influence career decisions. This cloaking of 
gendered career decisions-making in individualistic self-expression may be particularly 
resistant to social change, as undermining individuals‘ self-expressive freedoms would be 
a culturally unacceptable method to reduce gender inequality. Importantly, however, my 
findings suggest that we are not fully determined by our cultural beliefs: my research 
suggests that the cultural gender beliefs we adhere to, and those we choose to reject, is 
shaped by how we understand ourselves. I discuss the implications of these findings for 
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policy initiatives and social action. The chapter closes by suggesting how this focus on 
individual-level determinants could be extended to understanding the self-expressive 
edge of inequality more generally.   
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Institutional-Level Factors
•Legal and policy regulations
•Cultural structures (e.g. 
"separate but equal")
•Labor market processes (e.g. 
queuing, feminization)
•Organizational-level processes 
(e.g. hiring, flexibility, org 
cultures)
•Professional/Occupational 
Cultures
Interactional-Level 
Factors
•Cognitive biases
•Othering/ 
marginalization
Individual-Level Factors
•Human capital
•Socialization
•Role expectations
•Self-assessments
•Gendered self-expression
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Institutional, Interactional, and 
Individual-Level Factors of Occupational Sex Segregation 
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Table 1.1: Respondent Response and Retention Rates 
 
 Population Size Initial Panel Size Initial Response Rate 
  Original Sample 2063 739 35.8% 
         MIT 1020 298 29.2% 
         Olin 75 55 73.3% 
         Smith 636 252 39.6% 
         UMass 332 133 40.1% 
          Year of 
Survey 
Response 
Frequency 
Yearly Retention Rate 
(from Y1 panel) 
Yearly Response Rate 
(from original 
population) 
Took Year 1 2004 739 --- 35.8% 
Took Year 2 2005 465 62.9% 22.5% 
Took Year 3 2006 517 70.0% 25.6% 
Took Year 4 2007 559 75.6% 27.1% 
Took Year 5 2008 487 65.9% 23.6% 
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The Self-Expressive Edge of Sex-Segregation: The Role of Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions in 
College Major Selection and Career Launch  
 
 
 
Chapter 2—The Co-Construction of Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions 
 
 
 
  
                                                            45 
 
 
 
 
What are self-conceptions and gender schemas, and how are they constructed 
together over time?  This chapter conceptualizes these beliefs in the context of social-
psychological literature and investigates the empirical relationships between them.  In 
part one of this chapter, I provide definitions and theoretical foundations for self-
conceptions and gender schemas, and describe the general trends on these measures.  I 
also track how respondents‘ gender schemas and self-conceptions change over time—an 
important indication of the stability or flexibility of these beliefs.  In part two, I theorize 
several processes of co-construction between self-conceptions and gender schemas. 
Specifically, I argue that gender schemas can influence self-conceptions through 
processes of prescription, extrapolation, and biological fatalism.  Self-conceptions may, 
in turn, affect gender schemas through processes of generalization and 
reinforcement/subversion. Using structural equation modeling, I analyze the relationships 
between perceptions of oneself as masculine or feminine (the central axis of cultural 
distinction between males and females) and several dimensions of gender schemas:  
gender role beliefs, gender category beliefs, and gender essentialist beliefs.   
I find in part one that there are large differences in the ways men and women in 
my sample view members of their gender categories, understand gender roles, and 
perceive women‘s and men‘s ―essential natures.‖  Men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions 
are gendered in expected ways, but are less polarized than their perceptions of their 
gender categories.  This polarization of gender category beliefs, relative to self-beliefs, 
helps sustain the illusion of strong differences in the characteristics of men and women.  I 
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also find that respondents‘ self-conceptions and gender schemas are fairly stable over 
time, which helps to perpetuate the gender structure. 
The purpose of part two is to theorize and demonstrate mechanisms by which 
self-conceptions and gender schemas are co-constructed—the mechanisms by which men 
and women internalize the gender structure and, in turn, how their self-beliefs support or 
undermine their adherence to that structure.  I find that respondents‘ self-conceptions are 
informed by cultural beliefs about gender, and their understandings of the gender 
structure are influenced by their self-conceptions.  I discuss how the particular ways these 
mechanisms play out—especially the notable absence of a generalization effect—helps 
reproduce the gender hierarchy. 
19
 I end by discussing the implications of these results 
and lay the groundwork for the empirical analyses of chapters to come.  
PART ONE: THEORY AND DESCRIPTIVES OF GENDER SCHEMAS AND 
SELF-CONCEPTIONS 
How do cultural beliefs reinforce the gender structure?  Beliefs about the 
characteristics of and relationships between members of this fundamental social 
dichotomy get embedded within institutions and organizations and reproduce this 
structure at the macro and meso levels (c.f. Acker 2006, Blair-Loy 2003).  But cultural 
beliefs also influence how individuals understand themselves and make decisions about 
their lives.  A central argument of this project is that the beliefs that individuals hold 
about gender and about themselves—beliefs which are culturally informed and 
institutionally shaped—guide individuals to find their place within the gendered 
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 In the future, I plan to develop this theoretical contribution as a separate article that I will submit to a 
journal before the book is complete.  In that article, I would remove the empirical section in part one of this 
chapter and possibly parallel the analysis in part two using unsystematic and people-oriented self-
conceptions in addition to feminine self-conceptions. 
                                                            47 
 
 
 
structure.  In order for me to illustrate how this happens, I must first describe how gender 
schemas and self-conceptions inform one another over time.  I begin by defining and 
contextualizing these two sets of beliefs and presenting the means and standard 
deviations of the variables I use to measure gender schemas and self-conceptions.  Part 
two of this chapter theorizes and empirically investigates the co-construction of these 
beliefs over time.  
2.1 Gender Schemas 
 Gender schemas are, broadly, beliefs about the people who make up the social 
categories of ―men‖ and ―women,‖ and the proper power and status relations between 
them. Scholars in sociology and psychology have used this term in divergent ways, so I 
define these two approaches before presenting my conceptualization of gender schemas. 
 Psychologists have used the term ―gender schemas‖ for several decades.  
Psychoanalytical, social learning, and cognitive development theorists argue that one‘s 
―core gender identity‖ is created early in life and does not change over the life course.  
One becomes a ―man‖ or a ―woman‖ as a part of this process and the traits culturally 
associated with ―men‖ and ―women‖ are assumed to be attached to this identity. 
According to this literature, gendered perceptions are accurate because men and women 
are different, do different tasks, and like different things (Bem, 1984; Stoller, 1968).  
 Other psychologists reject these essentialist developmental theories of gendered 
thinking and argue instead that we learn ―gender-schematic processing‖ from our 
childhood socialization experiences that guides our perceptions of a polarized gendered 
world (Bem, 1984, 1993).  Here, ―gender schemas‖ are cognitive structures and networks 
of association that organize individual perceptions.  People use gender schemas to 
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evaluate their own and others‘ adequacy, and men and women develop interests and 
preferences in accordance with these schemas.  Alber and Hasher (1983) extend the 
notion of gender schemas to include the processes by which the cognitive structures of 
gender schemas select and actively modify personal experiences in order to fit within a 
coherent representation of gender (Renn & Calvert, 1993).  More recently, Valian (1999) 
argued that gender schemas lead to the formation of ―hypotheses‖ about men and women 
which bias the treatment and expectations of others in gender-confirming ways.   
 These psychological conceptualizations focus almost exclusively on the cognitive, 
gender-schematic thinking of individual actors.  Sociological perspectives on gender 
schemas, in contrast, start with the social structures that psychological theories of 
individual gender beliefs simply presuppose. William Sewell (1992) argues that schemas 
are procedures that are generally applied to the enactment and reproduction of social life.  
Schemas are ―virtual‖ (as opposed to actual) and operate at different depths; they are 
shared by many people and are rooted in culture.  The power of schemas—and also their 
potential for alteration—comes from their transposibility into new social situations.  
Sewell firmly embeds his definition of schemas in social structures (schemas are, along 
with resources, inextricable from structures), but he provides little account for how these 
schemas are deployed by individuals.  
 Cecelia Ridgeway, Shelley Correll and colleagues describe how such individual 
gendered thought processes can emerge from broader cultural beliefs about gender and 
how these thought processes, in turn, bias peoples‘ evaluations of themselves and others 
(Ridgeway 2006; Ridgeway & Correll 2004; Ridgeway et al. 2009). Cultural beliefs 
―define the distinguishing characteristics for men and women and how they are expected 
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to behave‖ and are ―rules for enacting the social structure of difference‖ (Ridgeway & 
Correll, 2004, pg 511).  These cultural beliefs result in deeply-held cognitive binaries that 
people carry with them into every social-situational context and engage when evaluating 
their own and others performances and behaviors (2006).  
 Other scholars move beyond cognitive conceptions of gender schemas by 
emphasizing the emotional and moral dimensions along which schemas operate.  
Drawing from Sewell‘s work, Mary Blair-Loy (2003) argues that cultural schemas are 
―ordered, socially-constructed and taken-for-granted frameworks for understanding our 
world‖ (pg 220).  These schemas shape both the structure of society through their 
―salience in institutions, interactions, and culture,‖ and shape life trajectories by 
―ordering cognitive processes, evoking emotional responses, and acting as moral 
universes‖ (pg. 176).  Gender schemas are powerful not only because they organize our 
thinking and our interpretations of our life events, but also because they evoke emotional 
responses and provide us with moral prescriptions for actions and decisions. 
 Building from Blair-Loy‘s conceptualization, I define gender schemas as shared 
cultural models that, once internalized and taken for granted, inform individual life 
trajectories by organizing cognition, emotions, and morality.  These shared cultural 
models on which gender schemas are based can vary widely in progressiveness or 
traditionalism, in how widespread they are (nationally-held ideologies or specific to a 
particular subculture), and in how explicitly in conflict they are with other cultural 
models.  Dominant cultural ideologies about gender exist in the U.S. that act as 
widespread cultural models.  As Connell argues about hegemonic masculinity (2005), the 
cultural model of proper behavior for men and women is widespread and known by both 
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dominant and non-dominant groups, and by both men and women.  These cultural 
models, furthermore, are built into educational, legal, and other institutions (Blair-Loy, 
2003).  Although subcultures or countercultures may have their own set of beliefs about 
gender, I am interested here in dominant, widely-held cultural models of gender. 
 Broadly, gender schemas can include several different dimensions of beliefs about 
the gender structure.  I investigate three of these dimensions: the proper relational 
dynamics between men and women (gender role beliefs), beliefs about the shared 
characteristics of the individuals that make up those categories (gender category beliefs), 
and the extent to which such characteristics are believed to be inscribed in physiological 
or natural differences (gender essentialist beliefs). 
20
   
Gender Role Beliefs. First, shared cultural models about gender often include 
beliefs about the proper division of paid work and family responsibilities among men and 
women.  The most traditional beliefs in the U.S. advance a separate spheres ideology 
where men and women are perceived to be responsible for separate and non-overlapping 
realms of society (i.e. work and family).  More progressive beliefs assume that men and 
women should have at least some responsibilities in each realm (Davis & Greenstein, 
2009).   
Gender role beliefs, because they specify power dynamics in those roles, are the 
most explicit cultural representation of the gender hierarchy out of the three dimensions 
of gender schemas I study.  As I illustrate, other gender schema beliefs sit more 
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 Another dimension, which I plan to write a separate article on in the future, is beliefs about the 
legitimacy of the unequal gender structure itself: whether respondents recognize and disprove of the power 
relations between men and women. 
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comfortably along the ―separate but equal‖ ideology discussed in chapter 1 (Charles & 
Bradley 2009). 
Gender Category Beliefs. The second dimension of gender schemas I investigate 
are beliefs people hold about the characteristics that define members of their gender 
category.  Gender category beliefs help maintain the perception of difference between 
men and women.  In order for the gender structure to be perpetuated (and legitimated), 
men and women must be portrayed as different, with different characteristics. Mimi 
Schippers (2007) puts these socially-constructed differences at the center of the 
maintenance of the gender hierarchy.  She argues that stereotypical gender qualities (e.g. 
―masculine,‖ ―emotional,‖ ―cooperative‖) are clustered into configurations that become 
the idealized notions of hegemonic masculinity and femininity.  It is the complementary 
and hierarchical relationships between the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity that help reproduce male dominance.  Along these lines, Schippers defines 
hegemonic masculinity as ―the qualities defined as manly that establish and legitimate a 
hierarchical and complementary relationship to femininity.‖  Hegemonic femininity, then, 
is ―the characteristics defined as womanly that establish and legitimate a hierarchical and 
complementary relationship to hegemonic masculinity‖ (Schippers 2007, p. 94).21  Thus, 
men‘s and women‘s perceptions of the characteristics that define their own gender 
category—and of the other gender category (which I cannot measure with these data)—
are important to the maintenance of the gender structure.  These gender category beliefs 
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 For Schippers, the complementary and hierarchical relationship between hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity are central to the maintenance of gender hegemony.  She thus disagrees with Connell (2005) that 
there is no hegemonic femininity; she argues instead that hegemonic femininity is that which provides the 
contrast that grounds the complementarity and hierarchy is based.  Hegemonic femininity, in other words, 
is the femininity against which hegemonic masculinity is contrasted.  
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indicate men‘s and women‘s adherence to the complementary and hierarchical relations 
between men and women. 
Despite the importance of the cultural distinction between men and women, in 
general, men and women are much more alike than they are different.  Cultural 
distinctions between men and women that exist in nearly every society (Epstein 1999; 
Rubin 1975).
22
  This distinction-making is key to upholding the gender structure.  I 
capture the extent of gender-stereotypicality in respondents‘ gender category beliefs by 
using questions about the characteristics men think are held in common by other men, 
and what characteristics women think are held in common by other women.  
 Gender Essentialist Beliefs. The gender structure is maintained not only because 
people believe men and women to be different and should perform different roles, but 
also because of the perpetuation of compelling explanations of why these differences 
exist.  ―Biological explanation is the master narrative holding that men and women are 
naturally different and have different intelligences, physical abilities, and emotional 
traits‖ (Epstein 2007, p. 7).  Beliefs that men and women are ―inherently‖ different, and 
that such differences define men‘s and women‘s talents, behaviors, and affect, are called 
―essentialist‖ beliefs.23  
As noted in chapter 1, this gender=sex paradigm anchors the explanations of 
gender differences in intrinsic, unchanging, biological differences between males and 
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 Epstein (1999) argues that this persistent emphasis on gender differences is caused by a public inattention 
to the evidence put forward by social scientists, incomplete or inappropriate models for understanding 
gender, ideological agendas, confusion between cause and effect, and a focus on sex as a primary cause of 
behavior. 
23
 In the stand-alone article that I will develop based on this chapter, I may examine how gender essentialist 
beliefs predict gender category beliefs.  My preliminary research (not shown) demonstrates that essentialist 
beliefs strongly predict men‘s perceptions of other men as masculine and women‘s perceptions of other 
women as feminine.  Gender essentialist beliefs may be the explanation people use for their stereotypical 
views of their gender category. 
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females.  The salience of biological essentialism as a cultural explanation for gender 
differences itself can reproduce inequality.  The perpetuation of these biological 
explanations reinforces gender differences as a ―natural‖ and ageless occurrence and are 
sometimes invoked as ―proof‖ of the gender system‘s legitimacy.24   
 I examine the extent to which men and women adhere to ―more traditional‖ or 
―stereotypical‖ beliefs along each of these three dimensions.  Traditional beliefs about 
gender roles depict the proper division of work and family responsibilities as men 
holding the breadwinner role and dominating the work and public spheres (Davis & 
Greenstein, 2009), while women‘s responsibilities are primarily in the domestic sphere.  
Women‘s interests and power are assumed to be subordinate to men‘s, particularly in the 
realm of marriage (Kane, 1998). I am also interested in the extent to which men and 
women view members of their gender categories in ways consistent with hegemonic 
masculinity and femininity.  
Second, traditional cultural models of gender also often promote essentialist 
beliefs about men‘s and women‘s talents, and portray members of each gender category 
in gender-stereotypic terms.  Non-essentialist cultural models of gender, on the other 
hand, recognize the socio-cultural basis of gender inequality, rather than a biological 
foundation.  
Interestingly, Charles and Bradley (2009) suggest that progressive gender role 
beliefs can sit comfortably alongside essentialist beliefs about men and women.  The 
―separate but equal‖ notions of justice pervasive in the United States facilitates the 
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 These beliefs do not necessarily have to be grounded in scientific findings, although they often are.  
Essentialist gender beliefs can stem from religious beliefs about, for example, the ways ―God made‖ men 
and women. 
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simultaneous belief that women and men should have equal roles in the workplace and in 
the family, but that they are still different by nature.  The most progressive gender beliefs 
reject essentialist notions of men and women, and understand these differences to be 
socially constructed, not rooted in the body or brain.  
Traditional gender role beliefs have been slowly eroding in the last five decades, 
and are more often held by older generations in the U.S. than younger generations 
(Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Kane, 1998).  But that does not 
mean that all young people‘s gender schemas are based on progressive cultural models 
about gender.  Consistent with the ―separate but equality‖ ideology, I expect men and 
women to have gender category beliefs that align with hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity, respectively, and to be likely to believe in gender essentialism. 
I do expect some gender differences in gender schemas.  Their gender category 
beliefs should be bifurcated in ways consistent with hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity. Furthermore, because of men‘s and women‘s very place in the gender 
structure, they likely have different perspectives on that structure.  I expect women to 
have slightly less traditional gender role beliefs (Baxter & Kane, 1995; Kane, 2000).  I 
also expect them to be slightly less likely to hold essentialist beliefs than men, since such 
beliefs are often used as justifications for women‘s disadvantaged place in the labor 
market and their extra home and family responsibilities (Messner & Bozada-Deas, 2009).  
Gender schemas are beliefs held by individuals that can be informed by many 
different cultural models.  It is outside the scope of this chapter to document the origins 
of these cultural models, or where they diverge or overlap.  Gender schemas are also 
likely influenced by institutional factors such as opportunity structures, which I cannot 
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analyze here.  In this chapter, I am interested in whether men and women hold 
―traditional‖ or ―progressive‖ beliefs along the three dimensions I discussed. 
Changes in Gender Schemas over Time: How might gender schemas change over 
time? In contrast to psychological notions of gender schemas as fixed from a young age 
(Bem, 1993; Valian, 1999), and overly-deterministic sociological notions of gender that 
leave little room for alteration or resistance (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu, 2001),
25
 
some scholars have argue that, as a result their very transposibility, schemas face the 
threat of challenge or modification at every application (Hays, 1994; Sewell, 1992).  
Furthermore, if people encounter different schemas, or come upon different resources, 
schemas can change. Specifically, schemas can change in the face of one or more of the 
following circumstances: (1) ―the relationship or situation on which the schema relies is 
dissolved, or the individual seeks a new relationship,‖ (2) ―sufficient resources or 
alternative schemas are available,‖ or (3) ―There is widespread, macro-level social or 
cultural change‖ (Blair-Loy, 2003, pg 141).   
Given my sample, I expect that such changes are most likely under the second 
condition.  College students encounter new people and new challenges (Astin, 1993).  
Students are no longer living with parents who may enforce traditional gender beliefs, 
they enter new life situations for the first time (e.g. independence), and may have new 
sexual or romantic experiences (Hamilton 2007, Hamilton & Armstrong 2009, Ray & 
Rosow 2010).  Second, students are likely to encounter either sufficient resources or 
alternative schemas which challenge the gender schemas they had when they entered 
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 Bourdieu argued that because women‘s thoughts and actions are ―structured in accordance with the very  
structures of the relation of domination that is imposed on them,‖ their actions—and even their very 
cognition—are acts of submission to this domination (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 21).   
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college (Hamilton & Armstrong 2009).
26
  This is especially true for women and men in 
non-traditional majors whose very success challenge essentialist beliefs about gendered 
abilities, or those in majors that explicitly challenge students‘ gender schemas as part of 
their curricula (e.g. women‘s studies and sociology).  I take up the relationship between 
college majors and changes in self-conceptions and gender schemas in chapter 3. 
2.2 Self-Conceptions 
 Self-conceptions are individualistic perceptions of the self: the ―theories‖ or self-
reflexive beliefs we hold about ourselves as experiencing, functioning, unique individuals 
within a deeply individualistic culture (S. Epstein, 1973; Gecas, 1982).  A ―self-concept‖ 
is most often understood as an ―organization of various identities, attributes, and their 
evaluations, developed out of the individual self-reflexive, social, and symbolic 
activities‖ (Gecas, 1982, p. 4). Self-conceptions are derived from reflections on past 
social experiences and function as ―systems of generalization‖ about the self (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987).    
Most social-psychological literature has largely ignored the extent to which self-
conceptions are structural and cultural entities with effects that go far beyond the 
individual level.  Sociologists since Durkheim ([1893] 1984) and Mead ( [1934]1962) 
have revealed the deeply social nature of conceptions of the self.  Mead (1962) argued 
that the self is a social structure that arises in social experiences.  However, ―the common 
social origin and constitution of individual selves and their structures does not preclude 
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 Men and women from middle or upper-class backgrounds, which are over-represented among college 
students, are likely to have resources available to them that are not available to working-class students. 
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wide individual differences and variations among them‖ (p. 201).  Perhaps because these 
wide differences are sustained that self-conceptions fail to appear social in origin.   
 I draw on sociological literature that takes a firmly structural and cultural stance 
on self-conceptions, as such literature provides the best starting point to understand how 
self-conceptions reproduce inequality.  The self, as an individual entity with qualities 
separate from collective groupings, is a pinnacle element of social life in postmodern 
societies.  This ―cult of the individual‖ (Durkheim, [1893] 1984)27  has intensified in the 
last century: ―Post-WWII advanced the individual as the legitimate actor, the main 
element of reality, and thus the primary repository of legitimate roles and identities‖ 
(Frank & Meyer, 2001, p. 87).  This expansion of the individual self as the master human 
identity buttresses an ―enormous cultural expansion in the legitimate range of free 
personal tastes and preferences‖ (pg. 90).   The indulgence of these personal tastes and 
preferences is the result of a ―search for the true self‖ (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, 
& Tipton, 1985, p. 55);  ―one‘s idiosyncratic preferences are their own justifications, 
because they define the true self‖ (pg. 75).  It is from these sociological foundations that I 
approach self-conceptions.  
The way men and women perceive themselves is one of the central factors in 
career decision-making. Partly because the increased existential security in post-industrial 
societies allows diversion from strictly economic motivations for employment (at least 
for a privileged minority) (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) and partly because 
of ―normative mandates for self-expression and the associated celebration of individual 
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 The cult of the individual is the intense focus on the rights and dignities of the individual, over and above 
that of the group, nation, relation, etc.  Durkheim argued that is the sole surviving form of mechanical 
solidarity in modern societies (Marske, 1987). 
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choice‖ (Charles & Bradley, 2009, p. 929), the expression of individuality is central to 
individual‘s career decision-making.   Following these trends of self-expression, I expect 
the self-concepts of the men and women in my sample to play an important role in how 
they move in and out of college majors, their status post-college, and how a subsample of 
engineering students develop professional identities. 
 These self-conceptions are, of course, deeply gendered.  From childhood 
socialization about identities, preferences, and values, to the internalization of 
expectations and sanctions of broader gender ideologies, to responses to the experiences 
with gendered institutions, our sense of self reflect the gendered society we live in 
(Markus & Kitayama, 2003).  ―Because gender remains a central axis of human identity,  
self-expressive values systems tend to encourage the development and enactment of 
culturally masculine or feminine affinities‖ (Charles & Bradley, 2009, p. 926). 
 However, to the holders of these gendered self-conceptions, and to others around 
them, these self conceptions may not appear gendered, they may just appear 
individualistic.  In theory, everyone, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or values 
system, is entitled to the right to their ―own bit of space‖ in which to be an individual, 
and is ―utterly free within its boundaries‖ (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 76).   As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Frank and Meyer (2001) argue that ―specialized identity claims‖ (such 
as ―man‖ or ―woman‖) have tended to become absorbed into general notions of 
individuality.  In other words, gender becomes in many ways a fulfillment of 
individualism (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). There is little indication that the sex-typing 
which produces these gendered aspirations has declined (Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, & 
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Lueptow 2001), just that it is encoded as personal ―indulgences‖ of self-conceptions 
(Charles & Bradley 2009). 
 Self-conceptions are different from gender schemas in that they are not based on 
shared cultural models in the same way.  There are, of course, cultural ideologies about 
how one ought to perceive oneself (as strong-willed and independent; as cooperative and 
helpful; as moral, etc.) and shared beliefs about the sorts of self-conceptions that are 
valuable or problematic, but there are not similar cultural models about how each of us 
individually should see ourselves. Individuals have a ―generalized other‖ that informs 
how they construct their identities (Mead, [1934]1962), but generalized others are usually 
not shared among people.  The very notion of individuality is that no two people can or 
will be the same person, or conceive of themselves in the same way.  
Like gender schemas, self-conceptions show aspects of stability (as core aspects 
of the self) and malleability (they change when new self-conceptions are added to the 
self) (Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Markus & Wurf, 1987). I expect self-conceptions to 
change, if only slightly, as respondents proceed through college and ponder what they 
would like to do –and who they would like to be—in the future. 
Because individuals hold a multitude of beliefs about themselves, research using 
self-conceptions usually does not attempt to capture individuals‘ entire perceptions of 
themselves (see e.g. Nagy et al. 2009). Similarly, my research focuses only on career-
relevant self-conceptions that correspond to stereotypes of gendered components of the 
typical professions that employ college graduates (considering oneself ―systematic‖ or 
preferring to work with people rather than things, for example). 
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I expect women and men to perceive themselves differently, with different 
defining characteristics.  Gender is constructed as a psychological, social, and/or physical 
binary by most major social institutions and in virtually every social interaction 
(Ridgeway, 2006).  As I discussed above, complementary and hierarchical characteristics 
are central to the maintenance of the gender hierarchy (Schippers 2007).  Not only do 
men and women perceive members of their gender category to have gender-stereotypical 
characteristics, I also expect men and women to see themselves embodying different, 
gender-stereotypical characteristics.   
 Before moving on to theorize the co-construction of gender schemas and self-
conceptions, I present univariate and bivariate descriptives of the variables I use to 
operationalize these beliefs and briefly discuss the stability of these measures over time.  
(See chapter 1 for a detailed description of my sample.) 
2.3 General Trends in Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions 
Measuring Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions 
I use three sets of variables to measure gender schemas that correspond to the 
three dimensions of gender schemas—gender role beliefs, gender category beliefs, and 
gender essentialist beliefs—described above.  Questions that tap respondents‘ gender role 
beliefs are modeled after those used in the General Social Survey and the World Values 
Survey, (e.g. ―a wife should take her husband‘s name at marriage,‖ 1=strongly disagree 
to 5=strongly agree; see Table 2.1 for question wording, response values, and the years in 
which the questions were asked).  Secondly, I use a set of attribute spectrum scales (used 
by Burke & Tully, 1977; Lee, 1998) that capture respondents‘ gender category beliefs 
(e.g. ―usually, others of my same sex are very logical‖=1 to ―very illogical‖=7).  These 
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are useful in measuring the extent to which respondents adhere to gender stereotypic 
views of their own gender category (Lee, 1998).  
Questions that capture the extent to which respondents adhere to gender 
essentialist beliefs ask this in four ways: whether they expect men and women to act 
differently from one another at work; whether they adhere to separate but equal notions 
of justice; whether they explain occupational sex segregation as the result of men‘s and 
women‘s natural talents; and whether they believe that some jobs and professions are 
more suitable for men than for women (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree).   
 Following social-psychological researchers, I use higher-order abstraction 
measures of self-conceptions that tap the respondents‘ perceptions of their ―actual‖ self, 
rather than those that represent their ―ideal‖ self or the ―ought‖ self (Markus & Wurf, 
1987; Nagy et al., 2008). Respondents were asked to locate themselves along the 
following attitude spectrum scales developed by Lee (1998): ―Usually I am very 
masculine‖=1 to ―very feminine‖=7; ―very individualistic‖ to ―very cooperative;‖ ―very 
unemotional‖ to ―very emotional;‖ ―very asocial‖ to ―very social;‖ ―very unfriendly‖ to 
―very friendly;‖ ―very logical‖ to ―very illogical;‖ ―very systematic‖ to ―very 
unsystematic;‖ and ―like to work with things‖ to ―like to work with people.‖ The fact that 
these are attitudinal spectrum scales helps capture the theoretical notion that the 
characteristics that define hegemonic masculinity and femininity are complementary and 
hierarchical: for example, women are assumed to like to work with people, which is 
complimentary to, yet less valued than, men‘s assumed preference to work with things.  
These self-beliefs are also career-relevant and correspond well with stereotypes of ideal 
incumbents of gender-typed fields, yet they are not overly-specific (Eccles, 1994; Gecas, 
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1982). Thus, these self-beliefs are likely consequential for academic major choices, 
occupational choices at career launch, and the development of gendered professional 
identities.  In the second part of this chapter, and in later chapters, I combine these 
individual variables within multi-dimensional indicators of theoretically interesting types 
of self-conceptions (e.g. ―I am feminine‖ or ―I am unsystematic‖).  
Trends in Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions Measures 
Table 2.2 presents the means and standard deviations for self-conceptions and 
gender schemas variables for men and women. The last two columns present the 
significance of the differences between men‘s and women‘s averages in Year 2 and Year 
5.  I briefly describe the general trends on these variables and how they differ by gender 
and other key demographic variables before discussing how they change over time.  
 The men and women in my sample generally consider themselves to be fairly 
cooperative and social, systematic and logical, and fairly even-keeled emotionally.  They 
like to work with people more than they like to work with things.  Only a few of the self-
conception variables are significantly different for men and women: men perceive 
themselves to be more logical, less emotional, and more masculine than women perceive 
themselves to be.  Given the popular cultural assumption that men and women are 
fundamentally different (Epstein 2007), it may seem surprising that men and women see 
themselves significantly differently on only half of the self-conception measures.  
In stark relief to their self-conceptions, men‘s and women‘s gender category 
beliefs are significantly different on every measure. Women see other women as 
significantly more feminine, cooperative, social, illogical, unsystematic, moral, emotional 
and wanting to work with people more than men see other men.  Men‘s and women‘s 
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gender category beliefs are also more gender polarized—more stereotypically masculine 
and feminine, respectively—than their self-conceptions.  These results are consistent with 
Epstein‘s sociology of gender differences (C. F. Epstein, 1988, 1999), which asserts that 
the maintenance of gender differences requires the perception that men and women are 
different.  
 Respondents hold relatively progressive gender role beliefs but are generally in 
agreement with gender essentialist beliefs--particularly the notion that men and women 
are naturally talented at different things.  Women have more progressive gender role 
beliefs and are more likely to reject gender essentialist notions.  This is consistent with 
gender perceptions literature that shows that women are more likely to hold progressive 
gender beliefs (Davis & Greenstein, 2009) because disadvantaged individuals are often 
more likely to recognize this disadvantage than those who are advantaged (Cech & Blair-
Loy, 2010; Davis & Greenstein, 2009).   Both men‘s and women‘s gender role beliefs 
become more progressive over time.  
Appendix A presents a series of OLS regression models using gender to predict 
these gender schemas and self-conception measures, plus respondents‘ race/ethnicity, 
nativity, their parents‘ income, their political conservatism, how religious they perceive 
themselves to be in relation to their peers, and their sexual identity.  I find in these 
models that the significant gender differences identified in the bivariate analysis hold net 
of other demographic variables, except that gender is not a significant predictor of gender 
essentialist views.  
 I find several differences on the basis of other key demographic axes.  Politically 
conservative students have more stereotypical perceptions of their gender categories and 
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more traditional and essentialist beliefs about gender. Highly religious students have 
more traditional beliefs about gender roles than less religious students. Sexual identity 
also predicts students‘ self-conceptions and beliefs about gender: men and women who 
identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual have less stereotypically masculine or feminine self-
conceptions, respectively; they have more progressive gender role beliefs; are less likely 
to hold gender essentialist beliefs; and are more apt to recognize gender inequality.  
There were comparatively few significant differences by racial and ethnic group, by 
nativity, and by family income.
 28
   
 Finally, there are several differences between students who attended the three 
private schools (MIT, Olin, and Smith) compared to those who attended University of 
Massachusetts Amherst (UMass).  In general, men and women at MIT, Olin, and Smith 
hold more progressive gender role beliefs than UMass students and consider themselves 
and their gender category to be less gender-stereotypic. With the exception of the more 
progressive gender role beliefs held by Smith graduates in year 5, these school 
differences were generally strongest in year 2 and became less pronounced by year 5.  
 There are two overarching trends in these demographic results.  First, 
demographic characteristics other than gender are much stronger predictors of gender 
schemas then they are of self-conceptions.  Although self-conceptions are certainly 
gendered, and are also informed by other demographic circumstances, respondents still 
seem to hold individualistic self-definitions.  Gender schemas, on the other hand, are 
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 Appendix A provides the full set of OLS regressions using these demographic factors to predict gender 
schemas and self-conceptions, and a more thorough discussion of the findings.  I simply summarize the 
trends here. 
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more dependent on characteristics such as political conservatism, religiosity, sexual 
identity, and race/ethnicity.  
Secondly, gender schemas act as a coherent set of beliefs.  Gender schemas are 
much more cohesive than self-conceptions.  In regression analyses using individual 
gender schemas and self-conception measures to predict each other (not shown), I found 
substantial coherence in gender category, gender essentialist and gender role beliefs 
behave over time.
29
  The gender category, gender essentialist, and gender role beliefs act 
like schemas: they are very strong predictors of one another and hold together as a 
cohesive set of beliefs.  
2.4 Stability and Flexibility of Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions Over Time 
Although excellent ethnomethodological work has captured gender being enacted 
in micro-level behaviors and interactions (Berk 1985; West & Fenstermaker 1995), and 
historical trend analyses have tracked aggregate changes in gender ideologies over time 
(Bielby & Bielby 1984; Davis & Greenstein 2009; Mason & Lu 1988; Okamoto & 
England 1999), little is known about the intra-individual stability of gender schemas over 
time. This flexibility has theoretical implications: stable individual gender schemas 
would reinforce the stability of the gender structure over time; flexible gender schemas 
would mean that the gender structure is reproduced in spite of this flexibility. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the stability scores of men and women on each of the self-
conception, gender category, and gender role and essentialist beliefs.
 30
  Appendix 1 
provides graphs of the change scores in year 2 and 5. Stability scores capture something 
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 Only one of these essentialism questions was asked in year 2 (some jobs and professions are better suited 
for men than for women); the others were asked in year 5 only. 
30
 Stability score= 1- (abs[(Year 5 value - Year 2 value)/(number of variable values -1)]) 
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different than the mean change scores: the latter indicate trends in the changes of beliefs 
over time; stability scores capture instability in these measures, no matter the direction of 
change.  A stability score of 100% means that a person‘s response on that item remained 
constant between year 2 and year 5. A stability score of zero means a person‘s response 
went from the very bottom of the variable value distribution to the very top of the value 
distribution (or vice-versa).   The horizontal dotted line in each Figure 2.1 chart is a 
visual benchmark representing 80% stability.  For self-conceptions, this represents about 
a 1.5 point move up or down each of the seven-point attitude spectrum scales; for gender 
schemas, this is a one-point change in agreement or disagreement with each of the gender 
schema measures. 
 Both men and women have stability scores above 80% for all but the ―I am 
cooperative‖ and ―people-oriented‖ self-conceptions.  For the stability scores of gender 
category beliefs, men‘s perceptions of other men exhibit slightly larger changes over time 
than women‘s perception of other women.   
 College is a formative time of personal growth where both beliefs about oneself 
and beliefs about the gender structure seem likely to change (Astin 1993). However, 
students‘ self-conceptions and gender schemas are fairly stable over time.  The stability 
of these beliefs contributes to the stability of the gender structure: even across these life 
experiences, respondents‘ perceptions of gender and their perceptions of themselves do 
not change drastically.  For example, students who came in with very traditional gender 
beliefs and very stereotypical perceptions of their gender category would likely have had 
80% or better stability in these beliefs. 
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 These beliefs are not stagnant, however.  The average stability score for each 
belief is around 75-80%, suggesting that gender schemas and self-conceptions are not 
immovable and, given the right circumstances, these beliefs do change. 
PART TWO: CO-CONSTRUCTION THEORY AND ANALYSIS 
 The first part of this chapter conceptualized my use of self-conceptions and 
gender schemas, briefly illustrated how these beliefs are predicted by gender and other 
key demographic variables, and discussed their stability over time.  I showed that there 
are large differences between the ways men and women in my sample view members of 
their gender categories and understand gender roles.  Men‘s and women‘s self-
conceptions are gendered in expected ways, but are not as polarized as their perceptions 
of members of their gender category. 
Before I can show how self-conceptions affect the reproduction of sex-
segregation of college majors and occupations in the chapters that follow, I need to 
investigate how self-conceptions are co-constructed with gender schemas over time. Thus 
far, relatively little is known about the processes of this co-construction, and even 
whether it is primarily uni-directional or bi-directional.   Little research, especially 
quantitative research, has systematically captured the influence of gender schemas on 
individual action over time or the extent to which these beliefs influence perceptions of 
self, partly because such inquiries are challenging without longitudinal panel data (Davis 
& Greenstein 2009). We know even less about how perceptions of self might influence 
the extent to which men and women hold traditional or progressive gender schemas.  
Such knowledge is important to explaining the resilience of gender inequality in the 
modern era (Charles 2009).  
                                                            68 
 
 
 
I begin by theorizing mechanisms by which this co-construction might occur. I 
then present an empirical analysis of one particular case of co-construction: how feminine 
self-conceptions influence—and are influenced by—gender role, gender category, and 
gender essentialist beliefs.  
2.5 Processes of Co-Construction: How Gender Schemas influence Self-Conceptions 
 How do gender schemas influence people‘s perceptions of themselves?  Although 
it is outside the scope of this project to discuss how men and women first develop these 
beliefs, it is important to understand how gender schemas, once in place, influence 
individuals‘ self-conceptions. Past research has shown that cultural ideologies reproduce 
inequality by shaping micro-level interactions and judgments of selves and others 
(Ridgeway 2006; Ridgeway & Correll 2004), but how do these cultural ideologies affect 
people‘s perceptions of themselves? 
Different dimensions of gender schemas may differently affect self-conceptions. 
The three dimensions I introduced earlier play different roles in the maintenance of the 
gender structure.  Traditional gender role beliefs specify the roles of men and women and 
the proper power relations between them; gender category beliefs uphold the 
complementary and hierarchical characteristics of men and women; and essentialism 
provides a cultural explanation and legitimate for the existing gender order.  As a result, I 
expect that they will be internalized by men and women through different mechanisms.  
Specifically, I describe processes of prescription, extrapolation and biological fatalism.  
 First, individuals‘ gender role beliefs may prescribe perceptions of self.  Cultural 
beliefs about gender to which individuals adhere provide rough guides for what 
individuals ought to do and ought to be like (Davis & Greenstein 2009; Ridgeway 2006).  
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Having traditional beliefs about the roles of power differentials between men and women 
should lead individuals to see themselves in ways consistent with those roles.  Blair-Loy 
(2003), for instance, demonstrates women executives‘ adherence to the ―family devotion 
schema,‖ a shared cultural model that depicts a woman‘s primary moral responsibility to 
be her role as wife and mother (p. 2).  This cultural model is consistent with (and 
inclusive of) other cultural models, such as the expectation of ―intensive motherhood‖ 
(Hays, 1996) that reinforce women‘s responsibilities in the home.  Some of the women 
executives in Blair-Loy‘s study were compelled by their adherence to this schema to 
leave their high-status careers and devote themselves full-time to childrearing; it 
prescribed for them the primacy of ―mother‖ within their self-conceptions.   
 Secondly, gender category beliefs may be extrapolated into individuals‘ beliefs 
about themselves. This is distinct from a prescriptive process because it relies on beliefs 
about what men and women are, rather than beliefs about what one thinks men and 
women should be like.  Individuals hold beliefs about the common characteristics of their 
gender category—beliefs that may align with or undermine commonly-held assumptions 
about the characteristics that encompass hegemonic masculinity and femininity (Connell 
2005, Schippers 2007).  Men and women who subscribe to these hegemonic beliefs about 
their gender category are likely to see themselves as embodying those characteristics as 
well.  People who reject hegemonic perceptions of their gender category, on the other 
hand, are more free to see themselves less stereotypically. 
Research on gendered self-assessment of math abilities provides an example of 
this extrapolation process. Women who believe that members of their gender are, in 
general, poor at math may come to have little confidence in their own math abilities, 
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regardless of their actual skills (Correll 2001, 2004; Hyde et al. 1990; Steele 1997).
31
  
Correll (2004) argues that if women perceive other women to have weaker abilities in 
math than men, this can affect how they perceive themselves. Similarly, men who 
perceive other men to be systematic may extrapolate this characteristic onto themselves 
as members of that gender category. In other words, men‘s and women‘s membership in 
their gender category may be accompanied by sets of characteristics that they also apply 
to themselves.
32
 
Finally, men and women who subscribe to gender essentialism believe that men 
and women have different characteristics, skills, and abilities by nature. Beyond 
providing a ready explanation and justification of the gender structure, men and women 
may find meanings about themselves in these essentialist beliefs.  I call this process 
biological fatalism.  Those who believe that men and women are naturally, fundamentally 
different may apply this to themselves—that they, as men or women, are ―naturally‖ one 
way or another.  ―I am a woman, women are naturally emotional, therefore I am 
emotional.‖  For example, part of the appeal of the ―men are from Mars‖/ ―women are 
from Venus‖ cottage industry of books, which are based on the assumption that gender 
differences are driven by biology, is that people read them not only to understand their 
                                                 
31
 There are, of course, ways that cultural models that men and women do not personally hold can influence 
how they perceive themselves—for example, Correll stated that her argument about gender-stereotyped 
self-beliefs about one‘s math abilities could come from individuals‘ perceptions that other hold these 
gendered beliefs.  Stereotype threat (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997) is another example.  
Women and men who believe they may be held accountable to cultural norms about the proper self-
conceptions for men and women may hold such self-conceptions while privately endorsing progressive 
gender beliefs. However, I am primarily interested in the relationship between respondents‘ perceptions of 
self and the gender schemas they endorse. 
32
 Perceptions of one‘s gender category do not necessarily have to be informed by gender essentialist 
beliefs (although gender essentialism provides pre-packaged and coherent sets of beliefs about the 
characteristics of men and women).  Perceptions of one‘s gender category can be completely based on 
social-constructionist logic and still uphold a stark differentiation between men and women.  
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friends, partners, and children, but also to better understand themselves.  Biological 
fatalism may be a way that men and women explain themselves and their self-
understandings.  
My analysis can help determine if gender schemas influence self-conceptions 
through processes of prescription, extrapolation, and biological fatalism, and whether 
these processes are similarly important for men and women. Figure 2.2 provides a 
schematic summary of these mechanisms.  
2.6 Processes of Co-Construction: How Self-Conceptions influence Gender Schemas 
 The effect of cultural beliefs on perceptions of self is important to scholars 
interested in the power of culture to influence behavior and self-beliefs.  The reverse 
causal process—how perceptions of self influence individually-held beliefs about 
gender—is equally important, but less well-understood.  As with the reverse causal 
direction, I expect that self-conceptions will influence the dimensions of gender schemas 
differently.  I argue that self-conceptions could influence gender category beliefs through 
a process of generalization, while they could affect gender role beliefs and gender 
essentialist beliefs through  a reinforcement/subversion process.  
First, self-conceptions may affect gender category beliefs through a process of 
generalization.  This is the inverse of the extrapolation process discussed above.  In this 
process, men and women generalize their self-perceptions to their entire gender category.  
For example, a woman who believes she is feminine may generalize this characteristic to 
other women.  However, self-conceptions that go against stereotypical perceptions of 
men and women may challenge stereotypical notions of one‘s gender category and cause 
one to see his/her gender category more neutrally. For example, a man‘s perception of 
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himself as neutral or feminine may undermine his perception of his gender category as 
hegemonically masculine.  The basis of this mechanism is that one might reconcile 
perceived differences between one‘s self-conceptions and the characteristics of one‘s 
gender category by broadening (neutralizing) the latter to be able to incorporate the 
former.  Through generalizability of astereotypical self-conceptions, notions of 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity could be undermined and alternate femininities 
and masculinities developed (Schippers 2007) 
 Secondly, self-conceptions may influence both gender role beliefs and gender 
essentialist beliefs through reinforcement or subversion. To the extent that perceiving the 
validity of traditional divisions of work and family responsibilities and traditional 
relations between men and women depends on gender-stereotypic self-beliefs, seeing 
oneself as having stereotypic characteristics may reinforce the validity of these beliefs.  
The inverse relationship is also likely to drive a significant result between self-
conceptions and gender role beliefs: non-gender-stereotypic perceptions of oneself may 
undermine the legitimacy of traditional gender role beliefs (which assume stereotypic 
perceptions of oneself) and lead one to have more progressive gender role beliefs. 
Similarly, self-conceptions that are consistent with gender essentialist beliefs may be 
more ―proof‖ to individuals that essentialism is a legitimate explanation of gender 
differences.  On the other hand, self-conceptions that contradict such essentialist notions 
may subvert the validity of that explanation for those individuals. 
 I next explain the importance of the co-construction processes and discuss the 
particular measures I am using to examine them.  Then, I investigate these relationships 
empirically using structural equation modeling with multi-indicator measures of gender 
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schemas and self-conceptions.  Finally, I discuss how the results inform our 
understanding of the co-construction of these individual-level beliefs and why they are 
important for understanding the reproduction of inequality. 
The Importance of Co-Construction 
 Here, co-construction refers to the ways gender schemas influence how people 
perceive themselves over time, and how perceptions of self, in turn, influence the extent 
to which people adhere to gender schemas. This co-construction is theoretically 
interesting and may be vital to the individual-level reproduction of inequality. It is an 
example of how individuals come to internalize the gender structure and how, in turn, 
their self-beliefs reproduce or undermine their adherence to that structure.   
Gender schemas likely influence changes in perceptions of self through 
prescription, extrapolation, and biological fatalism.  If these self-beliefs predict career 
decisions that reproduce sex-segregation, this is a site where cultural gender role beliefs 
act through self-conceptions to reproduce sex segregation.  This ―self-expressive edge of 
sex segregation‖ may be particularly resistant to social change, as this encoding process 
is culturally unavailable as a site for addressing gender inequality.  Thus, I hypothesize 
that a key mechanism by which sex segregation is reproduced on the individual level is 
that gender schemas become encoded in individualist self-conceptions, legitimated, and 
are resultantly culturally off-limits to policy regulation and social action.  
 Secondly, perceptions of self—particularly if they contradict gender essentialist 
beliefs (e.g. women who perceive themselves as particularly systematic or men who 
perceive themselves as particularly emotional)— may influence individuals‘ adherence to 
traditional gender role beliefs.  This is a potential site for the subversion of traditional 
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gender beliefs and has tremendous policy implications:  If young men and women can be 
encouraged to develop conceptions of themselves that are counter to essentialist beliefs, 
those individuals may begin to reconsider essentialist beliefs about members of their 
gender category or begin to question traditional gender role beliefs.  Conversely, more 
gender-stereotypic beliefs about the self may retrench individuals‘ essentialist gender 
beliefs.   
 For my purposes, I do not need to show that individuals‘ gender schemas have the 
potential to affect the entirety of their self-conceptions.  Rather, it will suffice to display 
evidence for my arguments here to show that some elements of self-conceptions influence 
some dimensions of self-conceptions to demonstrate that these processes of co-
construction do operate.  
 I examine the relationships between the three dimensions of gender schemas—
gender  role beliefs, gender category beliefs, and gender essentialist beliefs—and one 
multi-faceted self-conception: how ―masculine‖ or ―feminine‖ men and women perceive 
themselves to be. Here, I am referring to hegemonic notions of masculinity and 
femininity, rather than alternative or subordinate femininities and masculinities (Connell 
2005, Pyke & Johnson 2003, Schippers 2007). This self-conception is an ideal case for 
examining co-construction with gender schemas because hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity is the central axis along which the gender distinction is drawn and maintained 
(Esptein 1999).  As noted above, the perceived complementarity and hierarchy of 
masculinity and femininity are central to the gender structure. 
 Masculinity and femininity are heavily laden with cultural meanings for both men 
and women. For men, considering oneself to be ―feminine‖ is devalued in relation to 
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hegemonic masculinity, and it is, by definition, the opposite of being masculine 
(Schippers 2007).  Men face considerable social pressures to perceive themselves as (and 
enact) hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005).  Men who consider themselves less 
masculine than other men have to overcome a host of pressures and potential sanctions. 
For women, considering oneself to be feminine is both culturally expected and 
devalued (Schippers 2007).  Being feminine is culturally prescribed for women, and 
women face tremendous pressure to enact femininity (Wolf, 2002).  However, 
masculinity is more highly valued than femininity in may realms of importance to 
women, especially in most professional workplace settings (see, e.g. Dinovitzer 2009, 
Gorman 2005).  I am interested in how gender schemas influence respondents‘ 
perceptions of themselves as masculine or feminine: what gender schemas lead men and 
women to hold more stereotypical perceptions of themselves, and what gender schemas 
lead men and women to conceive of themselves in a less stereotypical manner.
33
 
2.7 Hypotheses 
 Broadly, I expect to see evidence of co-constitutive beliefs about gender and the 
self, whereby there are strong and consistent patterns where gender schemas predict 
men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions.  To the extent possible, I take advantage of my 
longitudinal data and examine the effects of gender schema beliefs on perceptions of self 
over time, and vice versa.   
                                                 
33
 Because the notions of femininity and masculinity are themselves complex, I do not claim that 
respondents all share the same definition of these concepts.  ―Masculinity‖ and ―femininity‖ are socially-
constructed traits whose boundaries are historically contingent and ever-shifting (Connell, 2005).  
However, the salience of these concepts in the U.S. means that there exists shared definitions of this 
concept that are likely quite consistent and stable across individuals (Lueptow et al., 2001). 
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I expect that the three dimensions of gender schemas—gender role beliefs, gender 
category beliefs, and essentialist beliefs—will significantly affect how feminine men and 
women perceive themselves to be. In particular, traditional gender role beliefs should be 
positively related to women‘s feminine self-conceptions to men‘s masculine self-
conceptions.  This is an example of the prescription process theorized above: women‘s 
and men‘s adherence to traditional gender role beliefs prescribes for them gender-typical 
self-conceptions.  Gender category and gender essentialist beliefs should also have an 
effect on men and women through a process of extrapolation and biological fatalism, 
respectively.  Both men and women who perceive their gender category to be relatively 
masculine or feminine, respectively, will be more likely to see themselves as masculine 
or feminine.  Because of the overarching assumption in essentialist beliefs about gender 
that men are ―naturally‖ masculine and women are ―naturally‖ feminine, I expect that 
women who adhere to essentialist gender beliefs will be more likely to have feminine 
self-conceptions and men who hold essentialist beliefs will be more likely than other men 
to see themselves as masculine.   
Secondly, I expect that perceptions of oneself will have a significant effect on 
respondents‘ gender schemas. Specifically, stereotypic perceptions of themselves (i.e. 
women with feminine self-conceptions and men with masculine self-conceptions) will 
hold more traditional gender role beliefs, as such beliefs fit easily alongside these 
stereotypic perceptions of self and do not directly contradict them.  This is an example of 
reinforcement.  Stereotypic self-conceptions are also likely to reinforce men‘s and 
women‘s gender essentialist beliefs:  It is a strong confirmation of essentialism if men see 
themselves as having the essentialist characteristics of ―masculinity‖ or women see 
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themselves as having the essentialist characteristic of ―femininity.‖  In contrast, 
perceptions of oneself as anti-stereotypic (women who perceive themselves to be 
masculine and men who perceive themselves to be feminine) may challenge the 
legitimacy of traditional gender role beliefs and the validity of essentialist notions of 
gender.  Thus, these men and women likely have more progressive gender role beliefs 
and less essentialist beliefs about gender than women with more feminine self-
conceptions and men more masculine self-conceptions. I also expect that those with 
gender-stereotypic self-conceptions will see their gender category as more feminine (for 
women) and more masculine (for men) in a process of generalization.   
2.8 Latent Variables 
 I use structural equation modeling (SEM) for my co-construction analysis, a 
statistical technique useful for testing and estimating causal relationships (Byrne, 2010).  
It is also well-suited for theory testing.  SEM allows for the construction of latent 
measures which were not themselves included in the survey but, rather, estimate several 
manifest (measured) variables which ―tap into‖ the concept represented by the latent 
variable.  In this way, the researcher is not required to measure every variable that might 
be part of a latent concept; several measures that each capture some facet of that latent 
concept are put together to make a stronger measure. The more tightly the variables hang 
together as a latent factor, the more coherent the concept is presumed to be.   
Structural equation models consist of two components: a measurement model and 
a structural (or construct) model.  The validity of both are measured with standard fit 
statistics.  I present four for each model: the χ2 and degrees of freedom (df), the 
comparative fit index (CFI) which compares the fit of the hypothesized model with that 
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of an independent model, and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), 
which accounts for both fit and model parsimony.  A good CFI is larger than .900 and an 
acceptable fit is larger than .800. An RMSEA below .06 indicates a great fit and an 
RMSEA below .08 is acceptable (Byrne 2010).
34
  I also include the squared multiple 
correlation, or the R
2
 of the dependent variable, in each model.  I first present the 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for each of the latent variable constructs I use in this 
chapter, then the structural components of causal models that use those latent variables. 
To ensure discriminant validity between the four latent measures I use in this chapter, I 
compared the χ2 and degrees of freedom between two models: one where the manifest 
measures predict their separate latent measures as usual and the four separate latent 
measures are correlated with one another, and a second model where all the manifest 
measures predicted a single latent measure.  The significance of the difference in the χ2 
and degrees of freedom between the two models gives an indication of discriminant 
validity.  I found discriminant validity significant at the .000 level in year 2 and year 5, 
for men and for women.
35
 
 A note on timing of measurement: some of the most substantively important 
measures that make up the essentialist beliefs and gender category beliefs measures are 
only available in year 5.  For these constructs, I run the models with both the year 2 and 
year 5 operationalizations.  
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 RMSEA is a more accurate fit statistic with medium-size samples than CFI because the CFI may be 
deflated with sample sizes less than 300 or 400  (SEMs can be reliably interpreted with samples of 100 or 
more) (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, & Paxton, 2008). 
35
 I also ensured that none of the manifest measures were more highly correlated with a measure outside of 
its latent group than it was correlated with the measures inside of its latent group. 
                                                            79 
 
 
 
Self-Conceptions: I am Feminine 
 I constructed the ―I am feminine‖ self-conception latent variable from five 
attribute spectrum scales: ―Usually I am very masculine‖ to ―very feminine,‖ ―Usually I 
am very unemotional‖ to ―very emotional,‖ ―Usually I am very unfriendly‖ to ―very 
friendly, ―Usually I am very asocial‖ to ―very social,‖ and ―Usually I am very 
individualistic‖ to ―very cooperative.‖  See Panel A in figure 2.3 for the CFA for the year 
2 latent construct of feminine self-conception, and Panel B for the year 5 CFA.  Of these 
five measures, ―I am friendly‖ and ―I am social‖ are conceptually much more similar to 
one another than any other pair of variables in this latent measure.  Empirically, the 
correlation between these two measures (.633 for men, .538 for men) is also much higher 
than between other pairs of variables.  I expect that, due to this conceptual and empirical 
overlap, the measurement errors on these two variables are likely also correlated. Thus, I 
include a correlated error term between the friendly and social measures in the latent 
measure for feminine self-conceptions for both men and women, and in both years 2 and 
5.  (This correlated error term is significant in year 2 and 5 for men, and in year 5 for 
women.)  
Interestingly, I find that the ―I am cooperative‖ measure becomes less salient in 
women‘s feminine self-conceptions between year 2 and year 5.36  This may point to a 
decoupling of cooperativeness or independence from notions of femininity and 
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 I established the significance of this change by comparing the χ2 and degrees of freedom difference 
between a model where the year 2 and year 5 latent measures of feminine self-conceptions were correlated 
and the coefficient estimates on the ―I am cooperative‖ measure constrained to equal one another, and a 
second model where these coefficient estimates were allowed to vary freely.  The significance of the χ2 and 
degrees of freedom change between the two models was significant at the .001 level for women, but was 
not significant for men. 
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masculinity as men and women proceed through an education process that tends to 
emphasize individual work.  
Gender Schema Beliefs: Traditional Gender Role Beliefs, Gender Category Beliefs, 
and Gender Essentialist Beliefs 
 The following measures make up the traditional gender role beliefs latent 
variable: ―A wife should willingly take her husband‘s name at marriage‖ (1=strongly 
disagree to 5=strongly agree), ―a woman should not let bearing children stand in the way 
of a career if she wants one,‖ (recoded so that 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree), 
―women can have a full and happy life without marrying‖ (recoded so that 1=strongly 
agree to 5=strongly disagree), and ―I consider myself feminist‖ (recoded so that 
1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree).
 37
  Year 2 construction and CFA for the 
traditional gender role belief latent variable is shown in Figure 3.4 Panel A, and the Year 
5 CFA is shown in Panel B. 
 The year 2 and 5 constructs of feminine gender category beliefs includes: 
―Usually, others of my same sex are very unfriendly‖=1 to ―very friendly‖=7; ―very 
individualistic‖=1 to ―very cooperative‖=7, ―very unemotional‖=1 to ―very 
emotional‖=7, ―very asocial‖=1 to ―very social‖=7 (see Panel A and B of Figure 2.5).   
 My time-lagged examination of the effect of gender essentialist beliefs on self-
conception is restricted by the presence of only one of the four essentialism questions in 
year 2: ―There are some jobs and professions that are more suitable for men than for 
women‖ (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree).  I include this as a single-measure 
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 ―I consider myself a feminist‖ is a gender role belief measure and not a self-conception measure because 
being a feminist signals adherence to a coherent set of beliefs about the social roles about men and women.  
It is more of an indication of the kinds of beliefs men and women have about the gender structure than a 
simple self-conception. 
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representation of gender essentialist beliefs in year 2.  Year 5 repeats this variable and 
adds three other measures that tap gender essentialist beliefs: ―I expect members of the 
opposite sex to act differently than me at work‖ (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly 
agree), ―The trend of occupational sex segregation in the U.S. exists because men and 
women are naturally talented at different things‖ (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly 
agree), and ―Men and women should have equal rights, but they are different by nature‖ 
(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree).  See Panels A and B of Figure 2.6 for the year 
2 and 5 constructs and CFAs. 
 Controls:  All SEMs include controls for whether the respondent attended Smith 
(yes=1), Olin (yes=1), MIT (yes=1) or UMass (yes=1, the comparison category), and 
whether they identify as African-American (yes=1), Asian-American (yes=1), Hispanic 
or Latino (yes=1) or white (yes=1, comparison category). 
  The next sections present the results of this co-construction analysis.  I then 
discuss these results and how they can inform our understanding of gender inequality 
more generally.  All reported significance is calculated using two-tailed tests and I use 
maximum likelihood techniques for dealing with missing data. 
2.9 Gender Schema Beliefs Predicting Feminine Self-Conceptions 
 Table 2.3 provides the SEMs predicting men‘s and women‘s year 5 feminine self-
conceptions with their year 2 traditional gender role beliefs.  (All models also include 
controls for school and race/ethnicity, the results of which I discuss below.)  For women, 
I find no significant effect of gender role beliefs on perceptions of self as feminine. For 
men, traditional gender role beliefs are significant and positive predictors of masculine 
self-conceptions: men who hold traditional gender role beliefs in year 2 are more likely to 
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see themselves as masculine in year 5 (prescription). In contrast, men with more 
progressive gender role beliefs are less likely to see themselves as masculine than other 
men.  
 Table 2.4 and 2.5 use feminine gender category beliefs to predict perceptions of 
self as feminine (extrapolation). Table 2.4 uses the year 2 measures of feminine gender 
category, a less accurate operationalization of this concept than the year 5 measure (Table 
2.5), which includes the ―usually others of my same sex are very masculine‖ to ―very 
feminine‖ measure. The effect of gender category beliefs is stronger for women than it is 
for men: women‘s feminine gender category beliefs in both year 2 and year 5 predict the 
extent to which they perceive themselves as feminine in year 5.  For men, in contrast, 
there is no significant relationship between how masculine they perceive other men to be 
and their own masculine self-conceptions using the year 2 operationalization of gender 
category beliefs, but the year 5 operationalization positively predicts men‘s masculine 
self-conceptions. The extrapolation process discussed above appears to be in operation: 
men and women who perceive their gender category to be feminine are more likely to see 
themselves as feminine as well. 
 The next two tables (2.6 and 2.7) present models predicting feminine self-
conceptions with gender essentialist beliefs (biological fatalism).  As noted above, due to 
available variables, year 2 conceptualization of gender essentialism includes only the 
―some jobs and professions are better suited for men‖ question. Women who hold this 
belief in year 2 are marginally more likely to see themselves as feminine than women 
who reject this notion of essentialism. The year 5 multi-indicator measure of essentialist 
views is a fully significant predictor of year 5 feminine gender schemas for women. This 
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relationship is strong for men using both year 2 and year 5 measures of essentialism:  
men who endorse essentialist beliefs about the proper jobs for men and women are 
significantly more likely to see themselves as masculine.  The reverse of this is that men 
who reject essentialist beliefs are less likely than other men to see themselves as 
masculine, and women who reject these beliefs are less likely than other women to see 
themselves as feminine.  
 Are these gender schemas measures related to the change in feminine self-
conceptions over time?  Tables 2.8 through 2.10 predict year 5 feminine self-conceptions 
with the three types of gender schemas beliefs, controlling for year 2 feminine self-
conceptions measures.  Including year 2 self-conceptions in the SEM means that the year 
5 measure effectively indexes the change in feminine self-conceptions over time.  
Positive coefficients indicate a measure that is related to a shift to more feminine self-
conceptions over time.  A negative coefficient indicates a factor that is related to a shift to 
more masculine self-conceptions over time.   
 I find that traditional gender role beliefs are marginally significantly related to 
men‘s increasingly masculine self-conceptions over time (prescription; Table 2.8).  These 
same traditional beliefs do not predict a change in women‘s feminine self-conceptions 
over time.  Gender category beliefs are not related to change in self-conceptions for men 
or women (Table 2.9).  Essentialist beliefs about occupations significantly predict men‘s 
increasingly masculine self-conceptions (biological fatalism), but are unrelated to 
women‘s feminine self-conceptions (Table 2.10).  Figure 2.2 summarizes these findings. 
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Discussion 
 Confirming the expectations above, gender schemas are indeed significant 
predictors of feminine self-conceptions.  This is a clear indication of something that has 
long been assumed: the way individuals see and understand the gendered structure has 
direct bearing on their gendered perceptions of self. However, there are interesting 
differences in how gender schemas influence men‘s and women‘s feminine self-
conceptions. 
 First, the process of prescription, whereby gender role beliefs influence self-
conceptions and are very important for men‘s, but not for women‘s feminine self-
conceptions.  Among men, those with traditional gender role beliefs are more likely to 
see themselves as masculine. This relationship is consistent with the masculinities 
literature (e.g. Connell, 2005) that argues that adherence to hegemonic masculinity—
fundamentally a belief about men‘s and women‘s roles in society—is definitionally and 
conceptually opposed to the expression of femininity for men.  In this process of 
prescription, men who hold traditional beliefs about gender roles would see themselves as 
less feminine than men with more progressive beliefs.  
 The inverse of this relationship is even more interesting: men who hold 
progressive gender role beliefs are more likely to see themselves as feminine.  Because 
ideologies of hegemonic masculinity exert tremendous pressure on men to enact such 
masculinity, progressive gender role beliefs may both allow space for and ideologically 
buttress more feminine self-beliefs among men.  The rejection of traditional gender role 
beliefs may create a more acceptable range of characteristics in which men can define 
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themselves.  Progressive gender role beliefs may provide a ready-made legitimation for 
non-hegemonic self-beliefs.   
 There is no prescription process of women, at least for this self-conception.  This 
lack of relationship is surprising at first, given the importance traditional gender role 
beliefs have in upholding the gendered order, particularly in the institutions of marriage 
and family. However, the relationship between traditional gender role beliefs and 
pressures to have gender-stereotypical identities are not as clear for women as they are 
for men.  Cultural alternatives are available to women that uphold stereotypically 
feminine perceptions of self while rejecting traditional gender roles.  For example, the 
―feminine-ism‖ ideal proclaims that ―being a strong, powerful woman doesn't mean you 
have to be tough, overworked and unattractive‖ (Salmansohn, 2010).  ―Feminin-ism‖ 
upholds pressure to enact stereotypical femininity even while rejecting traditional gender 
roles. This seeming empowerment of feminine self-expression still has undercurrents of 
subordination and submission to dominant power structures, where women need to feel 
―sexy,‖ and are not allowed to be ―controlling‖ or ―bitchy‖ (Schippers 2007).  The 
existence of such cultural alternatives may be the result of women‘s structural position, in 
which they wish to simultaneously hold equal positions and retain legitimacy in a heavily 
gender-differentiated world.  No such cultural alternatives seem to exist for men that 
allow them to simultaneously uphold traditional gender role beliefs and perceive 
themselves as feminine. I discuss this more below. 
 More important to women‘s feminine self-conceptions is their belief in gender 
essentialism, a process of biological fatalism.  Women who uphold gender essentialist 
beliefs are more likely to see themselves as feminine than women who reject essentialist 
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beliefs.  As a common explanation for gender differences, essentialism may justify 
women‘s adherence to hegemonic femininity. Those women who reject essentialism, on 
the other hand, tend to see themselves as less feminine than other women.  The rejection 
of essentialism takes away its power: those who do not believe that women are 
―naturally‖ feminine are more free to define themselves as more neutral or masculine.38 
 Biological fatalism also works for men: men who agree with gender essentialist 
beliefs are more likely to see themselves as masculine. Again, essentialist beliefs define a 
(narrow) range of men‘s ―natural‖ characteristics.  Men who reject essentialist beliefs 
seem to have more room to maneuver their self-conceptions.    
An extrapolation process also exists between men‘s and women‘s perceptions of 
their gender category and their self-conceptions.  For both men and women, the more 
masculine or feminine they portray members of their gender category, the more 
masculine or feminine they see themselves.  Respondents‘ beliefs about the 
characteristics that define their gender category as different, in other words, also 
influence their self-conceptions.   
 Thus, I find that men and women internalize gender schemas through different 
mechanisms: extrapolation and biological fatalism lead both men and women to have 
more gender-stereotypic self-conceptions, but prescription matters only for men.  Men‘s 
masculine self-conceptions are reinforced through three processes:  First, traditional 
gender role beliefs prescribe that they take their place in the power hierarchy, which 
includes adhering to hegemonic masculinity.  Second, the gender category beliefs that 
accompany hegemonic masculinity are extrapolated into men‘s self-conceptions: as a 
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member of that gender category, men understand themselves as ―masculine‖ and reject 
femininity in their self-conceptions. Third, biological fatalism encourages men to see 
their masculinity as ―natural‖ and innate.  
 For men to reject masculine self-conceptions and see themselves as more neutral 
or feminine, they may need to reject the expectations of the traditional power structure, 
the cultural assumptions about the characteristics that define the category ―men,‖ and the 
belief that masculinity is rooted in their biology. 
 Women‘s feminine self-conceptions are also reproduced by processes of 
extrapolation and biological fatalism, but not by prescription.  As noted above, I believe 
that this results from the cultural alternatives to traditional gender role beliefs that women 
have available.  These alternatives, however, nonetheless uphold women as different 
from men.  In order to see themselves as more neutral or masculine, women may need to 
reject hegemonic femininity as the defining characteristics of their gender category.  
They also need to reject gender essentialist beliefs about women‘s inherent ―femininity‖ 
in order to see themselves as more neutral or masculine.    
 I believe this difference in mechanisms is rooted in men‘s and women‘s location 
in the gender structure.  Men‘s portrayal of themselves as hegemonically masculine and 
their distancing of themselves from hegemonic femininity is central to the reproduction 
of the gender structure. This structure only exists to the extent that men and women are 
defined as fundamentally different.  Men, because they believe in traditional gender role 
beliefs and/or because they extrapolate that from their beliefs in the masculinity of their 
gender category and/or believe their masculinity is biologically-determined, reap the 
benefits of aligning their self-conceptions with hegemonic masculinity.  
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 Women, on the other hand, can perceive themselves as feminine without 
believing in traditional gender role beliefs.  As noted before, this lack of a prescription 
process for women aligns with separate but equal notions of gender.  Notions of 
hegemonic femininity that appear to be removed from traditional gender role beliefs may 
be more palatable to young women in the U.S.  However, extrapolation and biological 
fatalism are very strong influences in women‘s feminine self-conceptions.  They 
reproduce women‘s hegemonic femininity without the need for adherence to traditional 
gender role beliefs.  In other words, women‘s believe in patriarchy is not a requirement 
for the reproduction of ―feminine‖ selves.  This helps us understand why gender 
differences may continue despite strong cultural mandates for equality. I now move on to 
the second half of this co-construction: how self-conceptions influence individually-held 
gender beliefs. 
2.10 Predicting Gender Schemas with Feminine Self-Conceptions 
Tables 2.11 through 2.16 illustrate the ability of self-conceptions to predict the 
three dimensions of gender schemas: traditional gender role beliefs, gender category 
beliefs, and essentialism.   Table 2.11 illustrates processes of reinforcement/subversion of 
gender role beliefs by feminine and masculine self-conceptions.  For men, perceptions of 
themselves as masculine in year 2 predict traditional gender role beliefs in year 5: men‘s 
perceptions of themselves as more neutral or feminine than their peers do are more likely 
to subvert traditional gender role beliefs.  Similarly, women‘s feminine self-conceptions 
marginally reinforce their traditional gender role beliefs; women‘s less feminine self-
conceptions tend to subvert such beliefs.  The process of generalization does not seem to 
be operating for either men‘s or women‘s gender category beliefs: men‘s and women‘s 
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feminine self-conceptions are not related to whether they see members of their gender 
category as masculine or feminine (Table 2.12).  I discuss the implications of this null 
finding below. 
 Turning to the relationship between self-conceptions and gender essentialist 
beliefs (which can also be reinforcing or subversive) (Table 2.13), women‘s feminine 
self-conceptions reinforce their adherence to essentialist gender beliefs.   Women who 
see themselves as feminine in year 2 are more likely to espouse essentialist beliefs in year 
5.  Men‘s masculine self-conceptions also reinforce their gender essentialism; men‘s less 
masculine self-conceptions tend to subvert their beliefs in gender essentialism.   
 Tables 2.14-2.16 examine whether change in gender schemas can be predicted by 
self-conceptions over this relatively short time horizon. I find that, among men, less 
masculine self-conceptions marginally significantly predict a decline in traditional gender 
role beliefs over time (Table 2.14).  Given the significance of the time-lagged predictions 
above, it is likely that the reinforcement/subversion process may unfold over a longer 
timeframe than the four years captured in this study.  As above, self-conceptions do not 
have a significant generalization effect on men‘s and women‘s gender category beliefs 
over time (Table 2.15).   Nor do self-conceptions predict changes in essentialist beliefs 
over time (Table 2.16).  
Discussion 
The most significant effect of feminine self-conceptions on gender schemas was 
reinforcement/subversion of adherence to traditional gender role beliefs and gender 
essentialism.  For women, perception of oneself as feminine reinforces essentialist beliefs 
and marginally reinforces traditional gender role beliefs.  Men‘s year 2 masculine self-
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conceptions reinforce their traditional gender role beliefs  and gender essentialism and 
marginally predicts the increasing traditionality of these beliefs over time.  
 These results also indicate a subversion process.  For those women who hold 
more masculine self-beliefs, and those men who hold more feminine self-beliefs, their 
adherence to counter-stereotypic self-conceptions subvert the legitimacy of essentialist 
and traditional gender role beliefs.  Thus, it does seem possible that if men and women 
can learn to see themselves in a more neutral or less stereotypic light, these self-beliefs 
might actually undermine their adherence to such beliefs.  These subversion and 
reinforcement processes worked similarly for gender essentialist beliefs. 
 The absence of generalization as a significant mechanism by which feminine or 
masculine self-conceptions influence feminine or masculine gender category beliefs is 
important. Men and women appear to be able to maintain hegemonic perceptions of their 
gender category, even if they are themselves a exception to those rules.  Men‘s and 
women‘s self-conceptions are sensitive to their beliefs about the characteristics that 
define their gender category.  However, the causal connection does not run the other way: 
their perceptions of their gender category do not become less stereotypical, even if they 
come to see themselves as having neutral or astereotypcial characteristics.  Being the 
exception to one‘s gender category does not appear to undermine the legitimacy of that 
characterization itself.  
Differences by School and Race/Ethnicity 
 I included controls for school and race/ethnicity in the previous structural 
equation models. I find several interesting differences by school.  First, among women, 
those who attend MIT have significantly less feminine self-conceptions than women who 
                                                            91 
 
 
 
attend UMass.  In addition to these selection effects, women who attend MIT and Smith 
are more likely to have even more masculine self-conceptions by the time they graduate 
than UMass women.  I find no significant differences in self-conceptions by school for 
men.  Smith is considered to be a socially liberal school where rigid gender expectations 
are somewhat relaxed (Horowitz, 1984).  MIT is a technical school with largely male-
dominated curricula.  This finding is consistent with my past research which showed that 
women in male-dominated fields (e.g. engineering) tend to have more masculine or 
neutral self-concepts than women in other majors (Cech 2007).   
 Women at Olin, MIT and Smith also have more progressive gender role beliefs 
than UMass women.  Olin women become increasingly less essentialist over time than 
those at UMass.  Smith students also have less feminine perceptions of other women, less 
essentialist beliefs, and develop increasingly more progressive and non-essentialist 
beliefs over time, compared to UMass women.  There are no differences in the gender 
schemas of men at Olin, MIT and UMass.   
 Consistent with existing literature on racial/ethnic differences in gender beliefs 
and self-conceptions (e.g. Molloy & Herzberger 1998; Pyke & Johnson 2003, Okazaki 
2002, Ray & Rosow 2010), gender schemas and self-conceptions differ significantly by 
race/ethnicity.  African-American women are less likely to perceive themselves as 
feminine than white women, and both African-American women‘s and men‘s self-
conceptions become more masculine over time, compared to white men‘s and women‘s 
self-conceptions.  African-American women have more progressive gender role beliefs 
than white women.  (See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of these results by 
race/ethnicity). 
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 Hispanic and Latino men have marginally more masculine self-conceptions than 
white men, and their self-conceptions become more masculine over time.  Finally, Asian 
and Asian-American men‘s self-conceptions are less masculine than white men‘s self-
conceptions and become less masculine over time, compared to the change in white 
men‘s self-conceptions.  Asian and Asian-American men and women hold significantly 
more traditional gender role beliefs than white men and women, and Asian women 
become increasingly essentialist over time, compared to white women.
39
  
2.11 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to provide a theoretical and empirical 
introduction to gender schemas and self-conceptions, and to demonstrate their co-
construction over time.  I theorized and found evidence for several processes of co-
construction:  prescription, extrapolation, biological fatalism, reinforcement, and 
subversion.  Notably absent was evidence for the process of generalization.  I examined 
the co-construction of three sets of gender schema beliefs (traditional gender role beliefs, 
gender essentialist beliefs, and masculine and feminine gender category beliefs), and one 
component of self-conceptions (men‘s and women‘s perceptions of themselves as 
masculine or feminine), by analyzing the causal relationships between them. I now 
discuss these results and their importance to understanding gender inequality. 
 In part one, I found that self-conceptions and gender schemas are gendered in 
important ways, but that gender category beliefs are more polarized than self-
conceptions. This polarization helps maintain the perception of gender differences, even 
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 The book manuscript will include more explanation and interpretation of these intersectional race/gender 
findings.  
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as individuals‘ self-conceptions defy such strong polarization.  I also found that gender 
schemas and self-conceptions are relatively stable over this formative period in 
respondents‘ lives—but not completely stagnant.  This is consonant with (and contributes 
to) the aggregate stability of gender beliefs in the United States.  However, the movement 
on these beliefs that did exist suggests the possibility that these individual-level beliefs 
can change over time.   
The second part of this chapter investigated the relationships between self-
conceptions and gender schemas and found evidence that these beliefs function as a set of 
co-constitutive beliefs. Figure 2.2 summarizes these mechanisms and my empirical 
findings.  Self-conceptions and gender schemas do not vary independently of one 
another, and men and women do not define themselves completely independently of 
broadly-held gender beliefs.  I find strong co-constructive relationships between 
masculine self-conceptions and traditional gender role beliefs for men.  Here, causality is 
significant in both directions: men with traditional gender role beliefs are more likely to 
see themselves as masculine (prescription), and men with masculine self-conceptions are 
more likely to adhere to traditional gender role beliefs (reinforcement).   Women‘s 
essentialist beliefs and their feminine self-conceptions predict one another as well: 
women who hold essentialist beliefs are more likely to see themselves as feminine 
(biological fatalism).  Women who see themselves as feminine, in turn, are more likely to 
believe essentialist accounts of gender (reinforcement).  This co-construction is also clear 
for men, but with the opposite relationships:  men who hold essentialist beliefs are less 
likely to see themselves as feminine, and men who perceive themselves as feminine are 
less likely to hold essentialist beliefs.  
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 Essentialist gender beliefs create a feedback loop through self-conceptions: 
people who hold essentialist beliefs are more likely to see themselves along gender-
stereotypic lines, and those stereotypic self-conceptions, in turn, reinforce beliefs that 
men and women are different ―by nature.‖  
 Not all of the relationships between gender schemas and feminine self-
conceptions appear to be co-constitutive, however.  First, women‘s feminine self-
conceptions marginally influenced their adherence to traditional gender role beliefs, but 
not the other way around.  I argued above that women have cultural alternatives that 
allow them to reject traditional gender role beliefs but still hold feminine self-
conceptions.   
 Gender category beliefs have a uni-directional relationship with self-conceptions 
as well.  Specifically, respondents‘ perceptions of their gender category as feminine 
significantly predicted how feminine they perceived themselves, but the reverse 
relationship is insignificant.  This lack of relationship helps explain the resilience of 
ideologies of hegemonic masculinity and femininity, even when people‘s own self-
conceptions are exceptions to those beliefs.   
I have only examined one particular element of self-conceptions in this analysis. 
Other components of self-conceptions may be co-constructed with gender schema beliefs 
differently than feminine self-conceptions.  Predicting attitudes with other attitudes is 
notoriously difficult to do, compared to predicting attitudes with factors such as gender, 
age, race/ethnicity, or work status.  Predicting the change in attitudes over time is even 
more challenging, as many life factors affect why people‘s beliefs might change 
(especially in this population that is experiencing what is likely a formidable time in their 
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lives).   However, the connections between gender schemas and self-conceptions are 
quite clear.  The fact that I found significant relationships between them, and, in some 
cases, was able to predict the change in these beliefs over time, is important.  
 Finally, these results illustrate the potential power of these co-constitutive beliefs 
about gender and the self.  Gender schemas become internalized into people‘s 
perceptions of themselves through processes of prescription, extrapolation, and biological 
fatalism.  For example, adherence to traditional gender role beliefs may cause individuals 
to develop more gender-stereotypic self-beliefs over time.  The next two chapters 
demonstrate how these gendered self-beliefs predict career decisions that reproduce sex-
segregation.  Because of their relationships to self-conceptions described here, these 
gender schema beliefs may act through self-conceptions to reproduce sex segregation.  
This self-expressive edge of sex segregation may be particularly resistant to social 
change, as this encoding process is culturally unavailable as a site for addressing gender 
inequality.  It is one thing to argue against gender-essentialist notions of majors ―women 
do‖ or ―men do.‖ It is quite another to challenge someone‘s individualistic claim that a 
certain major is ―what suits‖ him or her.  
On the other hand, this chapter suggests potential sites for the subversion of 
patriarchal gender beliefs.  While altering the cultural models on which gender beliefs are 
based is an arduous task, my research illustrates that, if young men and women can 
develop less stereotypic perceptions of themselves, these astereotypic self-beliefs may 
reduce their adherence to traditional gender role beliefs and gender essentialism.  I return 
to this discussion in chapter 6.
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Figure 2.2: Schematic of Co-Construction and Significant Results (and Direction) 
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Figure 2.3: Latent Variable Construction and CFA for Feminine  
Self-Conceptions, Year 2 and 5, Standardized Coefficients 
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Figure 2.4: Latent Variable Construction and CFA for Traditional 
Gender Role Beliefs, Year 2 and 5, Standardized Coefficients 
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Figure 2.5: Latent Variable Construction and CFA for 
 Feminine Gender Category Beliefs, Year 2 and 5 
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Figure 2.6: Latent Variable Construction and CFA for  
Gender Essentialist Beliefs, Year 2 and 5 (Standardized Coefficients   
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Table 2.1: Self-Conception and Gender Schemas Questions 
 
  
Question Response Options 
Response 
Values 
Years 
Surveyed 
Self-Conception Questions 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Usually I am… 
Individualistic  Cooperative 
Work w/ things   Work w/ people 
Asocial  Social 
Logical  Illogical 
Systematic  Unsystematic 
Masculine  Feminine 
Unemotional  Emotional 
Unfriendly  Friendly 
1 to 7 2, 3, 4, 5 
Gender Schemas Questions 
Gender Category Beliefs 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Usually, others of my same sex are… 
Individualistic  Cooperative 
Work w/ things   Work w/ people 
Asocial  Social 
Logical  Illogical 
Systematic  Unsystematic 
Masculine  Feminine 
Unemotional  Emotional 
Unfriendly  Friendly 
1 to 7 2, 3, 4, 5 
Gender Role Beliefs 
Wife should willingly take husband‘s name at marriage. 
Women should not let bearing children stand in the way of a career if 
she wants it (reverse coded) 
Women can have full and happy life without marrying (reverse coded). 
I consider myself a feminist (recode). 
Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 to 5 2, 5 
Gender Essentialist Beliefs 
There are some jobs and professions that are more suitable for men than 
for women 
Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 to 5 2, 5 
I expect members of the opposite sex to act differently than me at work. 
The trend of occupational sex segregation in the U.S. exists because 
men and women are naturally talented at different things. 
Men and women should have equal rights, but they are different by 
nature. 
Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 to 5 5 
Demographic Information [Years Surveyed] 
Gender [1]                                                              School [1, 2, 3, 4] 
Race/Ethnicity  [1]                                                 Religiosity [2] 
Family Income [1]                                                  Political Conservatism [2] 
Parents‘ Education [1]                                            Sexual Identity [2, 5]  
Parents‘ Occupation[1]                                          Whether born in U.S. or elsewhere [1] 
Religiosity [2]                                                         Detailed Post-Graduation Occupation [5] 
Detailed Academic Major [1, 2, 3, 4]                     Detailed Post-Graduation Graduate or Professional School [5] 
Detailed Academic Minor [1, 2, 3, 4] 
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Table 2.2: Means and Standard Deviations for Men and Women, Year 2 and Year 5 
  
 
  WOMEN MEN 
  Gender 
Difference 
 
Year 2 
(n=298) 
     Year 5           
    (n=167) 
    Year 2  
   (n=304) 
     Year 5 
    (n=176) 
Yr2 
   p 
Yr5 
  p 
Self-Conception 
Measures Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
  I am Feminine  5.34 1.01 5.20  1.05 2.66 1.04 2.66  0.89 *** *** 
I am Cooperative  3.46 1.53 3.15 1.64 3.53 1.59 3.32 1.67 
  I am Social  5.00 1.42 5.22 1.26 4.76 1.60 5.04 1.32 
  I am Unsystematic  2.74 1.35 2.52 1.12 2.70 1.31 2.63 1.21 
  I am Illogical  2.54 1.21 2.43 1.12 2.03 1.00 1.94 1.02 *** *** 
I am Emotional  4.99 1.27 5.01 1.19 3.99 1.56 4.01 1.45 *** *** 
I am Friendly  5.72 1.06 5.85 0.94 5.59 1.12 5.64 0.90 
 
* 
I am People-Oriented  4.39 1.83 4.97 1.56 4.33 1.69 4.70 1.63 
 
+ 
    
  
  
   
  
   Gender Category 
Beliefs   
  
  
   
  
  Same Sex: Feminine  -- -- 5.45  0.74 -- -- 2.54  0.71 -- *** 
Same Sex: Cooperative  4.18 1.50 4.08 1.39 3.72 1.33 3.24 1.12 *** *** 
           Same Sex: Social  5.44 1.08 5.58 0.94 4.69 1.32 4.79 1.31 *** *** 
           Same Sex: Illogical  3.79 1.20 3.79 1.14 3.17 1.36 3.29 1.16 *** *** 
           Same Sex: Unsystem. 3.68 1.10 3.56 1.05 3.17 1.36 3.43 1.07 *** 
 Same Sex:  Emotional  5.67 1.01 5.43 0.92 3.06 1.02 3.42 0.98 *** *** 
Same Sex: Friendly  5.13 1.08 5.09 0.96 4.59 1.21 4.62 0.97 *** *** 
           Traditional Gender 
Role Beliefs 
(5=Strongly Agree; 
1=Strongly Disagree)   
  
  
   
  
  Wife should take 
husband‘s name 2.59 1.12 1.98 1.11 3.17 1.18 2.73 1.18 *** *** 
Women can live a 
full/happy lives w/o 
marrying (rev. coded) 1.83 0.96 1.50 0.86 2.10 1.11 1.81 1.03 *** *** 
Women shouldn‘t let 
kids stand in way of 
career (rev. coded) 1.99 1.00 1.71 0.89 2.41 1.16 2.10 1.10 *** *** 
I consider myself a 
feminist (rev. coded) 2.79 1.17 2.36 1.12 3.56 1.18 3.40 1.24 *** *** 
           Gender Essentialism 
(5=Strongly Agree; 
1=Strongly Disagree)   
  
  
   
  
  Some jobs better suited 
for men 3.33 1.26 3.47 1.32 2.62 1.23 2.70 1.30 *** *** 
I expect members of 
opposite sex to act 
differently  -- -- 3.51 1.23  -- -- 3.62 1.17  -- 
 M and W naturally 
talented at diff. things -- -- 3.80  1.19 -- -- 3.33 1.28  -- *** 
Have equal rights, but 
are different by nature. -- -- 2.46  1.25 -- -- 2.08  0.99 -- *** 
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Table 2.3: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Self-Conceptions with Traditional Gender Role Beliefs and Controls 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Traditional Gender Role 
Beliefs 
.165 .122 
 
-.218 .105 
* 
MIT -.694 .191 *** -.024 .109 
 Smith -.176 .161 
 
  
 Olin -.108 .245 
 
-.141 .176 
 African-American -.376 .225 + .143 .307 
 Hispanic or Latino -.080 .179 
 
-.150 .162 
 Asian or Asian-American .111 .124 
 
.154 .126 
 Chi-squared (df) 131.0 (67)  
 
99.0 (60)  
 RMSEA .045  
 
.048  
 CFI .937  
 
.853  
 R
2
  .200  
 
.146  
  
Table 2.4: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Self-Conceptions with Year 2 Feminine Gender Category Beliefs and 
Controls 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 Same Sex is 
Feminine 
.291 .136 
* 
.646 .541 
 MIT -.714 .192 ** -.071 .168 
 Smith -.189 .158 
    Olin -.213 .249 
 
-.134 .253 
 African-American -.432 .231 + .201 .469 
 Hispanic or Latino -.029 .188 
 
-.389 .255 
 Asian or Asian-American .163 .127 
 
.250 .189 
 Chi-squared (df) 119.6 (67)  
 
74.7 (60)  
 RMSEA .040  
 
.029  
 CFI .943  
 
.949  
 R
2 
.219  .078  
 
Table 2.5: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Self-Conceptions with Year 5 Feminine Gender Category Beliefs and 
Controls 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y5 Same Sex is 
Feminine 
.233 .082 
** 
.277 .123 
* 
MIT -.783 .193 *** -.098 .121 
 Smith -.197 .157 
    Olin -.189 .253 
 
-.066 .170 
 African-American -.374 .230 
 
.365 .348 
 Hispanic or Latino -.047 .190 
 
-.252 .185 
 Asian or Asian-American .172 .129 
 
.120 .132 
 Chi-squared (df) 142.6 (81)  
 
130.0 (73)  
 RMSEA .040  
 
0.051  
 CFI .948  
 
0.845  
 R
2 
.238  .154  
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Table 2.6: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Self-Conceptions with Year 2 Gender Essentialist Beliefs and Controls 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 Gender Essentialism .076 .043 + -.239 .078 ** 
MIT -.527 .192 ** -.096 .205 
 Smith -.245 .170 
    Olin -.300 .278 
 
-.146 .301 
 African-American .417 .249 + .410 .575 
 Hispanic or Latino -.047 .208 
 
-.466 .298 
 Asian or Asian-American -.001 .142 
 
.536 .232 
 Chi-squared (df) 38.5 (32)  
 
36.5 (28)  
 RMSEA .020  
 
.033  
 CFI .990  
 
.955  
 R
2 
.112  .151  
 
Table 2.7: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Self-Conceptions with Year 5 Gender Essentialist Beliefs and Controls 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y5 Gender Essentialism .108 .050 * -.315 .108 *** 
MIT -.489 .142 *** -.012 .178 
 Smith -.126 .109 
    Olin -.100 .172 
 
-.084 .258 
 African-American -.202 .155 
 
.183 .498 
 Hispanic or Latino -.064 .129 
 
-.302 .259 
 Asian or Asian-American .037 .093 
 
.442 .211 * 
Chi-squared (df) 79.7 (67)  
 
103.0 (60)  
 RMSEA .020  
 
.050  
 CFI .988  
 
.869  
 R
2 
.216  .200  
 
Table 2.8: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in 
Feminine Self-Conceptions (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Traditional Gender Role 
Beliefs 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. 
Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate S.E. 
 Traditional Gender Role Beliefs .101 .090 
 
-.384 .184 + 
Year 2 Feminine Self-Conceptions .559 .120 *** 1.007 .266 *** 
MIT -.338 .140 * -.191 .179 
 Smith .025 .126 
 
  
 Olin .024 .191 
 
-.192 .275 
 African-American -.415 .182 * -2.757 .870 *** 
Hispanic or Latino .003 .140 
 
-.551 .259 * 
Asian or Asian-American .103 .098 
 
.577 .213 * 
Chi-squared (df) 214.6 (133)  
 
197.7 (122)  
 RMSEA .036  
 
.047  
 CFI .936  
 
.838  
 R
2 
.788  .840  
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Table 2.9: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in  
Feminine Self-Conceptions (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Feminine Gender 
Category Beliefs 
 
 
Table 2.10: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in  
Feminine Self-Conceptions (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Gender Essentialist Belief 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 Gender Essentialism -.014 .018 
 
-.177 .065 ** 
Y2 Feminine Self-Conceptions .905 .325 ** 1.007 .249 *** 
MIT -.233 .095 * -.181 .170 
 Smith -.029 .073 
    Olin -.013 .116 
 
-.133 .247 
 African-American -.237 .116 * -2.771 .789 *** 
Hispanic or Latino -.001 .087 
 
-.704 .256 *** 
Asian or Asian-American .093 .063 
 
.701 .211 *** 
Chi-squared (df) 93.4 (83)  
 
130.6 (75)  
 RMSEA .016  
 
.051  
 CFI .990  
 
.861  
 R
2
 .548  .813  
 
Table 2.11: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Traditional Gender Role Beliefs with Year 2 Feminine Self-Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine .178 .107 + -.248 .118 * 
MIT -.300 .141 * .105 .085 
 Smith -.749 .146 ***   
 Olin -.407 .209 + .132 .197 
 African-American -.500 .191 ** .479 .207 * 
Hispanic or Latino -.006 .155 
 
.005 .170 
 Asian or Asian-American .388 .110 *** .393 .119 * 
Chi-squared (df) 109.3 (67)  
 
108.5 (60)  
 RMSEA .036  
 
.033  
 CFI .952  
 
.920  
 R
2 .365  .241  
 
 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 Same Sex is Feminine -.105 .121 
 
.040 .086 
 Y2 Feminine Self-Conceptions .606 .135 *** .868 .247 *** 
MIT -.367 .142 ** -.191 .160 
 Smith -.045 .121 
    Olin .001 .192 
 
-.065 .233 
 African-American -.360 .181 * -1.056 1.820 * 
Hispanic or Latino -.027 .145 
 
-.544 .243 * 
Asian or Asian-American .136 .099 
 
.523 .201 ** 
Chi-squared (df) 216.3 (133)  
 
191.3 (122)  
 RMSEA .036  
 
.045  
 CFI .932  
 
.862  
 R
2 
.571  .769  
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Table 2.12: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5 
Feminine Gender Category Beliefs with Year 2 Feminine Self-Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine .024 .120 
 
-.003 .015 
 MIT -.037 .159 
 
.098 .111 
 Smith -.394 .147 **   
 Olin -.099 .237 
 
.058 .158 
 African-American .383 .215 + -.221 .356 
 Hispanic or Latino -.162 .179 
 
.084 .157 
 Asian or Asian-American -.008 .119 
 
-.046 .118 
 Chi-squared (df) 125.7 (81)  
 
130.8 (73)  
 RMSEA .034  
 
.053  
 CFI .957  
 
.798  
 R
2 
.083  .010  
 
Table 2.13: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Year 5  
Gender Essentialist Beliefs with Year 2 Feminine Self-Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine .484 .225 * -.869 .371 ** 
MIT -.121 .228 
 
.098 .205 
 Smith -.530 .185 **   
 Olin -.345 .300 
 
-.218 .296 
 African-American .293 .267 
 
.087 .571 
 Hispanic or Latino .080 .225 
 
-.046 .296 
 Asian or Asian-American .693 .156 *** .687 .226 * 
Chi-squared (df) 79.7 (67)  
 
103.0 (60)  
 RMSEA .020  
 
.050  
 CFI .988  
 
.869  
 R
2 
.225  .229  
 
Table 2.14: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in 
Traditional Gender Role Beliefs (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Feminine Self-
Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine .163 .120 
 
-.124 .016 + 
Y2 Tradtl Gender Role Beliefs .770 .119 *** 1.076 .261 *** 
MIT -.184 .169 
 
.046 .112 
 Smith -.484 .166 **   
 Olin -.256 .254 
 
.173 .181 
 African-American .369 .228 
 
.139 .360 
 Hispanic or Latino .009 .187 
 
.175 .159 
 Asian or Asian-American -.239 .131 + .219 .122 + 
Chi-squared (df) 224.6 (117)  
 
184.3 (107)  
 RMSEA .044  
 
.050  
 CFI .918  
 
.836  
 R
2 
.618  .752  
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Table 2.15: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in 
Feminine Gender Category Beliefs (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Feminine Self-
Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine -.072 .113 
 
.003 .004 
 Y2 Feminine Gender Categ. Beliefs .255 .133 * .799 .445 
 MIT -.064 .130 
 
.014 .037 
 Smith -.279 .123 *   
 Olin -.140 .194 
 
-.071 .063 
 African-American .166 .176 
 
-.175 .136 
 Hispanic or Latino -.094 .146 
 
-.043 .057 
 Asian or Asian-American .015 .097 
 
.021 .041 
 Chi-squared (df) 184.7 (117)  
 
195.8 (107)  
 RMSEA .034  
 
.054  
 CFI .939  
 
.794  
 R
2 
.514  .471  
 
 
Table 2.16: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates of SEM Predicting Change in 
Gender Essentialist Beliefs (Year 2 to Year 5) with Year 2 Feminine Self-
Conceptions 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
 
Unst. 
Estimate S.E. 
 
Unst. Estimate S.E. 
 Y2 SC: Feminine .026 .153 
 
-.067 .059 
 Y2 Gender Essentialist Beliefs .607 .046 *** .618 .063 *** 
MIT -.160 .202 
 
.203 .178 
 Smith -.485 .187 **   
 Olin -.645 .300 * .101 .260 
 African-American .349 .271 
 
-.419 .553 
 Hispanic or Latino .384 .226 + .227 .254 
 Asian or Asian-American .357 .155 * .068 .193 
 Chi-squared (df) 37.6 (36)  
 
83.6 (32)  
 RMSEA .009  
 
.075  
 CFI .991  
 
.817  
 R
2 
.654  .378  
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The Self-Expressive Edge of Sex-Segregation: The Role of Gender Schemas and Self-
Conceptions in College Major Selection and Career Launch  
 
 
 
Chapter 3— Who Chooses Sex-Segregated Degrees? The Role of Individual-Level 
Beliefs on College Major Selection and Change 
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 The demography of a typical college course in elementary education looks 
strikingly different than that of a course in physics.  While some fields such as business 
and marketing have roughly equal proportions of men and women, the majority of 
academic majors are at least 70 percent female or male (Digest of Educational Statistics 
2009).  This segregation is important to understand in its own right, and sex-segregation 
in degree credentials also contributes to sex segregation in occupations.   
 The previous chapter demonstrated that gender schemas and self-conceptions are 
co-constructed.  What, then, is the relationship between these gendered self-conceptions 
and the academic fields of study that men and women choose?  This chapter examines 
how these culturally informed self-conceptions influence whether respondents graduate 
with male-dominated or female-dominated degrees. 
 I begin by briefly reviewing the literature on sex segregation in higher education.  
I then present my theory and hypotheses for how self-conceptions influence college 
major selection through the process of self-expression, and how these self-expressive 
major choices, in turn, reproduce sex segregation in higher education.  I show in this 
chapter that self-conceptions are indeed predictors of college degree selection.  Women 
with self-conceptions that align most closely with stereotypical traits associated with 
women (i.e. feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented) are more likely to graduate 
with degrees in female-dominated subjects.  Men who perceive themselves as less 
systematic are more likely to choose female-dominated degrees, and men who perceive 
themselves as people-oriented are more likely to move into more female-dominated 
majors as they progress through college.  These results are consistent with my analysis of 
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the likelihood of choosing several individual male-dominated or female-dominated 
degrees.  The chapter ends with a discussion of these findings and what they mean for 
respondents‘ career choices after college. 
 Not only does this chapter demonstrate that self-conceptions predict whether 
respondents choose  male- or female-dominated college majors, it also showed that these 
effects happen in segregation-reproducing ways: those most likely to choose the most 
sex-segregated majors are also those most likely to have perceptions of themselves that 
embody stereotypic traits of men and women. Chapter 4 will analyze how self-
conceptions influence sex segregation in career launch activities. 
3.1 Horizontal Sex Segregation in Higher Education  
Women made impressive inroads into higher education after the passage of Title 
IX (Charles & Bradley 2002). Women now make up the majority of college students, 
they earn 58 percent of all bachelor‘s degrees, and finish their degrees more quickly than 
men (Buchmann et al. 2008).   Similarly, sex segregation in higher education has 
decreased substantially since the 1950s and 1960s: the dissimilarity index across fields of 
study fell from 40 percent in 1965 to 19 percent in 1995 (Gerber & Cheung 2008).  As 
with many other dimensions of gender inequality, however, desegregation of college 
majors stalled in the 1990s (Cotter et al. 2011).   There remains substantial segregation 
across fields of study and men crowd in academic majors that are most likely to translate 
into high-paying, prestigious occupations (male-dominated) occupations (Gerber & 
Cheung 2008).  I briefly review the existing social science explanations for this enduring 
segregation and situate my approach within them. 
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Economic approaches argue that this sex segregation emerges out of men‘s and 
women‘s rational choices to maximize their lifetime earnings.  I reviewed these human 
capital explanations in the introduction for occupational sex segregation in general, but 
there has been an influential literature on the choice of academic majors in particular.  
First, Polachek (1981), Becker (1993) and others argue that women, guided by ―cost-
benefit‖ calculations, prefer college majors that will be connected to occupations with 
high earnings right out of college (presumably before women have children), and have 
flatter earnings profiles that will minimize the cost of interruptions to employment in 
order to care for children.  As discussed in the introduction, these human capital 
explanations have come under strong criticism (see D‘Amico 1987; England 1984, 1982). 
Secondly, a ―comparative advantage‖ theory suggests that because women out-
perform men in female-dominated majors, women choose such majors to maximize their 
possibility of having a positive outcome to their investment in higher education (Barone 
2011).  However, even with middle-range grade point averages, women have more 
opportunities to attain highly-paid occupations with a male-dominated degree than a 
female-dominated degree (Gerber & Cheung 2008).  
A third assumption is that women do not have the high school preparation in math 
and science and thus do not choose male-dominated college majors.   This may have been 
the case several decades ago, when women‘s math scores and preparation lagged men‘s, 
but men and women now take equally-demanding math classes in high school, they are 
more likely to have taken biology and chemistry classes than men, and earn better grades 
on average in these classes than their male peers (Buchmann et al. 2008).  Secondly, 
while women‘s math and science preparation may be on par with men‘s, women assess 
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their own abilities lower than men do.  These biased self-assessments, net of math ability, 
preparation, and performance, lead women to be less likely than men to enter college 
with math and science majors (Correll 2004). 
Rejecting rational actor explanations, sociologists and social psychologists have 
argued that structural and cultural processes lead to the perpetuation of sex segregation in 
higher education.  First, the combination of diversified higher education systems, 
increasingly more elaborate educational niches, and high female employment rates in 
recent decades exacerbates sex segregation in higher education (Charles & Bradley 
2002).  When students are given greater latitude to choose their field, they tend to 
reproduce this segregation.  Others have argued that desegregation happens most often in 
the most prestigious institutions, meaning that the effects of such desegregation are 
unlikely to make widespread change (Gerber & Cheung 2008).  I see this in the data I use 
here:  women are more highly represented in male-dominated fields at MIT and Olin than 
at UMass. 
From a cultural perspective, boys and girls are encouraged to pursue different 
interests and develop different skills (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999): girls tend to read 
more often than boys, and boys have more practice with formal reasoning than girls.  
This socialization is believed to influence the types of interests that young men and 
women develop in high school and the college majors they eventually intend to select 
(Watt & Eccles 2008).   Similarly, the role expectations literature (reviewed in the 
Introduction) argues that women and men are socialized to expect to take on different 
roles, and thus make career decisions based on their beliefs about how best to balance 
those roles.  Women who are socialized to expect that they will take on childcare and 
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spousal support roles will choose majors they believe will lead to more flexible or family-
friendly occupations.  This theory, however, suffers from the same problems as rational 
choice explanations. 
The socialization literature is problematic because the college majors that men 
and women choose are often far afield from their interests as children. Jacobs (1989) 
argues that such socialized preferences are only effective to the extent that they are 
sustained by external discriminatory and sanctioning mechanisms of social control.   
Mechanisms that sustain gendered interests and preferences do not necessarily 
have to be external, however.  Sociologists have recently argued that the resilience of sex 
segregation of college majors is due in part to individual-level cultural processes. Charles 
and Bradley (2009) argue that many men and women make college major decisions along 
still-popular essentialist notions of gendered tasks.  Men and women may ―indulge their 
gendered selves‖ in their choice of academic majors, seeking self-fulfillment and to be 
part of fields that are extensions of themselves (Charles & Bradley 2009).  I examine the 
extent to which perceptions of self influence the individual-level reproduction of sex 
segregation by attending to respondents‘ decisions about college majors.  In particular, I 
am interested in how these beliefs predict college sex segregation scores (i.e. the percent 
women in each respondents‘ majors) as an outcome variable. 
As discussed in chapter 1, there are forceful normative trends of choosing majors 
for self-expressive reasons.  If selves are gendered, self-expressive major selection should 
be gendered as well.   College presents relative freedom to align one‘s career goals with 
one‘s personal interests in ways that are much less costly than when they have entered the 
labor market.  A student can be an aspiring chemist one semester, a musician the next, 
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and end up graduating with a degree in political science.  Making such rapid changes in 
one‘s career trajectory once in the workforce would be difficult, if not impossible.  This 
flexibility, unparalleled in other parts of the career path, should provide the best 
conditions for making career decisions along self-expressive lines.  This makes it an ideal 
location to study how gendered self-conceptions influence men‘s and women‘s career 
decisions. 
 As demonstrated in the last chapter, self-conceptions are deeply interwoven with 
cultural beliefs about gender.  These gendered self-conceptions do not necessarily appear 
gendered to the individuals who hold them, however; they may simply appear 
individualistic. The expression of these self-conceptions in academic major selection can 
reproduce sex segregation in higher education but this self-expression might not seem 
gendered to those enacting it.   
3.2 Self-Conceptions and Self-Expressive Major Selection 
Gendered self-conceptions can be translated into gendered self-expressive major 
selection as men and women match their self-conceptions with stereotypes about male- 
and female-dominated fields writ large, regardless of the actual content of those fields, or 
with stereotypes about the specific content or skills required of individual fields.
40
   In the 
first of these self-expressive processes, young men and women match their self-
conceptions with broad, stereotypical assumptions associated with fields that are male-
                                                 
40
 This is roughly how I expect this process to occur.  Post-dissertation, I will analyze the qualitative data 
on respondents talking about their decisions about major selection and career launch for insights into the 
process by which self-conceptions turn into self-expressive career decisions.  What are students responding 
to? The content of the fields? The professional role?  The characteristics of the typical practitioners of those 
fields?  I think such a chapter would enrich my discussion of this ―self-expressive edge‖ of sex-segregation 
by allowing me to give specific details about how this happens at the individual level. 
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typed and female-typed.  These stereotypes exist partially separate from the actual 
activities that make up these fields and are an incarnation of the stereotypes broadly 
associated with women and men.  Female-typed fields are generally associated with traits 
stereotypically assigned to women (e.g. feminine, people-oriented, unsystematic), and 
male-typed fields are associated with traits stereotypically assigned to men—e.g. 
masculine, systematic, and objects-oriented.   As an act of self-expression, respondents 
may match their self-conceptions with these stereotypes.  It is unlikely that many students 
explicitly or intentionally base their decisions on the demographic representation of 
women or men in a certain field.  To reiterate the quote from chapter 1, it is no longer 
culturally legitimate to claim that ―I am choosing this major because I am a man,‖ but 
rather, ―I choose this major because it suits me.‖ 
The second process is the cumulative effect of gendered stereotypes about the 
activities and traits that make up the fields along the male-dominated to female-
dominated spectrum.  The activities and skills that comprise an elementary education 
degree, for example, are stereotypically associated with women, while the activities and 
skills that comprise a mechanical engineering degree are stereotypically associated with 
men.  Women and men who match their gendered self-conceptions to the stereotypes of 
the characteristic tasks of these fields will help to reproduce sex segregation in college 
majors through these ―self-expressive‖ choices. 
The cultural stereotypes assigned to any given field (or the tasks and skills 
assumed to be needed or valued in that field), however, are not necessarily accurate 
representations of the kinds of skills that are required to succeed in a field. The beliefs 
about what it means to be a competent student in a field are sensitive to the demographic 
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representation of men and women within them (England et al. 1996).  Thus, the skills and 
sensibilities assumed to be essential to success in a given field are usually only a 
selection of the skills actually required of that field—emphases and de-emphases that 
happen along gendered lines.  Nursing requires skills in logic, knowledge and 
manipulation of machinery, and mental calculations, while engineering requires 
teamwork and communication skills, but such skills are de-emphasized in these 
respective fields, perhaps because they are contrary to the gender-typing of these fields.  
In this chapter, I examine the effects of gendered self-conceptions on whether 
students select male-dominated or female-dominated majors, and whether students select 
individual male-typed or female-typed majors.  I expect that women and men with more 
feminine, unsystematic and more people-oriented self-conceptions will be more likely to 
graduate with female-dominated degrees than their peers. I also predict that they will be 
more likely to graduate with degrees in humanities and social sciences (examples of 
individual female-typed fields) and be less likely to graduate with degrees in physical 
sciences and engineering (examples of individual male-typed fields). I end with a 
discussion of these results and lead into the following chapter. 
3.3 Hypotheses  
To investigate the possibility that expression of gendered self-conceptions leads to 
gendered decisions about college majors, I examine the effects of several types of self-
conceptions on the probability that men and women will choose male-dominated or 
female-dominated majors.  I focus on three particular self-conception spectrums: 
perception of oneself as feminine (versus masculine), as unsystematic (versus 
systematic), and as people-oriented (versus things-oriented).  I use multiple self-
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conceptions in an attempt to show that any effects I find are likely not specific to a 
narrowly-defined type of self-conception.  My purpose is to show how self-conceptions, 
in general, could influence career launch decisions.  It should not be assumed that these 
are the only self-conceptions that influence career launch; rather they are useful 
exemplars of substantive categories of self-beliefs.  If I find an effect of self-conceptions 
here, it is likely there are many other self-conceptions that follow the same pattern.   
First, I examine whether respondents‘ perceptions of themselves as masculine or 
feminine affect their choice of female-dominated or male-dominated college degree 
fields.  As discussed in chapter 2, the feminine self-conception measure should be a 
salient factor in self-expressive decision-making related to sex-segregation. I expect self-
expressive patterns of career selection to unfold such that students with self-conceptions 
traditionally stereotyped as more feminine will be more likely to earn female-dominated 
degrees and be more likely to move into an even more female-dominated majors.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, perceptions of self as masculine or feminine is the central axis of 
gendered identity differentiation and holds power for both men and women (Eccles 
1999).  In addition to feminine self-conceptions, I am also interested in how respondents‘ 
perceptions of themselves as unsystematic influence their decisions about college majors.  
Men are stereotypically characterized as more ―systematic‖ than women (Lee, 1998).  
This measure is particularly important for capturing the self-expressive processes leading 
people into (or away from) male dominated fields such as science and engineering that 
are presumed to require strong skills in logical and systematic thinking (Faulkner, 2000; 
McIlwee & Robinson, 1992).   
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 Third, I examine the relationship between respondents‘ perceptions of themselves 
as people-oriented or things-oriented and the sex-segregation of the degree fields they 
select.  College majors that are female-dominated are often stereotyped as ideal for 
individuals who ―like to work with people‖ (e.g. elementary school teaching and 
nursing).  Many male-dominated fields are stereotyped as ―things‖ or ―objects-focused,‖ 
where the majority of a practitioner‘s time is engaged in working with objects (e.g. 
machines, tools) rather than people (Bem, 1993; Coltrane, 1998; Valian, 1999).  These 
distinctions are quite arbitrary in practice, as most occupations require work with both 
people and things.   Even the fields like engineering which are widely-stereotyped as 
―things-oriented‖ have extensive social and communicative aspects (Faulkner, 2000).  
Nonetheless, the cultural distinction between people-focused and things-focused fields 
are consistent with the sex-typing of fields.  I thus expect that people who perceive 
themselves as people-oriented will be more likely to choose degree fields that are female-
dominated, while those who perceive themselves as things-oriented will be more likely to 
choose male-dominated degree fields.  
3.4 Methods 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variable of interest is a measure of the percent women in 
respondents‘ college degree that ranges from 0-100% women. I call this measure the 
degree sex-segregation score.  A positive coefficient predicting this scale means that 
respondents with that characteristic are more likely to be enrolled in a female-dominated 
major; negative predictor coefficients would imply characteristics that lead respondents 
to enroll in male-dominated majors.  I identified a college sex-segregation score for each 
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person by matching their detailed college major (identified by year 5 transcript data and 
year 4 survey questions) with national statistics of the percent women in each of these 
fields.  I referenced the statistics computed by the National Science Foundation‘s 
Division of Science Resource Statistics for the percent women in science and 
engineering-related degrees
41
 and the National Center for Education Statistics‘ Digest of 
Educational Statistics for the percent women in non-science or engineering degrees.
42
  
Appendix 2 provides a more detailed description of the coding process and how I dealt 
with individuals with dual degrees. 
 I also created a measure of the change in respondents‘ college sex-segregation 
scores in descriptive and demographic models.  To create this variable, I subtracted the 
percent female in the majors in which they enrolled in year 1 from the percent female in 
the fields in which they eventually earned their degrees: 
[sex segregation change score in college = (% women in degree field) – (% women in year 1 
major)] 
 For example, individuals with a positive change score moved into more female-
dominated degree fields then the ones in which they originally majored.  I use this change 
score in the descriptive analysis; I model change in the causal models by including 
respondents‘ entrance major sex-segregation scores in the structural equation models 
predicting sex-segregation scores in their degrees.  
 To see whether the trends identified with the sex segregation scores hold across 
individual male-typed, gender balanced, and female-typed majors, I examine the effects 
of self-conceptions on the likelihood of choosing individual majors.  I run demographic 
                                                 
41 NSF detailed majors data: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/wmpd/pdf/tabc-5.pdf 
42
 Digest of Educational Statistics: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_286.asp 
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OLS models and structural equation models individually for two female-typed majors 
(arts and humanities and social sciences), two gender balanced fields (business and 
biology), and two male-typed majors (engineering and physical sciences). 
Independent Variables   
 I rely on several sets of independent variables to conduct this analysis.  First, I use 
the year 2 latent measure of feminine self-conceptions presented in chapter 2 to predict 
sex-segregation scores.  The year 2 latent measures for feminine self-conceptions are 
comprised of five attitudinal spectrum scales: ―Usually I am very masculine‖ to ―very 
feminine‖ (on a 1 to 7 scale), ―usually I am very unemotional‖ to ―very emotional‖ (1 to 
7 scale), ―usually I am very unfriendly‖ to ―very friendly‖ (1 to 7 scale), ―usually I am 
very uncooperative‖ to ―very cooperative‖ (1 to 7 scale), and ―usually I am very asocial‖ 
to ―very social‖ (1 to 7 scale).43  I created an additional latent variable to capture 
respondents‘ perceptions of themselves as ―unsystematic.‖  I use two manifest variables 
to construct the latent variable for unsystematic self-conceptions: ―usually I am very 
systematic‖ to ―very unsystematic‖ (1 to 7 scale) and ―usually I am very logical‖ to ―very 
illogical‖ (1 to 7 scale).44  
 A third self-conception I examine is respondents‘ belief that they are better suited 
for working with people rather than things.  For this, I use a single indicator, ―Usually I 
like to work with things‖ to ―Usually I like to work with people‖ (1 to 7).  Because there 
are no other indicators with which I could build a latent variable, I use the ―people-
                                                 
43
 See chapter 2 for men‘s and women‘s CFAs for year 2 feminine self-conceptions. 
44
 The systematic/unsystematic measure is the reference indicator in the latent variable; I constrained the 
variance of the error term on this manifest variable to 1 to allow for model identification.  Year 2 CFAs for 
men and women:  χ2=0, df=0, CFI=1.000, RMSEA=.000. Standardized regression weights for men: .620 
for ―I am illogical‖ and .645 for ―I am unsystematic.‖  Standardized regression weights for women: .667 for 
―I am illogical‖ and ―.670 for ―I am unsystematic.‖ 
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oriented‖ measure as a single manifest variable predicting sex-segregation scores and 
their change scores.  Tests for discriminant validity of these self-conception measures 
were significant at the .000 level for both men and women.
 45
 
 As discussed in chapter 2, it would be impossible to capture individuals‘ entire 
conceptions of themselves in a survey instrument.  Instead, I use three career-relevant 
self-conceptions that are highly gendered and are themes that are likely to be invoked in 
self-expressive decision-making. I showed that the ―feminine‖ self-conceptions are co-
constructed with cultural gender beliefs in the previous chapter.  To make the argument 
that gender schemas act through self-conceptions to reinforce occupational sex 
segregation, it is enough that I show that some culturally-informed self-conceptions 
influence college major selection.  
The demographic models discussed below (and those presented in Appendix 2) 
measure several demographic characteristics on choice of major,  including  respondents‘ 
gender (women=1)
46, whether respondents were born in the U.S. (yes=1), their family‘s 
income (in dollars), whether they identify as gay, lesbian or bisexual (yes=1), their 
political conservatism (1=very liberal to 7=very conservative), how they rate their 
religiosity compared to their peers (1=lowest 10% to 5=highest 10%), and their SAT 
math and verbal scores.   The structural equation models control for the following 
race/ethnicity and school measures: whether respondents identify as African-American 
(yes=1), Hispanic or Latino (yes=1) or Asian or Asian-American (yes=1), or non-
Hispanic white (yes=1; reference category); whether they attended MIT (yes=1), Olin 
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 I also ensured that each manifest variable was not more correlated with a measure outside of its latent 
variable group than it was correlated with the measures in its latent variable group. 
46
 The structural equation models are ran separately for men and women, so they do not include a control 
for gender. 
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(yes=1), Smith (yes=1) or UMass (yes=1; reference category), and their SAT math and 
verbal scores.  
Analytic Strategy 
Table 3.1 presents the univariate and bivariate statistics for college sex 
segregation scores at year 1, at college degree (year 4), and the change in sex segregation 
scores between year 1 and college graduation.  I use OLS regression in Table 3.2 to 
determine the demographic predictors of sex-segregation scores and change in sex-
segregation scores over time.  Since people-oriented self-conception is not measured with 
a latent variable, I examine the effects of this self-conception on the dependent variable 
using OLS regression.  The remainder of the analysis in this chapter uses structural 
equation modeling.  I remind the reader that latent variables are meant to represent 
overarching concepts, the components of which are captured by the manifest variables 
predicted by the latent measure.  The benefit of latent variables is that not all possible 
measures of this concept must be included as manifest variables for the concept to be 
adequately represented by the latent variable (Byrne, 2010).   Table 3.3-3.5 present the 
structural models (the relationships between the latent independent variable and the 
dependent variable) and the controls predicting the degree sex segregation score and 
change scores. Tables 3.6-3.11 present the SEMs and OLS models predicting whether 
students select into specific male-dominated, gender balanced, or female-dominated 
majors.  All models presented in this chapter control for school attended, race/ethnicity, 
and SAT math and verbal scores. (No other demographic factors were significant 
predictors of sex-segregation scores in the demographic models.)  
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As noted in chapter 1, this sample of students from MIT, Olin, Smith and UMass 
is not a representative sample of all institutions of higher education in the United States.  
It is, however, an advantageous sample for examining the effects of self-conceptions on 
academic major selection.  MIT and Olin are elite private institutions that emphasize 
training in male-dominated fields.  Students at these schools experience greater-than-
average pressure to major in the most prestigious (i.e. male-dominated) fields of study at 
these institutions—it is far less prestigious to be a business major at MIT than a physics 
major and these prestige rankings are palpable.  At more mainstream institutions like 
UMass, there is not the same pressure for students to choose male-dominated fields over 
neutral or female-dominated majors.  Therefore, it is a harder case to show that self-
conceptions would have an effect on major selection and change at these institutions than 
in a representative sample of US college students.   
Smith is a useful case for a different reason. Smith has historically be an a locus 
of progressive gender beliefs, where women are challenged to think outside of and 
beyond traditional stereotypes of the types of work that women ―can‖ or ―should‖ do.  It 
should be harder, therefore to find evidence that feminine self-conceptions lead women to 
choose more female-dominated fields when those very lines of social reasoning are 
directly challenged by the culture of the institution.  I expect that the self-expressive 
decision-making trends I document here would be even stronger in a more representative 
sample of college students.  
 The next section details the demographic trends of respondents‘ college degrees. 
The following section presents the models predicting percent women in respondents‘ 
college degrees and the changes in sex-segregation scores between their year 1 majors 
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and their eventual degrees. Since self-conceptions were only measured in year 2 and 5, I 
cannot use self-conceptions to predict the majors students initially enter.  I do, however, 
use self-conceptions (plus controls) to predict whether students enter more male- or 
female-dominated majors between college entry and graduation.  
3.5 College Major Selection and Demographic Predictors of Sex Segregation in 
Higher Education 
 Table 3.1 presents the univariate and bivariate statistics for year 1 sex-segregation 
score, college degree sex-segregation score, and the change in sex segregation score 
between year 1 and graduation.  Here, women‘s year 1 and degree sex-segregation scores 
are significantly higher than men‘s scores: men and women perpetuate sex segregation 
with their initial academic major selection and the college degrees they eventually earn.  
The majors that men enter have an average of 26.9% women, compared to 44.6% women 
in the fields that women enter.  By the time they graduate, the average percent women in 
the degrees earned has shifted only slightly: 43.2% for men and 27.1% for women.   
Students who attend MIT and Olin enter and graduate from significantly more male-
dominated fields than UMass students—an expected outcome due to the educational 
focus of both MIT and Olin. These school effects hold for men and women.  Smith 
students are more likely to enter and graduate from female-dominated fields than UMass 
students.  
Over 40 percent of men and women change majors over the course of their 
college careers, but Table 3.1 suggests that these movements do not do much to disturb 
the sex-segregation originating from students‘ initial major selection in year 1.  The 
change scores are near zero both men and women. The histograms presented in figure 3.1 
                                                126 
 
 
 
and 3.2 illustrate that there is some movement of men and women into more male- or 
female-dominated majors in college, but these do not appear to be substantial shifts.  In 
fact, there is no significant difference in the sex segregation change score between men 
and women—men‘s and women‘s major switching does not aggravate (or undermine) the 
significant sex-segregation in their original major selection.  There are no school 
differences in this trend, except that Olin students are more likely than UMass students to 
switch into more male-dominated fields of study. This school effect is likely driven by 
the curriculum at Olin, which does not offer any female-dominated majors.  
The bivariate results largely hold once other factors are controlled.  Table 3.2 
presents the OLS regression models predicting sex-segregation scores of students‘ year 1 
majors and degree fields, and the change in sex segregation scores during college.  The 
models include variables for gender, school attended, race/ethnicity, nativity, family 
income, LGBT status, political conservatism, religiosity, and SAT math and verbal 
scores.  I also ran the models separately by gender.  The model predicting sex segregation 
scores of degree fields include students‘ cumulative GPA as well.  As expected, men 
enter and graduate from significantly more male-dominated fields than women.  The MIT 
and Olin school effects documented above hold for women once other demographic and 
performance measures are controlled, but the only school effect that exists for men is that 
Olin men are more likely than UMass men to enter and graduate from male-dominated 
college majors. SAT scores, a rough and imperfect measurement of skill, shows that men 
and women with higher math SAT scores are likely to enter and graduate with more 
male-dominated majors than students with lower SAT math scores.  Verbal SAT scores 
do not influence women‘s college major choices, but men with high verbal SAT scores 
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are more likely to graduate with a female-dominated degree than men with lower verbal 
SAT scores. GPA does not have a significant effect on sex segregation scores.
47
   
The third set of models in Table 3.2 predicts the change in college sex segregation 
scores between year 1 and graduation.  By including the sex segregation score of year 1 
in a model predicting sex segregation scores of students‘ degrees, these models 
effectively index the change in sex segregation scores over the course of their time in 
college.  Consistent with Table 3.1, gender is not a significant predictor of moving into 
more male or female-dominated majors in college.  None of these demographic and 
performance measures significantly predict women‘s movement between college majors.  
Among men, those who are at Olin are more likely to switch into more male-dominated 
majors than UMass students.  Men with high SAT math scores are more likely to switch 
into more male-dominated majors, and men with high SAT verbal scores are more likely 
to switch into more female-dominated majors. It is interesting that this performance 
measure does not matter for women.  Other literature (e.g. Correll 2001, 2004) has shown 
that women‘s assessments of their skills and competencies in math, net of their abilities 
and performance are weaker than men‘s assessments.   Thus, men‘s exit out of male-
dominated college majors may have more to do with their actual abilities in those fields 
than women‘s movement into and out of majors.  Again, GPA is not related to whether 
men and women move into a more male- or female-dominated major in college. 
Overall, these trends suggest that men‘s and women‘s selection of college majors 
reinforces occupational sex segregation in college majors.  There is some movement of 
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 Due to trends of grade inflation and wide variability in GPAs across institutions, SAT is a more 
consistent measurement of skill. 
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men and women along the spectrum of sex-segregated majors over the course of their 
time in college, but this movement neither aggravates nor undermines the sex segregation 
originally established by men‘s and women‘s initial selection of college majors.  
3.6 Structural Equation and OLS Models with Self-Conception Measures 
 Tables 3.3 through 3.5 present the structural equation and OLS regression models 
predicting sex segregation scores of college degrees and the change in sex segregation 
scores of students‘ majors between year 1 and graduation.  The models in Tables 3.3 
include the feminine self-conception latent measure plus controls for school, 
race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores.  I present the models separately for men 
and women.  In the first set of columns in 3.3, the feminine self-conceptions latent 
measure is significant and positive for women.  This means that every point more 
feminine women perceive themselves to be corresponds to 6.9% more women in their 
college degree fields.  Thus, women who perceive themselves as more feminine than 
their peers are more likely to graduate from a female-dominated major, net of school, 
race/ethnicity, and SAT scores, and those who perceive themselves as more masculine 
than their peers are more likely to graduate from a male-dominated major.   
 The second set of models in Table 3.3 predicts the change in sex segregation 
scores between college entry and graduation.  To the first set of models in this table, I add 
the sex segregation score of students‘ year 1 majors.  This addition effectively means that 
the dependent variable in the second set of models indexes the change in sex segregation 
scores between college entry and graduation.  Masculine or feminine self-conceptions are 
not a significant predictor of changing into more female- or male-dominated majors in 
college for either men or women. 
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 A similar trend holds for unsystematic self-conceptions (Table 3.4).  Women who 
perceive themselves as less systematic then their women peers are more likely to 
graduate with a female-dominated degree.  Men who perceive themselves as less 
systematic then their peers are also more likely to earn a female-dominated degree.  It is 
important that this result holds net of students‘ performance on math and verbal tasks:  
among students with the same math SAT score, students who perceive themselves as less 
systematic than their peers will be more likely to choose female-dominated degrees.  
Controlling for SAT scores helps illustrate that unsystematic self-conceptions are not 
tapping into students‘ actual abilities; but rather their perception of their logical skills—
perceptions that have been shown by social-psychological literature to be fairly 
inaccurate at capturing people‘s objective skills, and, more importantly, such perceptions 
are highly gendered (Correll 2004, 2001). In this process of self-expression, students 
appear to be matching their self-perceptions (which may or may not be related to their 
actual skills) to stereotypes about the fields in which they choose their degrees.   
Unsystematic self-conceptions are not a significant predictor of changing majors, 
however.  
  Table 3.5 includes the people-oriented self-conception measure.  Here again, 
women who perceive themselves as more people-oriented then their peers are more likely 
to earn female-dominated degrees, and women who perceive themselves as more things-
oriented are more likely to earn male-dominate degrees.  People-oriented self-
conceptions are not a significant predictor of the sex segregation score of men‘s degree 
choices.   However, men who have people-oriented self-conceptions are more likely to 
change into a more female-dominated major over the course of their college careers. 
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 A few interesting racial/ethnic differences arose once I controlled for gendered 
self-conceptions.  Net of unsystematic self-conceptions (Tables 3.4), African-American 
men are more likely to enter a male-dominated degree than similar white men.  African-
American men are also more likely to earn an engineering degree than white men (Table 
3.11).  Among women, net of gendered self-conceptions, African-American women are 
more likely than white women to earn a physical sciences degree (Table 3.10) but 
marginally less likely to earn a biology degree (Table 3.9).  These results could be due to 
the combined result of selection effects of high-achieving African-American students into 
the schools in my study (Gerber & Cheung 2008) and, perhaps, the existence of support 
programs for under-represented minority students in male-dominated majors such as 
science and engineering and a lack of them for female-dominated majors.   I also find 
that, net of unsystematic and people-oriented self-conceptions, Asian and Asian-
American men are more likely than white men to earn female-dominated degrees.  Asian-
American men face countervailing stereotypes as both less hegemonically masculine than 
white men (Connell 2005), but also as ―naturally‖ talented at math and science-related 
fields, compared to white men (Eglash 2003).  Perhaps the former stereotype is helping to 
produce this result.  I hope that this analysis will be conducted across other U.S. 
institutions to help determine whether these racial/ethnic differences are the result of a 
selection process or a trend across higher education in the U.S. 
 Discussion 
 These results illustrate that the students in this sample are reproducing 
occupational sex segregation in their college major choices.  Men choose more male-
dominated majors and degrees than women and women choose more female-dominated 
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majors and degrees than men.  While I found that many men and women changed their 
majors over the course of their time in college, this switching neither aggravates nor 
undermines the segregation trends in their initial choice of college majors.  Thus, is 
seems that the early choices students make about their college majors are the most 
important in reproducing sex segregation throughout college.   
 I also found that self-conceptions predict whether men and women graduate with 
male- or female-dominated degrees:  women who perceive themselves as feminine or 
unsystematic and men who perceive themselves as less systematic compared to their 
peers are more likely to earn a female-dominated degree.  Women with people-oriented 
self-conceptions are more likely to earn a female-dominated degree than women with 
more things-oriented self-conceptions, and men with people-oriented self-conceptions are 
more likely switch into more female-dominated majors while in college.  Thus, it is not 
just that women and men help to reproduce the demographic imbalance of their fields of 
study, but rather those who are most likely to choose the most sex-segregated majors are 
also those who are most likely to hold the most stereotypical perceptions of themselves 
(women as feminine, unsystematic and people-oriented; men as systematic and things-
oriented). 
 The sex segregation scores help illustrate respondents‘ individual contributions to 
reproducing sex segregation, and are a single metric for examining the effect of self-
conceptions on where men and women place themselves along this spectrum in response 
to stereotypes about male- and female-dominated fields.  However, it is also useful to 
understand how self-conceptions predict whether men and women enter individual fields 
along that spectrum of female-dominated to male-dominated fields.  The next section 
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examines the relationship between men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions and their 
likelihood of choosing two culturally female-typed majors (social sciences and 
humanities), two relatively gender-neutral majors (business and biology), and two 
culturally male-typed majors (engineering and physical sciences).  Looking at these 
individual fields will help understand whether this is a spectrum-wide phenomenon, 
largely driven by general stereotypes about male-dominated and female-dominated, or 
whether the results just presented are largely driven by students‘ self-expressive 
responses to the stereotypes of a few specific male-dominated or female-dominated 
fields. 
3.7 Demographic predictors of individual majors  
 The analysis of the full sample demonstrates that both men and women with more 
female-typed self-conceptions, relative to their peers, are more likely to graduate with a 
female-dominated major.  It is impossible to tell from this analysis whether these findings 
are the result of a common theme across the male- to-female-dominated spectrum of 
college majors, or whether they are being driven by the trends in one or two individual 
majors.  In order to determine the extent to which this is a spectrum-wide trend, I 
examine the effect of self-conceptions on majoring in two female-dominated fields 
(humanities and social sciences), two gender-neutral fields (business and biology), and 
two male-dominated fields (engineering and physics).  If students are truly responding to 
stereotypes about male-dominated and female-dominated fields (whether those 
stereotypes originate from the types of activities and skills that are assumed to be need 
and valued in those fields, or from the cultural assumptions deriving from the 
representation of men and women in those fields), then more feminine, unsystematic, and 
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more people-oriented self-conceptions should lead men and women to be more likely to 
graduate with degrees in social science and humanities, while masculine, systematic, and 
things-oriented self-conceptions should lead men and women to graduate from male-
dominated fields such as engineering and physics.  
Appendix 2 presents the demographic and performance measures that predict 
graduating with degrees in humanities, social sciences, business, biology, engineering, 
and physical sciences. 
48
  Note that Olin is all engineers, and a large portion of the MIT 
student body are engineers as well, so I have quite a few engineers in the sample.  
However, I have data on the specific type of engineering students are in, and there is 
quite a bit of variation in the representation of women across the engineering fields.  For 
example, the percent women biological and chemical engineering is nearly 30%, while 
the representation in mechanical engineering is only about 8%.  I take advantage of this 
large sample size in chapter 5, when I examine the intra-field cultural forces that lead to 
the reproduction of sex segregation.  Appendix 2 also presents the percent of respondents 
who occupy each large academic majors category from year 1 through graduation.  It also 
presents the logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of choosing each of these 
majors with controls for the same demographic characteristics as used in the OLS models 
for degree sex segregation scores. 
It is possible that the trends documented above using the sex segregation scores 
might be driven by the results of one or two majors.  It is important, therefore, to 
                                                 
48
 Each of these degree categories contains many different types of majors, each with varying 
representation of men and women. However, due to small sample sizes on these individual majors, I opt to 
combine them into larger categories.  A more fined-grained analysis with a larger sample may find 
differences within these degree categories, but I expect that the results would be consistent with the results 
I present here. 
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determine whether the effect of gendered self-conceptions is localized to only a few 
majors or is spread throughout the spectrum of male-dominated and female-dominated 
degrees.   If this is indeed a trend that exists throughout the spectrum of sex segregated 
majors, then more feminine, unsystematic, and more people-oriented self-conceptions 
should be positively related to graduating with a female-dominated degree and should be 
negatively related to graduating with a male-dominated degree.  There should be little 
pattern for those majors that are fairly gender balanced.  Figure 3.3 below illustrates the 
direction of the relationships between the three focal self-conceptions and the likelihood 
of choosing these fields. (I discuss which of these relationships are significant below.) 
The consistency of the pattern is striking: the direction of the feminine, unsystematic, and 
people-oriented self-conceptions is positive in all but one case among the two female-
dominated majors and the direction of the self-conception measures is negative in all 
cases among the male-dominated majors.  The pattern does not hold among the gender-
neutral fields.  Many of these relationships are not significant, but their direction is 
important:  given a larger sample, it is likely that many more of these relationships would 
be significant.  If it were only the male-dominated or female-dominated majors that were 
driving the trends documented with the sex segregation scores, then the patterning in the 
other blocks would be much less clear.    
 Tables 3.6-3.11 present the structural equation and OLS models predicting 
respondents‘ likelihood of choosing individual female-typed degrees with feminine, 
unsystematic, and people-oriented self-conceptions measures, respectively.  The models 
also control for school, race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores.    Significant 
coefficients in these models mean that those factors increase the likelihood that a 
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respondent will earn a degree in that field, compared to other fields.  The first set of 
models  (Table 3.6) predict the likelihood of earning a degree in the humanities.  None of 
the self-conception measures are significantly related to choosing this major for either 
men or women.  There are several self-conceptions that predict men‘s and women‘s 
choice of a social science degree, however (Table 3.7).  Women who perceive themselves 
as feminine are more likely to choose a social sciences major over other majors, and men 
and women who are people-oriented are marginally more likely to have this major as 
well.  
 Table 3.8 and 3.9 predict the likelihood of choosing two gender-neutral majors: 
business and biology.  These gendered self-conceptions are not strong predictors of 
choosing either of these majors.  Women who perceive themselves as unsystematic are 
marginally more likely to earn a biology degree than other majors.  The self-conception 
measures are not significantly related to earning a business major. 
 The gendered self-conceptions I study are important determinants of whether men 
and women earn a degree in the two male-dominated fields.  Women who perceive 
themselves as systematic and men who perceive themselves as things-oriented are more 
likely to choose a physical sciences major over other fields (Table 3.10). Similarly, men 
who perceive themselves as more masculine than their peers are more likely to graduate 
with engineering degree, and women who perceive themselves as things-oriented are 
more likely to graduate in engineering (Table 3.11).   
 
Discussion 
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 The trends in how self-conceptions predict whether men and women enter 
individual majors are consistent with the spectrum-wide trends documented in the first 
part of the chapter.  The direction of the relationships of feminine, unsystematic, and 
people-oriented self-conceptions to individual male- and female-dominated majors 
suggests that the earlier-documented trends are not the result of a handful of individual 
majors that have unusually strong relationships to these self-conception measures.  It 
seems that the stereotypes that accompany fields that are male-dominated and female-
dominated are not benign.  Men and women appear to use these stereotypes to place 
themselves along the spectrum of sex-segregated majors.  
 It is important that these self-conceptions are able to predict selection of certain 
degrees net of students‘ math and verbal SAT scores.  For instance, women‘s 
unsystematic self-conceptions significantly decrease the likelihood that they will choose a 
physical sciences degree (a very math-intensive field of study), even among women with 
the same math skills.  In other words, these self-conceptions are not proxies for students‘ 
abilities to actually fulfill the activities within these fields, but rather their perceptions of 
how well they fit with these beliefs about these fields. 
Do Majors Affect Self-Conceptions Over Time? 
 College is a formative time of personal growth and reflection, influenced by 
events inside and outside the classroom.  As discussed in chapter 5, academic majors 
have embedded within them professional a socialization process, whereby students learn 
values, beliefs, and practices of members of the profession most closely related to their 
academic degree (Becker et al. 1969; Cech et al. 2011; Schleef 206).  We might expect, 
therefore, that college majors would change how students think of themselves over time.  
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To test the reverse causal order—that academic majors influence self-conceptions—I ran 
models (not shown) using the six individual college majors noted above (humanities, 
social sciences, business, biology, engineering, and physical sciences) to predict the 
changes in respondents‘ feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented self-conceptions 
between year 2 and 5.  I found that students‘ majors do not appear to affect their self-
conceptions over time.  I also ran models using the sex segregation score and found that 
the percent female in respondents‘ initial college majors was not related to the change in 
their self-conceptions over time. Thus, contrary to the alternative hypothesis, 
respondents‘ majors do not have much of an effect on these self-conception measures.  
The effects of professional socialization may happen on a longer time horizon than I am 
able to capture here.   
3.8 Conclusions 
 The purpose of this chapter was to document the effects of the culturally-informed 
self-conceptions described in the previous chapter on men‘s and women‘s college major 
selection and change.  Specifically, I was interested in whether, through the process of 
self-expressive career decision-making, men and women would make college major 
choices based on their gendered perceptions of self.  These self-conceptions, shown to be 
co-constructed with gender schemas, are indeed important in determining whether 
students earn male-dominated or female-dominated degrees. 
 Using students‘ college sex-segregation scores (the percent women in their 
college degrees), I examined the trends for men and women.  I found that, among this 
specialized sample, men and women are reproducing sex segregation in college majors 
by their decision-making: women are more likely to graduate with female-dominated 
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majors and men are more likely to graduate with male-dominated majors.  Many students 
change majors over the course of their college careers, but this switching did not usually 
entail much change in their sex-segregation scores.  Those who switched majors tended 
to stay within the same range gender representation as the field they initially entered.  
Additionally, the movement of men and women among college majors neither reinforced 
nor undermined the sex-segregation of their choices at college entry.   
 The lack of significant differences between men‘s and women‘s change in sex 
segregation scores between their intended majors and the fields in which they earned 
their degrees suggests that the movement of men and women between majors does not 
significantly expand or undermine sex segregation in the aggregate.  Thus, while the 
issue of retention is important to keep people with training in their fields, the movement 
of men and women to other fields does not constitute a major watershed.  On the other 
hand, students‘ initial choice of majors is consequential to the sex-segregatedness of their 
later career decisions.  Those who change their majors do not usually venture far down 
the spectrum of sex-segregated fields in these changes.  Recruitment into college majors, 
then, is a critical point of differentiation.  Thus, limited resources directed toward 
encouraging men and women into other-gendered majors at the pre-college levels would 
be more effective at challenging the current trends of occupational sex segregation than 
retention efforts or those that encourage students to change majors.  
 I used structural equation modeling and OLS regression to predict sex segregation 
scores with self-conceptions measures.  I found that women who perceive themselves as 
more feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented then their peers are more likely to 
graduate from a female-dominated major, net of their school and their ―skill‖ (as 
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measured by math and verbal SAT scores).  Similarly, men who perceive themselves as 
unsystematic were more likely to earn a female-dominated college degree, and those with 
people-oriented self-conceptions are more likely to change into more female-dominated 
majors over time. 
 These patterns do not appear to be driven by one or two outlying majors.  
Running the models predicting the likelihood of choosing two female-dominated, two 
male-dominated and two gender-balanced majors, I found that self-conceptions matter 
throughout the spectrum of individual sex-segregated majors.  Feminine, unsystematic 
and people-oriented self-conceptions are positively related to graduating with one of the 
female-dominated majors and negatively related to graduating with one of the male-
dominated majors.  No clear pattern emerged among the gender balanced majors. 
 The findings here point to a double feedback loop, whereby the self-expressive 
career decisions of men and women not only help to reproduce the demographic 
imbalance of their fields of study, but also the perceptions of male and female-dominated 
majors as culturally masculine and feminine domains.   
The demographic representation of men and women in these fields helps to 
reproduce the gender typing of these fields—it reinforces the presence of men and 
women and that presence anchors the cultural stereotypes of men and women to those 
fields.  The students in my sample with gender-typical self-conceptions reproduce the 
demographic imbalance of these fields, and, indirectly, are contributing to the sex-typing 
of these fields.  But, these results show that they reproduce the cultural sex-typing of 
these fields in a more direct way: those who hold the most gender-stereotypic traits 
(women who see themselves as very feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented, and 
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men who see themselves as very systematic) are more likely to choose the most gender-
stereotyped majors.  Thus, it is not just that these culturally sex-typed fields attract men 
and women accordingly, but that female-typed fields attract women and men who see 
themselves with female-stereotyped traits then their peers.  Thus, through these self-
expressive decision-making processes, the cultural sex-typing of these fields is essentially 
embodied in the types of men and women who select into these fields.  This self-
expressive edge of sex segregation is multidimensional and, thus, difficult to retract.  
What happens after college? 
 The results presented in this chapter focused on a time of career flexibility 
unmatched by any experience in the labor market.  If self-conceptions affected career 
decisions at all, we would expect to find it happening in college—where high flexibility 
meets low penalties for changing one‘s mind.  This delayed decision-making model is 
relatively unique to the U.S.; other post-industrial countries impose much greater 
restrictions on men‘s and women‘s career decision-making in college, or even in 
secondary school (Turner 1960).  As I discuss in the concluding chapter, the abundance 
of room for men and women to make self-expressive career decisions helps to reproduce 
sex segregation.  As counter-intuitive to cultural norms of self-expression as it may be, 
one of the most effective procedures for undermining sex segregation in college majors 
may be to require students to take a more strictly-enforced set of electives: math, physics, 
child development, poetry, etc, and take away some of students‘ room to completely 
tailor their college courses to their gendered self-conceptions.   
 The next chapter will examine what happens when men and women leave college 
and either enter the workforce or enroll in a graduate program.  Will their culturally-
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informed self-conceptions still affect their career decision-making, even once they face 
the structural constraints of having a specific college degree? 
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of Women’s Sex-Segregation Change Scores Between 
Year 1 Major and College Degree 
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of Men’s Sex-Segregation Change Scores Between 
 Year 1 Major and College Degree   
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WOMEN  MEN 
 
 
Feminine Unsystem People  Feminine Unsystem People 
Female Humanities + + -  + + + 
Dominated Social Sci + + +   + + +   
Gender- Business + - +  - - + 
Neutral Biology - +  -  - - - 
Male- Engineering -    - -     -    - - 
Dominated Physics - -    -  - - -    
 
Figure 3.3: Direction of Relationships between Feminine, Unsystematic, and People-
Oriented Self-Conception and the Likelihood of Graduating with Certain Degrees 
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Table 3.1: Univariate and Bivariate Statistics for Degree Sex-Segregation and Change in 
Sex-Segregation Scores, by Gender and School 
  ALL   WOMEN   MEN   p 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
                All 
Year 1 Sex-Segregation Score 0.383 0.212 0.446 0.202 0.269 0.179 *** 
(percent female in Year 1 Major)        
Degree Sex-Segregation Score 0.372 0.213 0.433 0.214 0.271 0.171 *** 
(percent female in college degree) 
Yr 1 to Degree Sex-Segregation Δ Score  -0.001 0.146 -0.009 0.148 0.015 0.141  
(change in the percent female between 
Year 1 Major and college degree earned) 
        UMass        
Year 1 Sex-Segregation Score 0.417 0.217 0.554 0.158 0.318 0.201 *** 
Degree Sex-Segregation Score 0.422 0.202 0.552 0.143 0.347 0.198 *** 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Score (Yr 1 to Deg) 0.051 0.144 0.022 0.125 0.072 0.153  
MIT        
Year 1 Sex-Segregation Score 0.304 0.178 0.344 0.174 0.268 0.174 *** 
Degree Sex-Segregation Score 0.31 0.183 0.348 0.196 0.271 0.162 ** 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Score (Yr 1 to Deg) -0.001 0.149 0.001 0.152 -
0.002 
0.146 
Olin        
Year 1 Sex-Segregation Score 0.179 0.067 0.208 0.078 0.158 0.048 ** 
Degree Sex-Segregation Score 0.15 0.04 0.156 0.049 0.145 0.033  
Δ in Sex-Segregation Score (Yr 1 to Deg) -0.025 0.065 -0.045 0.081 -
0.012 
0.009 + 
Smith        
Year 1 Sex-Segregation Score 0.502 0.192      
Degree Sex-Segregation Score 0.508 0.196      
Δ in Sex-Segregation Score (Yr 1 to Deg) -0.018 0.155           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIT students have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Year 1 and at graduation than Umass 
MIT students are more likely to switch into more male-dominated fields than Umass students 
Olin students have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Year 1 and at graduation than Umass  
Smith students have significantly higher sex-seg scores at Year 1 and at graduation than Umass 
Among Women, MIT have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Yr 1 and at graduation than Umass  
Among Women, Olin have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Yr 1 and at graduation than Umass 
Among Women, Olin students are more likely to switch into more male-dominated fields than Umass  
Among Men, MIT have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Year 1 and at graduation than Umass 
Among Men, MIT are more likely to switch into more male-dominated fields than Umass students 
Among Men, Olin have significantly lower sex-seg scores at Year 1 and at graduation than Umass 
Among Men, Olin are more likely to switch into more male-dominated fields than Umass students 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Variables Predicting Sex-Segregation in Year 1 Major, in College Degree Field, and in the Change between Year 1 
and Degree.  
  SEX-SEGREGATION SCORES in YEAR 1 
MAJOR 
SEX-SEGREGATION SCORES in DEGREE 
FIELD 
SEX-SEGREGATION CHANGE SCORE 
(Controlling for  Year 1) 
  
All 
   
WOMEN 
   
MEN 
   
All 
     
WOMEN 
         
MEN 
   
All 
 WOMEN          
MEN 
  
  Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 Unst. 
Coeff 
 
Constant 62.267 *** 68.8 *** 65.000 ** 68.611 *** 56.200 ** 85.100 ** 25.670 * 9.600  36.724   
Female 8.199 **  
 
   3.762 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.676       
MIT Student -4.290 
 
-13.472 * 4.100   -3.523 
 
-9.383 *    -.600 
 
-1.277  -.513  -2.461   
Olin Student -17.092 *** -27.816 *** -8.000   -21.250 *** -29.148 *** -16.200 * -9.229 * -8.585  -10.472 * 
Smith Student 8.579 * 1.672 
 
   4.207 
 
.122 
 
 
 
-1.156  -.285     
Hispanic  -0.336 
 
-1.339 
 
-1.668   -.193 
 
2.503 
 
-5.192 
 
-.398  2.849  -3.454   
Black  -6.167 
 
-4.101 
 
-16.379   -11.082 
 
-8.388 
 
-33.111 
 
-9.361  -8.243  -22.430   
Asian. 2.258 
 
1.497 
 
1.788   .837 
 
-.408 
 
1.122 
 
-1.355  -1.994  -1.510   
Born in the US -3.191 
 
-2.650 
 
-4.644   -3.642 
 
-.934 
 
-11.206 
 
-.469  .813  -4.697   
Family Income 0.000 
 
.000 
 
.000   .000 
 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.000  .000  .000   
LGB -1.979 
 
-3.401 
 
.508   1.062 
 
-.996 
 
4.378 
 
2.090  .828  3.933   
Conservatism 0.168 
 
-.623 
 
1.852   .654 
 
1.239 
 
-.315 
 
.366  1.327  -1.644   
Religiosity 0.323 
 
1.438 
 
-2.370   -.026 
 
-.157 
 
.153 
 
-.335  -1.160  1.463   
SAT Verbal 0.021 
 
.018 
 
.028   .030 
 
.021 
 
.080 * .014  .006  .057 * 
SAT Math -0.060 ** -.046 * -.064   -.091 *** -.075 ** -.129 ** -.039 * -.033  -.080 * 
  GPA   
    
  3.633 
 
5.548 
 
2.395 
 
2.098  4.188  2.144   
 Sex Seg Score 
in Year 1       
 
 
 
 
 
 
69.837 *** 71.139 *** 69.667 **
* 
   
    
  
      
       
         R-squared 0.341 *** 0.326 *** 0.108 * 0.359 *** 0.350 *** 0.218 ** 0.644 *** .640 *** .562 ** 
 
                                                147 
 
 
 
 
1
4
7
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: SEM Predicting Percent Women in Degree Field with Feminine (vs. Masculine) Self-Conceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Percent Women in Degree Field 
   Change in Percent Women from Year 1 Major to 
Degree  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Feminine SC 6.865 2.875 * 2.983 2.562 
 
.091 2.150  .214 .317  
% women in yr 1 major --- 
 
 
--- 
  
.713 .044 *** .644 .051 *** 
MIT -13.237 4.649 ** -5.459 3.411 
 
-3.846 3.633  -3.906 2.690  
Smith -3.113 3.338 
 
  
 
-3.691 2.583     
Olin -33.856 5.962 *** -17.837 4.412 *** -13.357 4.760 ** -9.479 3.537 ** 
African-American -3.801 4.741 
 
11.785 21.161 
 
1.901 3.696  -12.631 6.737  
Hispanic or Latino/a 5.916 4.607 
 
-1.906 4.000 
 
3.605 3.107  -3.824 3.127  
Asian or Asian-American 7.001 4.030 + 2.808 2.791 
 
.261 2.081  -3.497 2.190  
SAT Math -.070 .019 *** -.046 .021 * -.034 .015 * -.038 .016 * 
SAT Verbal .033 .016 * .020 .018 
 
.014 .012  .020 .014  
    χ2  (df) 45.3(40) 
 
 
60.5 (36) 
 
 
45.6(44)   63.6(40)   
   RMSEA .017 
 
 
.049 
 
 
.009   .046   
   CFI .995 
 
 
.934 
 
 
.992   .953   
   R
2 
.280 
 
 
.168 
 
 
.768   .545   
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Table 3.4: SEM Predicting Percent Women in Degree Field with Unsystematic (vs. Systematic) Self-Conceptions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent Women in Degree Field      Change in Percent Women from Year 1 Major to Degree  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimat
e 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unsystematic SC 2.854 1.489 * 4.201 2.162 * .880 1.467  2.047 1.902  
% women in yr 1 major --- 
 
 
--- 
  
.931 .142 *** .630 .053 *** 
MIT -15.078 4.896 ** -2.769 3.731 
 
-4.366 3.833  -2.526 2.857  
Smith -5.545 3.624 
 
  
 
-4.272 2.796     
Olin -36.539 6.325 ** -14.971 4.752 ** -14.270 5.065 ** -8.190 3.686 * 
African-American -3.117 4.745 
 
-24.748 9.428 * 1.826 3.682  -25.777 14.944 + 
Hispanic or Latino/a 6.398 4.081 
 
.793 4.552 
 
3.498 3.134  -1.804 3.437  
Asian or Asian-American .756 2.757 
 
3.162 2.827 
 
.074 2.115  -3.694 2.203 + 
SAT Math -.062 .020 ** -.063 .022 * -.031 .016 * -.045 .017 ** 
SAT Verbal .032 .016 * .024 .018 
 
.013 .012  .019 .014  
    χ2  (df) 7.2 (9) 
 
 
9.5 (8) 
 
 
8.6(10)   9.5(9)   
   RMSEA .000 
 
 
.025 
 
 
.000   .014   
   CFI 1.00 
 
 
.955 
 
 
1.00   .999   
 R
2 
.291  .198  .588   .553   
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Table 3.5: OLS Predicting Percent Women in Degree Field with People-Oriented (vs. Things-Oriented) Self-Conceptions 
 
 
  
 
Percent Women in Degree Field Change in Percent Women from Year 1 Major to Degree  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
People-Oriented Self-
Conception 
 
2.001 
 
.816 ** 
 
1.095 
 
1.021 
 
 
.980 
 
.663  
 
1.534 
 
.753 * 
% women in yr 1 major --- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
.639 .065 *** .702 .082 *** 
MIT -14.640 6.114 * 2.242 6.114 * -3.307 5.640  .498 4.136  
Smith -.899 4.566 
 
  
 
-.581 3.665     
Olin -28.409 6.670 *** -14.851 6.322 * -10.848 5.640 ** -6.385 4.754  
African-American -7.552 8.011 
 
-23.535 17.597 
 
-6.478 6.430  -8.802 13.059  
Hispanic or Latino/a 5.761 6.596 
 
-.183 7.905 
 
6.107 5.272  .152 5.816  
Asian or Asian-American .243 3.459 
 
.175 4.522 
 
-.715 2.778  -.996 3.329  
SAT Math -.059 .023 ** -.103 .030 ** -.039 .018 * -.073 .022 ** 
SAT Verbal .034 .019 + .034 .045 + .023 .016  .038 .014 * 
Constant 46.334 18.068 * 71.090  20.393 ** 11.509 4.923 * 31.662 15.689 * 
   Adjusted R
2
 .359*** 
 
 
.223*** 
 
 
.587***   .580***   
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Table 3.6: SEM & OLS Models Predicting Graduating with an Arts and Humanities Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis. 
ARTS & With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
HUMANITIES WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Feminine SC .019 .062 
 
.001 .003 
 
      
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
.032 .042  .027 .026  
MIT -.003 .099 
 
-.040 .036 
 
-.025 .104  -.026 .038  
Smith .227 .071 ** 
  
 
.200 .077 **    
African-American .015 .103 
 
-.072 .087 
 
.022 .103  -.246 .182  
Hispanic or Latino/a .024 .086 
 
-.038 .043 
 
.018 .086  -.018 .047  
Asian or Asian-American .018 .059 
 
-.038 .043 
 
.011 .059  .050 .030 * 
SAT Math -.002 .000 *** -.001 .000 + -.002 .000 *** -.001 .000 * 
SAT Verbal .002 .000 *** .001 .000 * .002 .000 *** .001 .000 + 
    χ2  (df) 42.5 (36) 
 
 
55.1 (32) 
 
 
5.3 (8)   7.1(7)   
   RMSEA .020 
 
 
.054 
 
 
.000   .009   
   CFI .993 
 
 
.896 
 
 
1.00   .999   
   R
2 
.292  .082  .294   .106   
ARTS & With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
HUMANITIES WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.      Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC -.009 .019    .013 .010  
MIT .006 .135  -.018 .053  
Smith .287 .101 **    
African-American    .076 .176  .012 .009  
Hispanic or Latino/a    -.063 .145  .048 .045  
Asian or Asian-American      .036 .081  .062 .030 * 
SAT Math    -.002 .001 *** -.001 .000 * 
SAT Verbal       .002 .000 *** .001 .000 ** 
Constant      .691 .406 + -.004 .188  
  Adjusted R
2
 .299***   .059   
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Table 3.7: SEM & OLS Predicting Graduating with a Social Sciences Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis   
SOCIAL With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
SCIENCES WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Feminine SC .182 .073 * .002 .004 
 
      
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
.009 .053  .019 .040  
MIT -.365 .110 ** -.105 .040 ** -.345 .115 ** -.097 .042 * 
Smith -.093 .079 
 
  
 
-.111 .086     
African-American -.039 .114 
 
-.012 .101 
 
-.013 .114  -.069 .204  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.049 .095 
 
-.032 .048 
 
-.046 .095  -.017 .053  
Asian or Asian-American -.001 .065 
 
.001 .034 
 
-.014 .066  -.001 .034  
SAT Math .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
 
.000 .000  .000 .000  
SAT Verbal .001 .000 + .000 .000 
 
.000 .000  .000 .000  
    χ2  (df) 44.6(36) 
 
 
56.2 (32) 
 
 
5.9(8)   7.2(7)   
   RMSEA .023 
 
 
.057 
 
 
.000   .009   
   CFI .991 
 
 
.887 
 
 
1.00   .999   
   R2 .156  .076  .107   .131   
SOCIAL With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
SCIENCES WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .032 .019 + .028 .016 + 
MIT -.271 .102  -.101 .040 * 
Smith .018 .086     
African-American -.109 .168  -.109 .168  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.110 .139  .030 .099  
Asian or Asian-American -.053 .078  -.016 .068  
SAT Math -.001 .000 + .000 .000  
SAT Verbal .002 .000  .001 .000  
Constant .188 .388  .190 .257  
  Adjusted R
2
 .058*   .088*   
 
                                                152 
 
 
 
 
1
5
2
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: SEM & OLS Predicting Graduating with a Business Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis. 
BUSINESS With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
 
Feminine SC .008 .051 
 
-.001 .005 
 
       
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
-.007 .039  -.067 .093   
MIT -.177 .082 * -.124 .089 
 
-.170 .085 * -.154 .094 +  
Smith -.097 .058 + 
  
 
-.092 .063      
African-American -.065 .084 
 
-.071 .202 
 
-.066 .084  .232 .454   
Hispanic or Latino/a -.133 .070 + .064 .106 
 
-.131 .070 + .028 .118   
Asian or Asian-American .073 .048 
 
.116 .075 
 
.074 .049  .119 .076   
SAT Math .001 .000 + .000 .001 
 
.001 .000  .001 .001   
SAT Verbal .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
 
.000 .000  .000 .000   
    χ2  (df) 48.3 (36) 
 
 
56.3 (32) 
 
 
10.0(8)   7.8(7)    
   RMSEA .027 
 
 
.055 
 
 
.023   .022    
   CFI .987 
 
 
.891 
 
 
.998   .995    
   R
2 
.053  .049  .054   .064    
BUSINESS With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
 WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .009 .014  .015 .033  
MIT -.174 .093 + -.023 .161  
Smith -.101 .058 +    
African-American -.078 .116  -.065 .135  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.105 .072  .029 .203  
Asian or Asian-American .065 .059  .064 .141  
SAT Math .000 .000  .000 .001  
SAT Verbal .000 .000   .001 .001  
Constant .149 .291  0(0)   
  Adjusted R
2
 .013   .009   
 
                                                153 
 
 
 
 
1
5
3
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: SEM Predicting Graduating with a Biology Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis. 
BIOLOGY With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Feminine SC -.094 .068 
 
-.087 .068 
 
      
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
.083 .050 + -.077 .081  
MIT .041 .106 
 
.082 .081 
 
-.009 .110  .076 .084  
Smith -.088 .075 
 
  
 
-.130 .082     
African-American -.186 .109 + -.339 .216 
 
-.193 .109 + .145 .398  
Hispanic or Latino/a .019 .090 
 
.075 .096 
 
.011 .092  .023 .106  
Asian or Asian-American .009 .062 
 
.051 .068 
 
-.001 .063  .064 .069  
SAT Math .000 .000 
 
-.001 .000 ** .000 .000  -.002 .000 ** 
SAT Verbal .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
 
.000 .000  .000 .000  
    χ2  (df) 39.2 (36) 
 
 
54.3 (32) 
 
 
5.4(8)   6.9(7)   
   RMSEA .014 
 
 
.053 
 
 
.000   .000   
   CFI .997 
 
 
.901 
 
 
1.00   1.00   
   R
2 
.045  .080  .058   .147   
BIOLOGY With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
 WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC -.008 .023  -.019 .025  
MIT .067 .147  .155 .124  
Smith -.057 .113     
African-American -.264 .183  -.108 .203  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.152 .160  .044 .156  
Asian or Asian-American -.001 .093  .062 .108  
SAT Math .000 .001  -.002 .001 * 
SAT Verbal .000 .001  .000 .001  
Constant .522 .459  0(0)   
  Adjusted R
2
 .011   .143*   
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Table 3.10: SEM & OLS Predicting Graduating with a Physical Sciences Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis. 
PHYSICAL With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
SCIENCES WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Feminine SC -.162 .208 
 
-.113 .090 
 
      
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
-.098 .052 * -.041 .075  
MIT .097 .102 
 
-.012 .104 
 
.129 .105  .038 .107  
Smith .065 .072 
 
  
 
.121 .078     
African-American .268 .105 * -.430 .301 
 
.262 .105 * -.466 .536  
Hispanic or Latino/a .014 .087 
 
.040 .123 
 
.016 .088  .045 .134  
Asian or Asian-American -.059 .060 
 
-.002 .088 
 
-.046 .060  .022 .087  
SAT Math -.001 .000 * .001 .001 * .001 .000  .001 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .000 * .000 .001 
 
-.001 .000 * .000 .001  
    χ2  (df) 44.9 (36) 
 
 
46.0 (32) 
 
 
9.2(8)   7.4(7)   
   RMSEA .023 
 
 
.042 
 
 
.018   .015   
   CFI .990 
 
 
.936 
 
 
.999   .998   
   R
2 
.177  .098  .095   .072   
PHYSICAL With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
SCIENCES WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC -.006 .020  -.056 .017 * 
MIT .199 .130  .065 .095  
Smith .085 .100     
African-American .398 .162 * .018 .103  
Hispanic or Latino/a .254 .142 + .090 .115  
Asian or Asian-American -.157 .082 + .010 .071  
SAT Math .002 .000  .001 .000 * 
SAT Verbal -.002 .000 *** -.001 .000 + 
Constant .060 .405  -.134 .314  
  Adjusted R
2
 .095**   .062**   
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Table 3.11: SEM & OLS Predicting Graduating with an Engineering Degree with Self-Conceptions (SC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Olin students, who are all engineering majors, are excluded from this analysis.  
ENGINEERING With Feminine Self-Conceptions (SEM) With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions (SEM) 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
 
Feminine SC -.128 .212 
 
-.283 .108 **        
Unsystematic SC   
 
  
 
-.039 .052  -.064 .122   
MIT .300 .111 ** .172 .121 
 
.321 .115 ** .120 .125   
Smith -.048 .078 
 
  
 
-.015 .086      
African-American -.007 .114 
 
.832 .354 * -.018 .114  .695 .593   
Hispanic or Latino/a .034 .095 
 
-.081 .143 
 
.040 .095  -.067 .156   
Asian or Asian-American .001 .065 
 
-.093 .103 
 
.008 .066  -.134 .101   
SAT Math .001 .000 
 
.000 .001 
 
.001 .000  .001 .001   
SAT Verbal -.001 .000 
 
.000 .001 
 
-.001 .000  .000 .001   
    χ2  (df) 50.2(36) 
 
 
57.9 (32) 
 
 
6.4(8)   7.7(7)    
   RMSEA .029 
 
 
.057 
 
 
.000   .020    
   CFI .986 
 
 
.891 
 
 
1.00   .996    
   R
2 
.197  .138  .199   .102    
ENGINEERING With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
 WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC -.054 .022 * -.002 .038  
MIT .265 .145 + .061 .186  
Smith -.038 .110     
African-American .144 .184  .144 .184  
Hispanic or Latino/a .077 .161  -.056 .238  
Asian or Asian-American .097 .093  -.133 .165  
SAT Math .001 .001  -.002 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001  .002 .001  
Constant -.293 .457  -.236 .621  
  Adjusted R
2
 .190***   .007   
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The Self-Expressive Edge of Sex-Segregation: The Role of Gender Schemas and Self-
Conceptions in College Major Selection and Career Launch  
 
 
 
Chapter 4—Beyond College:  
Self-Conceptions and the Reproduction of Occupational Sex Segregation 
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 How do the self-expressive career decisions of men and women translate into 
occupational sex-segregation at career launch?  Chapter 2 demonstrated that the self-
conceptions of the men and women in my sample fell along gendered lines: on average, 
women‘s self-conceptions are more feminine than men‘s, and men‘s self-conceptions are 
more masculine than women‘s.  I also illustrated how these self-conceptions are partially 
determined by their individual-level cultural beliefs about gender. 
 As a result of the normative importance given to self-expressive career decision-
making, we would expect that these culturally-shaped perceptions of self would guide 
men‘s and women‘s career decision-making.  But, is there really a significant effect of 
self-conceptions on career decisions, net of the myriad structural, cultural, and individual 
constraints on such decisions?  And, if self-conceptions do influence career decisions, 
does this occur in ways that help reproduce occupational sex segregation?   
 Chapter 3 showed that self-conceptions were indeed predictors of college major 
selection and change.  Women and men with self-conceptions that align most closely 
with stereotypical traits associated with women (e.g. feminine, unsystematic, and people-
oriented) were more likely to graduate with degrees in female-dominated subjects and 
less likely to graduate with male-dominated majors.   
 Not only did chapter 3 demonstrate that self-conceptions could predict whether 
respondents‘ choose  male- or female-dominated college majors, it also showed that these 
effects happen in segregation-reproducing ways: Those most likely to choose the most 
sex-segregated majors were also those most likely to have perceptions of themselves that 
embody stereotypic traits of men and women.   
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 These gendered self-beliefs were codified into decisions that reproduce the 
gendered structure in a clear way.  But college major selection is, in many ways, the easy 
case.  College is a time of tremendous freedom in career decision-making.   
 This flexibility to make career choices along self-expressive lines is greatly 
diminished once they leave college.  Given these added constraints, will men‘s and 
women‘s self-conceptions still matter to their career decisions?  This chapter tests 
whether culturally-informed self-conceptions help determine whether these college 
graduates enter male-or female-dominated career paths 18 months after they graduate.  
 What I find in this chapter is that men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions do indeed 
help determine whether they enter male-or female-dominated career paths.  Culturally 
informed self-perceptions predict where men and women end up in the sex-segregated 
structure of occupations, even once respondents‘ college degrees are accounted for. As I 
argue, not only do these patterns reproduce the demographic sex-segregation of the 
occupations men and women enter, but they also effectively help reproduce the cultural 
sex-typing of male and female-dominated occupations as ―masculine‖ and ―feminine.‖  
The next section provides an overview of my theoretical approach to the investigation in 
this chapter.  I then examine the empirical relationships between self-conceptions and 
beliefs and sex-segregation.  Finally, I discuss the results in the context of the 
reproduction of occupational sex segregation in the workforce.  
4.1 Theoretical Background 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, there are forceful normative trends of 
choosing career paths for self-expressive reasons.  I illustrated in chapter 2 the 
interconnection between perceptions of the gender structure and perceptions of self—
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namely, respondents‘ gender schemas significantly predict their self-conceptions.  If 
perceptions of self significantly predict the extent of sex-segregation in the post-
graduation career choices men and women make, then I will have identified a mechanism 
by which sex-segregation is reproduced at the individual-level—reproduction within a 
culturally-legitimated realm of individualistic self-expression. 
Career Launch and Occupational Sex Segregation 
 This chapter seeks to find out whether the trends identified between self-
conceptions and respondents‘ contributions to sex-segregation continue once they have 
left college and entered the workforce or graduate school.  The individual-level forces 
that reproduce sex segregation in college majors are somewhat similar to those that 
reproduce segregation in the workforce, and the segregation in the former certainly 
contributes to segregation in the latter (Jacobs 1989). While there is some slippage that 
allows one to enter different occupations than that in which he or she received an 
undergraduate education, the specialization inherent in a college degree necessarily limits 
the types of occupations and graduate programs he or she is qualified to enter.  A college 
graduate with a degree in art history cannot get a job as an engineer, for example.  For 
these reasons, college majors are an important factor in the reproduction of occupational 
sex segregation. 
However, the career decisions men and women make just after leaving college 
have effects that arguably extend throughout their careers (Jacobs, 1989).   Once one has 
established a career trajectory, career track changes are possible, but costly in terms of 
time, income, and job prestige.  Additionally, due to the differential valuation of female-
dominated versus male-dominated occupations (Charles & Grusky, 2004; England, 
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1984), if one chooses a female-dominated career track, they have entered a bracket of 
lower-paid, less prestigious jobs.  Individuals in these occupations may certainly end up 
in jobs that are far above the median income for male-dominated occupations, women 
and men working in female-dominated jobs make, on average, less than people in male-
dominated jobs (England, 1984).   
 I call this early stage of career decisions ―career launch.‖  While career launch 
could encompass the first several years of one‘s career, I study the sex-typing of men‘s 
and women‘s early occupations or of the graduate school program in which they have 
enrolled eighteen months after they have graduated.  This time lag is purposeful.  The 
first year after college graduation is a period of adjustment (Astin, 1993); some men and 
women take a year off from employment to ―figure out what they want to do with their 
lives.‖  Others might work a temporary job while they search for a more long-term 
position in their field of interest.  The respondents in my study also hit the beginning of 
the 2007-2008 economic downturn as they exited college, likely making entrance into 
graduate school programs more competitive and job searches a multi-year process for 
many.  I exclude from this analysis the four respondents who were either traveling or 
looking for a job at the time of the year 5 survey.  The lag between graduation and the 
time in which I measure career launch allows for this volatility to stabilize, while not 
allowing enough time to elapse that they have the opportunity to make another large 
career move. 
 To the extent that they have freedom to make decisions about their trajectories at 
career launch, I expect men and women to make such decisions along self-expressive 
lines.  As it was for college major selection, self-expression is an important normative 
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consideration for decisions about one‘s career:  young men and women are still expected 
to give self-expressive answers to the question, ―what will you do with your degree?‖  
 I am particularly interested in two aspects of the career launch decision process in 
this chapter:  whether respondents choose female-dominated or male-dominated 
occupations after graduation, and the extent to which men and women move into more 
male-dominated or more female-dominated occupations than that the fields in which they 
graduated.  As in the previous chapter, I use a measure I call respondents‘ career launch 
sex-segregation score.  Instead of a dichotomous variable predicting whether or not 
respondents enter a female-dominated (or male-dominated) occupation, the sex-
segregation score captures the percent female of the occupation respondents choose.  This 
is a purely demographic measure of sex-segregation: the cultural sex-typing of 
occupations is not necessarily completely determined by the representation of men and 
women therein.  However, it is a useful indication of whether respondents‘ self-
conceptions  influence where they locate themselves along the spectrum of sex-
segregated occupations.  It is in indication as well of their individual-level contribution to 
reproducing or undermining occupational sex-segregation.  
4.2 Hypotheses 
 To investigate the possibility that gendered self-expression leads to gendered 
decisions at career launch, I examine the effects of feminine, unsystematic, and people-
oriented self-conceptions on the probability that men and women will choose male-
dominated or female-dominated career tracks.  I use several types of self-conceptions in 
an attempt to show that any effects I find are likely not specific to a narrowly-defined 
type of self-conception.  Again, my purpose is to show examples of mechanisms by 
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which self-conceptions influence career launch decisions.  These are not the only self-
conceptions that influence career launch; rather they are useful exemplars of substantive 
categories of self-beliefs.  If I find an effect of self-conceptions here, it is likely there are 
many other self-conceptions that follow the same pattern.   
I expect self-expressive patterns of career selection to follow those identified in 
chapter 3; namely, that students with self-conceptions traditionally stereotyped as 
feminine will be more likely to enter female-dominated career launch paths and be more 
likely to move into an even more female-dominated field after college graduation.    
Similar patterns should exist for unsystematic and people-oriented self-conceptions.  
This chapter tests the assumption that respondents‘ career launch decisions are 
made, in part, as gendered expressions of self.  The analysis will help determine whether 
these gendered self-concepts contribute to the reproduction of occupational sex 
segregation.  
 Although self-expression may seem to be a likely determinant of career launch 
decisions, it is plausible that self-conceptions are not significant predictors of such 
decisions.  Given the economic situation during which these young men and women 
entered their careers, and the structural constraints imposed on people just emerging from 
their undergraduate education, these constraints may simply be too strong to allow men 
and women much room to make decisions along self-expressive lines.  Or, their decisions 
may not be patterned in such a way that self-conceptions stereotypically associated with 
women lead respondents to choose more female-dominated occupations (and self-
conceptions associated with men lead respondents to choose male-dominated 
occupations). If I find that self-conceptions are significantly predictive of sex-segregation 
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scores and the change in sex-segregation scores between degree and career launch, it is 
likely that such effects would be identified in larger samples with more detailed measures 
of self-conceptions. 
4.3 Methods 
 The dependent variable is a measure of the percent women in respondents‘ post-
college occupations or graduate school programs on a scale ranging from 0-100% 
women.  A positive coefficient predicting this scale means that respondents with that 
characteristic are more likely to choose female-dominated occupations or graduate 
programs; negative predictor coefficients would imply that characteristic lead 
respondents to choose career launch paths that are more male-dominated.  I identified a 
sex-segregation score for each person by matching their detailed field of work or study 
(identified by year 5 survey questions) with national statistics of the percent women in 
each of these occupations.  For those in the workforce, I referenced U.S. Department of 
Labor‘s Bureau of Labor Statistics to find the percent women in respondents‘ field of 
work. I used statistics computed by the National Science Foundation‘s Division of 
Science Resource Statistics for the percent women in science and engineering-related 
graduate programs
49
 and the National Center for Education Statistics‘ Digest of 
Educational Statistics for the percent women in non-science or engineering graduate 
programs.
50
   
 I use a measure of the change in respondents‘ sex-segregation scores in 
descriptive models.  To create this variable, I subtracted the percent female in their 
                                                 
49 NSF detailed majors data: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/wmpd/pdf/tabc-5.pdf 
50
 Digest of Educational Statistics: 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_286.asp 
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undergraduate degree field from the percent female in their career launch field.
51
  People 
with a positive change score moved into more female-dominated field than the field in 
which they earned their degree.  People with a negative change score switched into a 
more male-dominated field than the one in which they graduated.  I model change in the 
demographic analysis and the causal models by including respondents‘ sex-segregation 
scores of their degrees in the structural equation models predicting sex-segregation scores 
in their career launch occupations (see below for a description of my analytic strategy).  
My key independent variables are the year 2 latent measures of feminine self-conceptions 
(introduced in chapter 2) and unsystematic and people-oriented self-conceptions 
(introduced in chapter 3). 
 All models control for the following race/ethnicity and school measures: whether 
respondents identify as African-American (yes=1), Hispanic or Latino (yes=1) or Asian 
or Asian-American (yes=1), or non-Hispanic white (yes=1; reference category); and 
whether they attended MIT (yes=1), Olin (yes=1), Smith (yes=1) or UMass (yes=1; 
reference category).  I also control for whether respondents entered graduate school or the 
workforce after graduation (1=entered graduate school; 0=entered the workforce).  The 
demographic models in Table 4.2 measure a more complete list of characteristics, 
including  respondents‘ gender (women=1)52, whether respondents were born in the U.S. 
(yes=1), their family‘s income (in dollars), whether they identify as gay, lesbian or 
bisexual (yes=1), their political conservatism (1=very liberal to 7=very conservative), and 
how they rate their religiosity compared to their peers (1=lowest 10% to 5=highest 10%).  
                                                 
51
 See Appendix 2 and chapter 3 for information on the calculation of the sex-segregation scores for 
respondents‘ undergraduate degrees.  
52
 The structural equation models are ran separately for men and women, so they do not include a control 
for gender. 
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Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the mean sex-segregation scores and 
the change in respondents‘ sex-segregation scores between college and career launch and 
Table 4.2 lists the most common occupations among those respondents who entered the 
workforce.  I use OLS regression in Table 4.3 and 4.4 to determine the demographic 
predictors of sex-segregation scores and change in sex-segregation scores over time. The 
remainder of the analysis in this chapter uses structural equation modeling.  I remind the 
reader that latent variables are meant to represent overarching concepts, components of 
which are captured by the manifest variables predicted by the latent variable.  The benefit 
of latent variables is that not all possible measures of this concept must be included as 
manifest variables for the concept to be adequately represented by the latent variable 
(Byrne, 2010).   Table 4.5-4.6 present the structural model (the relationships between the 
latent independent variable and the dependent variable) and the controls.  Table 4.7 uses 
OLS regression to predict the effect of people-oriented self-conceptions on sex 
segregation scores.  All structural and OLS models presented in this chapter control for 
school attended, race/ethnicity, and whether respondents entered the workforce or a 
graduate school program. (No other demographic factors were significant predictors of 
sex-segregation scores in the demographic models, thus I did not include them in the 
models presented below.) 
 The next section details the demographic trends of respondents‘ career launch 
paths. The following section presents the structural equation and OLS models predicting 
percent women in respondents‘ career launch paths and the changes in sex-segregation 
scores between their degrees and their occupations or graduate school programs. 
4.4 Demographic Predictors of Sex-Segregation Scores at Career Launch 
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 Table 4.1 presents the means and standard deviations for women‘s and men‘s sex-
segregation scores at career launch and the change in their sex-segregation scores 
between college degree and career launch.  I provide the pooled statistics, as well as the 
descriptives by gender, career launch activity (employment or graduate programs) and 
school.  As expected, women enter significantly more female-dominated occupations and 
graduate school programs than men: women have an average sex-segregation score of 
42.8%; men‘s average score is 26.9%.  Women enter significantly more female-
dominated occupations whether they enter graduate school or employment after 
graduation.  This gendered pattern also holds in every school except Olin, where all 
students graduate with engineering degrees.  Because of the nature of the populations 
from which my sample was drawn, the average sex-segregation score of the sample is 
shifted toward the male-dominated end of the spectrum.  The scores for UMass are likely 
most representative of the typical college in the U.S.  Women who graduated from 
UMass have a sex-segregation score of 56.8 percent, substantially higher than women 
graduates of MIT (32.6%) or Olin (17.8%), but only slightly higher than Smith (51.2%).   
Men‘s sex-segregation scores are more consistent than women‘s scores across the 
career launch activities and among graduates of the three schools.  Men with degrees 
from Olin enter significantly more male-dominated occupations than men from MIT or 
UMass.  It is an interesting reflection of how sex-segregation is reproduced that men 
graduates of an average state school are no more likely to enter female-dominated 
occupations than those who graduate from a technical school like MIT.  School selection, 
then, makes a large impact on where women end up among the segregated occupations, 
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but much less so for men.   See Figure 4.1 for histograms and distribution curves for 
men‘s and women‘s sex-segregation scores. 
 There is no significant gender difference in the average changes in men‘s and 
women‘s sex-segregation scores between their degrees and their career launch 
occupations, although there is a slight difference once respondents‘ race/ethnicity, school, 
and other demographic measures are controlled for (see table 4.4).  The biggest 
difference between men‘s and women‘s movement after graduation is among the 
graduates of UMass.  Women enter slightly more female-dominated occupations and men 
enter slightly more male-dominated occupations than their degree fields.  The means of 
these change scores are quite close to zero for both men and women.  However, figure 
4.2 shows that these values hide a good deal of movement into more or less dominated 
fields after graduation.  Both men and women appear to be equally likely to move into 
more female-dominated or more male-dominated occupations.   
 It is clear from Table 4.1 that women enter significantly more female-dominated 
occupations than men, regardless if they enrolled in graduate school programs or entered 
the workforce.   However, the difference between men‘s and women‘s sex-segregation 
scores is smaller among those in graduate school programs than those in the workforce.  
In fact, women enrolled in graduate school programs have significantly lower sex-
segregation scores than women who enter the workforce (34.74% versus 44.27%, 
p=.009). Furthermore, women who started their career in the workforce moved into more 
female-dominated occupations than those in which they graduated (average change in 
sex-segregation score for employed women: 3.60%), while women who entered graduate 
programs entered less female-dominated occupations (average change in sex-segregation 
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scores for women in graduate school: -7.02%).  This difference is statistically significant 
(p=.000).  There are no significant differences in sex-segregation scores or change in sex-
segregation scores between men that entered the workforce and those that entered 
graduate programs.  Women who enter graduate school go into more male-dominated 
field than those in which they graduated, but there is no difference in change scores 
among men. 
 Table 4.2 lists the five most common occupations for respondents who entered the 
workforce for everyone, and for men and women separately.  Engineering occupations 
feature prominently in these lists because all Olin students and many MIT students 
graduated with engineering degrees.  The purpose of this table is to show the diversity of 
jobs that men and women enter. The largest categories for women and men had 10 and 17 
people, respectively. In other words, respondents are not crowded into a handful of 
occupations, but, as shown in Figure 4.2, are spread out across the spectrum of male- and 
female-dominated degree fields.   
 Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present demographic OLS models predicting sex-segregation 
scores and the change in respondents‘ sex-segregation scores at career launch, both 
pooled and for men and women separately.  As expected, women are significantly more 
likely to enter female-dominated occupations then men.  Respondents who graduated 
from MIT and Olin are significantly more likely to enter male-dominated career paths 
than those who graduated from UMass.  This makes sense, given the substantive 
specializations of MIT and Olin in male-dominated math and science occupations.   
These school differences appear to be driven by women only. As suggested by the 
bivariate statistics, women whose career launch begins in graduate school are marginally 
                                       169 
 
 
 
more likely to be in a male-dominated field, compared to women who start their careers 
in the workforce. 
 In addition, Asian and Asian-American women are more likely to be in female-
dominated occupations than non-Hispanic white women.  This is consistent with cultural 
stereotypes that Asian and Asian-American women as upholding many of the 
stereotypical characteristics of femininity (submissiveness, cooperativeness, friendliness, 
etc) (Pyke & Johnson 2003).
53
  Hispanic women are marginally more likely than non-
Hispanic white women to be in a male-dominated field.  This result disappears once 
gendered self-conceptions are included in the model, suggesting that this difference is the 
result of Hispanic women‘s slightly less feminine self-conceptions, compared to white 
women.   
The demographic models predict much less of the variation in men‘s sex-
segregation scores: men who graduate from Olin are more likely to enter a male-
dominated field at career launch than men who graduate from UMass.  No other 
predictors of sex-segregation scores are significant for men.   
 The OLS regression models predicting the change in respondents‘ sex-segregation 
scores are presented in Table 4.4.  To measure the change in sex segregation scores 
between college and career launch, I added respondents‘ degree sex segregation score to 
the model in table 4.3.  I find only a small gender difference in this change: women are 
marginally more likely than men to enter an even more female-dominated occupation 
than the field in which they graduated.  MIT and Olin seem to have some success 
                                                 
53
 Pyke and Johnson (2003) describe the normatively femininity of Asian-American women as ―subordinate 
femininity,‖ which has a similar relationship to emphasized femininity for white women as  does 
masculinity among Asian-American men has to hegemonic masculinity among white men. 
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launching women into more male-dominated occupations than UMass, controlling for 
their college degrees.  Graduate students are more likely than those in the workforce to 
have moved into a more male-dominated field after graduation.  This effect is largely 
driven by women‘s results, however, as enrollment in graduate schools is a significant 
and negative predictor of sex-segregation change scores for women. None of the 
demographic predictors are significant for men‘s change scores.  As in the previous table, 
Asian-American women are more likely than white women to enter even more female-
dominated career launch occupations once they have graduated.  
 The overall trending of these characteristics suggest that the men and women in 
this sample are helping to reproduce occupational sex segregation in their career paths—
women are more likely to enter into female-dominated occupations and men are more 
likely to enter into male-dominated occupations.  The next part of this chapter attempts to 
help explain why they chose these paths.  Specifically, what role do men‘s and women‘s 
gendered self-perceptions play in their career launch decisions?   The next section 
presents the results of the causal models predicting sex-segregation and the change in 
sex-segregation scores at career launch. 
4.5 Predicting the Career-Launch Sex Segregation Scores 
 Do respondents‘ self-conceptions predict whether they enter male-dominated or 
female-dominated occupations after graduation?  Do self-conceptions have an effect net 
of respondents‘ college degree fields? This section uses structural equation modeling 
(SEM) and OLS regressions to model the relationship between these individual-level 
beliefs and respondents‘ sex-segregation scores at career launch, and the change in their 
sex segregation score between college and career launch.  
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I begin by testing whether respondents‘ year 2 perceptions of themselves as 
feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented predict their sex-segregation scores at career 
launch.   Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the structural equation models with the latent 
measures for feminine and unsystematic self-conceptions and table 4.7 presents the OLS 
model with people-oriented self-conceptions. Because the processes that influence men‘s 
and women‘s career decisions are likely different, I run separate models for men and 
women.  Each table presents the unstandardized coefficient estimates, the standard error 
and the significance level (based on two-tailed tests) for each independent measure.  I 
provide the chi-squared, degrees of freedom, CFI and RMSEA as fit statistics, as well as 
the squared multiple correlation (R
2
) of the dependent variable.  
Looking to the first two columns of table 4.5, I find strong relationships between 
self-conceptions and respondents‘ sex-segregation scores, for women.  The coefficient for 
the feminine self-conceptions latent measure is significant and positive for women, 
meaning that every point more feminine women perceive themselves to be corresponds to 
a 6.1 percent increase in the percent women in their career launch occupations.  Feminine 
self-conceptions are not similarly predictive of sex-segregation scores for men.   
In addition to respondents‘ sex-segregation scores, I am also interested in the 
extent to which they have entered more female-dominated or more male-dominated 
occupations than the ones in which they earned their undergraduate degree.  To model 
this change, I add a measure of the percent women in respondents‘ degree to the models 
presented in the first two columns in Tables 4.5-4.7.  Controlling for the percent women 
in their degree fields effectively means that the dependent variable—respondents‘ sex-
segregation scores at career launch—indexes the differences in gender composition 
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between the sex-segregation measures at the two time points.  In these change models, a 
significant and positive coefficient indicates that a respondent with that characteristic is 
more likely to move into a more female-dominated field after graduation; a negative 
coefficient means that those respondents are more likely to transition into a more male-
dominated field. 
Looking to the third and fourth columns in 4.5, women with feminine self-
conceptions are more likely than other women to enter even more female-dominated 
occupations after graduation.  This effect exists for men as well: men who perceive 
themselves as more masculine are more likely to enter male-dominated occupations or 
graduate school programs after college.   
Table 4.6 indicates that both men and women who perceive themselves as 
unsystematic are significantly more likely to enter a female-dominated career-launch 
occupations, and to move into even more female-dominated fields than the ones in which 
they earned their degree.  This effect is double the size for men than women: for every 
point unsystematic men perceive themselves to be, the percent women increases by more 
than eleven points.  This is a revealing finding, as many male-dominated professions (i.e. 
engineering and science) are stereotyped to require people who are highly logical and 
systematic.  Women and men who do not feel as though they have such characteristics 
are more likely to go into more female-dominated jobs or graduate programs.  This result 
holds even after controlling for the sex segregation of respondents‘ college degrees. 
People-oriented self-conceptions also predict women‘s entrance into female-
dominated career launch occupations, and whether they move into even more female-
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dominated fields than the ones in which they earned their degree (Table 4.7).  People-
oriented self-conceptions do not predict men‘s sex segregation scores. 
Tables 4.5-4.7 indicate school and demographic differences in sex-segregation 
scores as well.  Among women, those who graduated from MIT and Olin enter 
significantly more male-dominated career launch occupations than UMass graduates.  
Once unsystematic self-conceptions are controlled for, Smith women are also more likely 
than UMass women to enter a male-dominated occupation.  Consistent with the 
descriptive results, those who enter graduate school are in significantly more male-
dominated fields than those who enter the workforce.  Among men, Olin graduates are 
more likely to enter more male-dominated fields than Umass graduates.  MIT graduates‘ 
sex-segregation scores are not significantly different from those of male UMass grads.   
Several demographic factors are significant predictors of the change in sex-
segregation scores between college and career launch.  First, women who graduated from 
Olin are more likely than UMass graduates to enter an even more male-dominated career 
than their degree field.  The effect for career launch activity (whether they enter graduate 
school or the workforce) remain after sex-segregation of degree is controlled for. Among 
men, there are no significant school effects on whether men move into more or less male-
dominated occupations after graduation.   
As in the OLS models, Asian and Asian-American women are more likely to 
enter female-dominated occupations than women.  Once the gendered self-conceptions 
and degree sex segregation score are controlled for, Hispanic men are more likely than 
non-Hispanic white men to move into more female-dominated majors after graduation.  
This may be due to the stereotypes of Hispanic men as less ―naturally‖ skilled at male-
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dominated occupations such as math and science (Eglash 2003), but I cannot say for sure 
from these data.  Net of unsystematic self-conceptions, African-American men are more 
likely than white men to enter male-dominated occupations. 
The results above indicate that culturally informed self-perceptions predict where 
men and women end up in the sex-segregated structure of occupations, effects that persist 
even once respondents‘ college degrees are accounted for.  Table 4.8 summarizes these 
results, listing the self-conceptions that predict the career launch sex segregation score 
and the change in sex segregation score between respondents‘ degree and their career 
launch activity. The next section places these results in context: what does it mean that 
sex-segregation and the change in sex-segregation scores can be predicted by individual-
level beliefs about the self? 
4.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter identified gendered patterns in men‘s and women‘s career launch 
paths: women enter occupations or graduate programs that have significantly higher 
representation of women than the occupations and graduate programs that men enter.  It 
is perhaps unsurprising that the men and women in my sample reproduce occupational 
sex segregation in their career launch decisions.  These findings also reveal that the 
average changes in men‘s and women‘s sex-segregation scores (the difference in percent 
women between their undergraduate degree field and their career launch field) are not 
very different. In the aggregate, men and women maintain the level of sex-segregation 
from their college degrees.  This suggests that the bulk of early sex-segregative processes 
(at least as they unfold for college graduates) takes place in the shuffling of men and 
women into sex-segregated undergraduate degrees.  There is some variation by type of 
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career launch activity, as women who enter graduate programs actually move into more 
male-dominated occupations than women who enter the workforce, but overall there is 
not much aggregate trending in their movement after graduation.  However, the fact that 
the mean of the change scores is near zero for both men and women hides important 
substantive differences between the men and women who do move into sex-segregated 
occupations.   
 What helps explain these patterns? Female-typed occupations are generally 
associated with traits stereotypically assigned to women (e.g. feminine, people-oriented, 
less systematic or systematic) and male-typed occupations associated with traits 
stereotypically assigned to men—e.g. masculine, systematic, and objects-oriented.  As a 
result of the cultural beliefs that accompany the sex-typing of occupations, I expected that 
men and women would make career decisions based on the extent to which they 
understand themselves as consistent with the perceived characteristics of those 
occupations.  Therefore, I tested the hypotheses that men and women with perceptions of 
themselves as relatively feminine, unsystematic, and more people-oriented would select 
into more female-typed occupations and grad programs, regardless of the actual content 
of those occupations. My analysis in chapter 5 engages with the question of how field-
specific cultures and activities affect sex-segregative processes within them.   
Women who perceive themselves as feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented 
end up in more female-dominated career launch occupations than women with more 
masculine, systematic, and things-oriented self-conceptions.  It is not just that women, 
qua women, are more likely to end up in female-dominated occupations, but that the more 
they see themselves adhering to traits stereotypically associated with women, the more 
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likely they are to end up in the most female-typed occupations.  Not only, then, do these 
women reproduce the demographic sex-segregation of their occupations, they also 
reproduce the cultural sex-typing of those fields as social locations inhabited by people 
who are generally feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented.  In other words, the 
cultural perceptions of those occupations as suitable for people who are feminine, 
unsystematic and people-oriented becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 I also find evidence of similar effects among men.  Men who perceive themselves 
as highly systematic are more likely to end up in male-dominated occupations.  Again, 
not only are men who enter male-dominated occupations reproducing the demographic 
over-abundance of men in these occupations, they are also reinforcing the stereotypes of 
those occupations as suitable for people who are systematic.  Men who do not believe 
they have these characteristics are more likely enter female-dominated occupations.  This 
reproduces the cultural perceptions of female-dominated occupations as locations for 
people who are unsystematic, even as men‘s entrance into female-dominated occupations 
challenges the demographic imbalance of these occupations. 
 Beyond the relationship between self-conceptions and the percent women in 
respondents‘ career launch occupations, I also found several factors that predict whether 
men and women moved into more female-dominated or more male-dominated 
occupations after earning their undergraduate degrees.  This college-to-work juncture is 
an important point where occupational sex segregation is reproduced above and beyond 
college majors (Jacobs 1995, 1989, Seymour & Hewett, 1997; Xie & Shauman, 2003). 
My results show that when movement did happen, it reinforced the cultural sex-
typing of these occupations.  Both men and women who perceived themselves as more 
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feminine and less systematic than their peers were more likely to move into a more 
female-dominated field than the ones in which they earned their undergraduate degrees.  
This, again, reinforces the cultural sex-typing of those occupations as places for people 
with feminine and unsystematic self-conceptions.   
This degree-to-career transition represents a degree of freedom with which men 
and women can tailor their careers to fit their sense of self.  Net of the structural barriers 
imposed by their certifications in certain occupations, men and women do have some 
freedom to move into more female-dominated or more male-dominated fields after 
graduation.  My results also show that men who perceive themselves as people-oriented 
are more likely to move into female-dominated occupations or graduate programs—fields 
that stereotypically are more likely to fulfill the expression of that self-conception than 
male-dominated occupations.   
 Important to our understanding of occupational sex segregation, the effect of self-
conceptions on sex-segregation scores does not appear to end after college.  College is a 
time of relative flexibility in career decision-making, compared to the labor force, and 
this freedom may allow more self-expressive decision-making than other points in the 
career path.  The fact that self-conceptions remain a significant predictor of sex-
segregation and change in sex-segregation at career launch, despite the increased rigidity 
that makes it more difficult for people to align their career trajectories with self-
expressive priorities, is important.  The continued salience of self-conceptions on the sex-
segregation of people‘s career launch occupations, over and above the segregation in 
their undergraduate degrees, suggests that the influences of self-conceptions may extend 
beyond the career launch phase and occur throughout the career pipeline.   
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Looking Forward 
 This chapter painted a broad-brushed picture of the effects of self-conceptions and 
gender schemas on the individual-level reproduction of sex-segregation.  The strength of 
this analysis lies in its ability to put everyone on the same metric: the percent women in 
respondents‘ career launch field and the change in sex-segregation scores between their 
college degree and career launch.  However, this analysis also flattens much variation by 
individual field.  Additionally, as discussed in chapter 3, there are likely intra-field 
cultural factors that influence the ways in which self-conceptions lead to persistence in or 
attrition from those occupations.  Focusing on these intra-field processes also facilitates 
the identification of particular factors which lead men and women to select into or out of 
a field. 
 As a case study of these intra-field processes of sex-segregation, I examine the 
portion of my sample who entered college intending to be engineering majors. While 
there are many aspects of any field that help facilitate gender differences in persistence, I 
focus on one of particular importance: the ways in which gender schemas and self-
conceptions filter men and women engineering students‘ development of (gendered) 
professional identities, and how those gendered professional identities, in turn, lead to 
differential persistence in the field of engineering.  It is an example of the cultural 
processes that underlie the sex-segregated structure of occupations in the United States. 
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Figure 4.1: Histograms and Normal Distributions of Sex-Segregation At  Career 
Launch (measured in % women) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Histograms and Normal Distributions of Changes in Sex- Segregation 
between Degree Field and Career Launch Field (% women)   
Men                             Women 
 
Men                             Women 
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Table 4.1: Univariate and Bivariate Statistics for Sex-Segregation and Change in Sex-
Segregation Scores, by Gender, Career Launch Activity, and School 
 
ALL 
 
WOMEN 
  
MEN 
 
p 
 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
(men 
vs.women) 
 
All 
 
          
Sex-Segregation Score 
(% female in career launch 
field) 
36.61 23.05  42.68 24.17  26.32 17.53 ***  
Δ in Sex-Segregation Score 
(change in the % female 
between  
respondents‘ college degree 
and their career launch field) 
  0.27 18.19    0.74 19.86  -0.52 16.69   
           
Workforce Entrance           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
38.39 
0.21 
25.2 
18.29 
 44.28 
3.60 
25.92 
19.33 
 28.87 
-0.85 
19.13 
15.71 
*** 
+ 
 
           
Graduate School Entrance           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
31.94 
-4.75 
15.27 
17.06 
 34.72 
-7.02 
16.26 
19.01 
 26.29 
  0.16 
11.29 
10.58 
* 
+ 
 
 
           
UMass           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
41.93 
-1.94 
25.91 
20.74 
 56.81 
3.17 
23.32 
22.25 
 29.87 
-6.44 
21.93 
19.12 
* 
+ 
 
 
MIT           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
30.36 
-0.91 
18.07 
17.11 
 32.66 
-1.81 
19.67 
18.24 
 27.69 
0.12 
15.85 
15.89 
 
+  
Olin           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
17.65 
2.82 
13.23 
12.33 
 17.80 
2.17 
10.48 
9.97 
 17.92 
3.57 
15.17 
15.42 
 
  
Smith           
Sex-Segregation Score 
Δ in Sex-Segregation Scores 
   51.24 
1.98 
23.19 
21.59 
 
     
+ p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Among men, no significant difference in sex-segregation scores or change scores between respondents 
entering the workplace or entering a graduate school program. 
Among women, those who entered the workplace after graduate have a significantly higher sex-segregation 
score (p=.009) and change score (P<.000) than women who entered graduate school.  
MIT has significantly lower sex-seg scores than UMass (p<.000); Olin has significantly lower sex-seg 
scores than UMass (p<.000); Smith has significantly higher sex-segregation scores than Umass (p=.013). 
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 Table 4.2: Most Common Jobs Among those Who Entered Employment  
 
 Table 4.3: Descriptive Measures Predicting Sex-Segregation Scores 
SEX-SEGREGATION  All      WOMEN          MEN  
SCORES Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig 
Constant   54.747 *** 77.601 *** 24.87  
Gender (1=women) 7.663 **     
MIT Graduate -18.405 *** -29.129 *** -5.777  
Olin Graduate -29.823 *** -41.186 *** -19.463 *** 
Smith Graduate -0.121  -8.41    
Hispanic or Latino -7.285  -12.668 + 4.854  
Black or African-American -3.892  0.158  -8.54  
Asian or Asian-American 4.874  8.738 * -3.148  
Born in the US -1.768  -1.926  -0.503  
Family Income -0.001  0.001  -0.001  
Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual 2.694  2.149  8.942  
Political Conservatism 0.015  0.465  -0.46  
Religiosity 0.444  0.29  0.977  
Enrolled in Grad School -4.637 + -5.864 + -0.783  
(vs. employed)       
                               R-squared           0.286 ***            0.279 ***            0.047 * 
  
 Table 4.4: Descriptive Measures Predicting Change in Sex-Segregation Scores 
Everyone Women Men 
Electrical Engineer (27) 
Mechanical Engineer (16) 
Computer/Software Engineer 
(16) 
Biological Scientists (13) 
Business Operation Specialist 
(11) 
Biological Scientist (10) 
Electrical Engineer (9) 
Mechanical Engineer (7) 
Primary/Secondary 
Teacher (6) 
Chemical Engineer (6) 
Electrical Engineer (17) 
Computer Software Engineer (12) 
Mechanical Engineer (9) 
Securities, Commodities and 
Exchange Agent (8) 
Business Operation Specialist (5) 
CHANGE IN SEX- All      WOMEN         MEN  
SEGREGATION SCORES Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig 
Constant 34.314 ** 59.280 *** -11.239  
Percent Women in Degree 0.577 *** 0.550 *** 0.664 *** 
Gender (1=women) 4.070 +     
MIT Graduate -9.322 ** -17.870 *** 0.348  
Olin Graduate -11.696 ** -20.353 ** -2.480  
Smith Graduate 0.397  -5.113    
Hispanic or Latino -6.077  -11.249  6.355  
Black or African-American 0.276  3.104  1.013  
Asian or Asian-American 3.897  8.639 * -5.109  
Born in the US -2.536  -2.910  0.252  
Family Income 0.001  0.001  0.001  
Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual 0.214  1.271  2.113  
Political Conservatism -0.019  0.213  -0.305  
Religiosity 1.054  0.651  1.983 + 
Enrolled in Grad School -5.214 * -7.620 * 1.062  
(vs. employed)       
     R-squared: 0.472 *** 0.438 *** 0.472 *** 
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Table 4.5: SEM Predicting Percent Women in Career Launch Field with Feminine (vs. Masculine) Self-Conceptions 
 
  
  
 
Percent Women in Career Launch Field Change in Percent Women from Degree to Career Launch  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Feminine SC 6.105 3.396 * .349 .405 
 
2.994 1.568 * 5.243 2.226 * 
% women in Degree --- 
  
--- 
  
.567 .058 *** .581 .078 *** 
MIT -24.231 4.397 *** -1.177 3.194 
 
-13.619 3.915 *** 4.374 2.851  
Smith -4.016 4.042 
    
-1.995 3.463     
Olin -39.736 6.530 *** -12.759 4.566 ** -18.244 6.021 ** .606 4.309  
African-American 1.419 5.947 
 
-8.449 10.063 
 
3.608 5.065  -40.356 34.323 + 
Hispanic or Latino/a -.769 4.920 
 
9.636 4.497 * -4.699 4.215  9.209 3.956 * 
Asian or Asian-American 5.571 3.318 + -.792 3.400 
 
5.533 2.837 + -2.969 3.092  
Grad School after College -9.496 2.748 *** .386 3.094 
 
-9.277 2.333 *** -.095 2.725  
    χ2  (df) 50.6 (36) 
  
50.6 (32) 
  
52.6 (40)   57.3 (36)   
   RMSEA .029 
  
.045 
  
.026   .044   
   CFI .980 
  
.887 
  
.986   .917   
   R
2 
.280 
  
.078 
  
.477   .345   
 
                                       183 
 
 
 
 
1
8
3
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: SEM Predicting Percent Women in Career Launch Field with Unsystematic (vs. Systematic) Self-Conceptions 
 
 
Percent Women in Career Launch Field   Change in Percent Women from Degree to Career Launch  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unsystematic SC 7.028 2.569 ** 11.093 4.701 * 5.048 2.427 * 7.851 3.987 * 
% women in Degree --- 
 
 
--- 
  
.561 .058 *** .516 .076 *** 
MIT -25.781 4.386 *** .030 3.336 
 
-15.411 3.911 *** 4.899 2.882 + 
Smith -8.956 4.063 * 
  
 
-5.741 3.498     
Olin -42.989 6.622 *** -10.683 4.781 * -20.683 6.144 *** .570 4.294  
African-American 2.579 5.867 
 
-42.925 21.564 * 4.438 5.000  -32.145 18.531 + 
Hispanic or Latino/a -1.228 4.952 
 
15.499 4.983 ** -4.247 4.226  13.596 4.179 ** 
Asian or Asian-American 4.628 3.333 + -1.654 3.490 
 
4.967 2.838 + -4.412 2.964  
Grad School after College -8.823 2.794 ** .469 3.283 
 
-8.695 2.374 *** .147 2.757  
    χ2  (df) 5.7(8) 
 
 
13.0 (7) 
 
 
8.2 (9)   12.5 (8)   
   RMSEA .000 
 
 
.055 
 
 
.000   .044   
   CFI 1.00 
 
 
.948 
 
 
1.00   .976   
   R
2 
.313 
  
.186 
  
.489   .372   
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Table 4.7: OLS Predicting Percent Women in Career Launch Field with People-Oriented (vs. Things-Oriented) Self-Conceptions 
 
Table 4.8: Summary of Results 
 Self-Conceptions that Predict Career 
Launch Sex Segregation Score 
Self-Conceptions that Predict Change in Sex 
Segregation Scores, Degree to Career Launch 
 
Women 
 
    Feminine 
    Unsystematic  
    People-Oriented 
 
    Feminine 
    Unsystematic 
    People-Oriented 
 
Men 
 
    Unsystematic 
 
 
    Feminine 
    Unsystematic 
 
 
 
Percent Women in Career Launch Field   Change in Percent Women from Degree to Career Launch  
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
Unst. 
Estimate 
S.E.  
People-Oriented SC 2.844 .987 ** -0.497 1.065 
 
1.780 0.886 * -.430 .828  
% women in Degree --- 
 
 
--- 
  
.546 .077 *** .639 .083 *** 
MIT -27.061 5.413 *** -1.897 4.758 
 
-16.232 5.031 *** 4.412 3.786  
Smith -4.613 5.031 
 
  
 
-3.962 4.453     
Olin -35.844 6.583 *** -16.869 5.324 ** -17.740 6.368 ** -.648 4.646  
African-American -2.294 8.002 
 
-11.598 17.671 
 
1.531 7.103  -.306 13.805  
Hispanic or Latino/a -5.403 6.496 
 
8.384 8.285 
 
-6.875 5.754  7.246 6.439  
Asian or Asian-
American 
7.196 4.100 
+ 
-3.287 4.626 
 
8.338 3.632 
* 
-5.655 3.680 
 
Grad School after 
College 
-7.679 3.368 
* 
-1.502 4.100 
 
-9.658 2.994 
*** 
.908 3.244 
 
Constant 64.195 14.923 *** 20.620 18.999 
 
45.505 13.472 **    
  Adjusted R
2 
.310*** 
 
 
.072* 
 
 
.460***   .445***   
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The Self-Expressive Edge of Sex-Segregation: The Role of Gender Schemas and Self-
Conceptions in College Major Selection and Career Launch  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5-- Gendered Professional Identities and Gendered Persistence: A Case 
Study of Engineering Students 
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The previous two chapters explored how culturally-informed self-conceptions 
lead to sex-segregation in college major selection and career launch.  Not only do the 
self-expressive decisions of men and women reproduce demographic sex segregation, 
they also help reproduce the occupations that men and women enter as culturally male-
typed and female-typed domains.  
 The reproduction of sex-segregation is not limited to inter-field processes, 
however.   Processes within occupational fields can influence whether women and men 
decide to commit to and persist in a male- or female-dominated field, or whether they 
leave it for some other line of work. In an era where self-expression is an influential 
factor in career decision-making, one‘s perceived fit with the culture of one‘s future 
profession is likely an important axis along which decisions to stay or leave are made. I 
argue here that professional identity development—a part of the cultural process of 
professional socialization—is filtered by gendered self-conceptions, leading men and 
women to have slightly different professional identities at the end of their training 
experiences.  These gendered professional identities in turn, are differently likely to 
promote persistence among men and women, and thus can reinforce sex segregation. 
 Professional identities are an important site for understanding the intra-field 
cultural processes of sex segregation. Professional identities are developed through 
professional socialization (Becker et al. 1964; Merton et al. 1982) and they encompass 
the intra-field cultural beliefs about what it means to be a professional in that particular 
field.  Because they are internalized as identity features, professional identities may react 
with self-conceptions and become important factors in self-expressive decision making. 
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 In this chapter, I examine the role of professional identities in self-expressive 
career decision-making by studying the subsample of respondents in undergraduate 
engineering programs.  Specifically, I investigate how gendered self-conceptions 
influence respondents‘ development of several dimensions of professional identities as 
they progress through the professional socialization of their engineering programs, and 
how these gendered professional identities, in turn, influence whether men and women 
persist in engineering.  The four professional identity dimensions I study are: math and 
science prowess, technological leadership, commitment to managerial and 
communication skills, and social consciousness. I find that men and women develop 
different professional identities on average, and that the gendering of these professional 
identities is partly the result of gendered self-conceptions filtering the internalization of 
these dimensions. These gendered professional identities, in turn, lead to gendered 
persistence: women are less likely to have the professional identity features that increase 
the likelihood of persisting in this male-dominated field.  I examine the effects of 
gendered professional identities on two types of persistence: behavioral persistence 
(staying in an engineering major and continuing in engineering through career launch) 
and intentional persistence (whether they plan to be an engineer in five years).  These 
findings support my argument that intra-field cultural processes—in addition to broader, 
inter-field processes—lead to the reproduction of sex segregation through seemingly 
individualistic, self-expressive decisions. 
 I begin by describing professional socialization and professional identity 
development and then introduce the four professional identity dimensions I use in this 
chapter.  I demonstrate empirically that these professional identity dimensions are 
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developed, at least in part, out of respondents‘ professional socialization experiences.  
Next, I show how these identities are gendered, and how the development of these 
identities is filtered by respondents‘ self-conceptions.  Third, I illustrate how these 
gendered professional identities are related to behavioral and intentional persistence in 
engineering.  Finally, I discuss whether these processes might occur in other professions, 
and what this means for the self-expressive edge of segregation overall.  Figure 5.1 
provides a schematic of this chapter‘s analyses. 
5.1 Why Engineering? 
 Engineering is a useful case study for examining intra-profession cultural 
mechanisms of segregation for several reasons.  First, it has a condensed yet flexible 
credentialing process that should amplify the mechanisms of interest (Cech et al. 2011).  
On the one hand, engineering programs must prepare students to represent their 
profession after only four years of undergraduate education.   On the other hand, 
engineering students enjoy the career decision-making flexibility that undergraduate 
education provides—more flexibility than that of stand-alone, post-graduate professional 
credentialing programs such as law or medical school, for example (Becker et al. 1964; 
Epstein 1993). Engineering also has a rich and fairly well-documented professional 
culture, but it has not been studies as extensively as medicine and law.  Third, 
engineering remains heavily male-dominated, even as women have increasingly moved 
into previously male-dominated professions such as law and medicine in the last four 
decades (NSF 2008).  As my previous analysis shows, there are many barriers to women 
entering engineering.  Understanding why they stay or leave once they have chosen an 
engineering major is equally as important to decoding sex segregation as understanding 
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their choice to enter these fields in the first place.
54
  Finally, on a practical note, 
engineering students are the largest group in my data, and several survey questions 
explicitly reference engineering and engineering education. 
5.2 Professional Culture and Professional Socialization 
Professions are more than the sum of their characteristic tasks and expertise; they 
also nurture elaborate meaning systems about those tasks and expertise. Alongside their 
specialized training, legally-recognized certification procedures and organized 
associations, professions maintain a heritage of traditions, hierarchies of valuation, and 
norms of behavior (Trice 1993; Weeden and Grusky 2005).  A professional culture is the 
system of meaning, lifestyle and demographic ―reputations,‖ and rituals, myths, and 
symbols associated with profession and its tasks (Abbott 1988; Cech 2011; Grusky 
2005).  Widespread social beliefs like gender schemas have salience within professional 
cultures, but the particular values and beliefs that make up professional cultures may not 
occur elsewhere in the social landscape (Haas and Shaffir 1991).
55
    
Professional cultures are important to the reproduction of occupational sex 
segregation because these cultures are not benign.  The belief systems that give meaning 
to the tasks and expertise within a profession‘s boarders can have built within them biases 
about who is best suited to carry out those tasks and expertise. Professional cultures can 
bias employers‘ and co-workers‘ judgments of women (through what I call elsewhere 
                                                 
54
 Making these career choices in the first place may be influenced by professional cultures to some degree, 
but such cultures likely are shallow and caricatured to outsiders.  Abbott (1981) showed that the status 
hierarchies of medicine and law varied markedly, depending on whether insiders or outsiders were asked.  
The male- and female-typed stereotypes that accompany those fields are likely much more salient to 
outsiders than professional cultures.  Future versions of this project with have a chapter on self-expressive 
decision-making, so I will be able to speak to these decisions.  
55
 These cultures may make little sense or have little resonance to those who have not been trained in the 
profession (Haas & Shaffir 1991). 
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―professional competence schemas,‖ seemingly objective cultural models about 
professional skills and expertise) as well as other ―demand-side‖ processes of 
discrimination (Cech 2011).
56
  Professional cultures can also influence peoples‘ own 
understanding of how they fit within a profession: men and women use those same 
professional competence schemas, for example, to evaluate their own skills.  Although 
the intra-professional cultural factors that lead to segregation and inequality through 
institutional and interactional-level processes are important, I am interested here in the 
individual-level mechanisms by which professional culture can translate into the 
reproduction of sex segregation and, particularly, can influence men‘s and women‘s 
decisions to stay or leave the profession. 
Professional cultures become most familiar to individuals through professional 
socialization, the process of inculcating neophytes into their professional roles (Epstein 
1970).  Professional socialization happens most explicitly in the credential acquisition 
process, during which aspiring professionals earn the credentials needed to practice in the 
profession (Cech et al. 2011).  Socialization also happens to varying degrees in 
workplaces and mentoring relationships.  Professional socialization inculcates neophytes 
into a ―web of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions‖ (Barley 
and Tolbert 1997, pg 93) that are expected of a members of their field and helps them 
develop the ―habits of mind‖ of a committed professional.  Through classes, summer 
jobs, assignments, involvement in student chapters of professional organizations, hall talk 
and friendships, students are transformed into a ―professionals,‖ adopting values and 
                                                 
56 Additionally, exclusionary ideologies can be embedded in the cultural myths, humor and 
tales of origin of a profession, such as lore about “founding fathers,” or within a profession’s 
norms of social interaction, such as the bravado typical of a surgical theater (Cech 2011).    
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norms and learning to project a confident, capable image to the public (Becker et al. 
1961; Dryburgh 1999; Granfield 1992; Greenwood 1966).  
These intra-profession cultural ideologies are transmitted through the professional 
socialization process to a new generation of professionals. As a result, men and women 
learn early what it means to be a member of the profession and are encouraged to try on 
that role for size as they progress through their training. 
Professional Identity Development 
The most important element of professional cultures for the individual-level 
reproduction of sex-segregation are professional identities. These identities are the 
―relatively stable and enduring constellation of attributions, beliefs, values, motives, and 
experiences in terms of which people define themselves in a professional role‖ (Ibarra 
1999, p. 764 referencing Schein 1979).  Professional socialization is deeply attitudinal in 
nature, and the culture, skill and etiquette of a professional appear in the individual as 
personal traits. The longer they spend in the initiation process, the more firmly impressed 
upon students are the values and beliefs of the profession (Hughes 1967; Ritzer 1971).    
Professional identities develop through iterative and self-reflective 
experimentation with the different identity features of the profession that respondents 
learn through professional socialization.  Neophytes adapt these identities by observing 
and emulating their role models and by experimenting with ―provisional selves‖-- their 
representation of the attitude and behaviors expected of their new role.  Neophytes are 
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evaluated on these provisional selves from external feedback from teachers and peers and 
by judging themselves against their own internal standards (Ibarra 1999).
57
   
These ―provisional selves‖ are vulnerable to influences from other aspects of 
people‘s identities. Not all provisional selves that respondents try on will fit with their 
existing notions of themselves.  Provisional selves that are congruent with their self-
conceptions are the more likely to ―stick;‖ professional identity features that feel 
inorganic or discordant with their conceptions of themselves are more likely to be 
rejected (Ibarra 1999).  Thus, as individuals progress through their professional 
socialization experiences, they may cobble together quite different professional identities, 
depending on their self-conceptions.
58
   
Some of these professional identities may be more consistent with the cultural 
norms of the professional role and with the realities of professional practice than others.  
Neophytes who develop professional identities that emphasize values, priorities or 
expertise that are tangential to what the dominant professional culture values will be less 
likely to remain in the profession.  Similarly, if their professional identities are not 
reflected in the experience of being a member of the profession on a day-to-day basis, 
they will more likely to seek out another field. For those who develop dominant 
professional identities, performance of their professional roles can feel self-expressive.  
                                                 
57
 See Ibarra (1999) for an excellent model of this adaptation process.  
58
 This process is iterative, and others (e.g. Becker & Howard 1965; Schein 1978) have argued that there is 
some change of self-conceptions as a result of professional identity development, but I am more interested 
here in the lesser-studied aspects of this relationship: how existing self-conceptions filter the development 
of professional identities.  This is important for understanding how professional identities may come to be 
gendered.  As I move forward with this project, I will check for the reverse relationship: whether 
professional identities influence self-conceptions over time. 
                                                    193 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine how four dimensions of professional identity— math 
and science prowess, technical leadership, managerial and communication commitments, 
and social consciousness—are gendered, and how these gendered professional identity 
dimensions, in turn, lead to gendered persistence in engineering.  Little is known in the 
professional socialization literature about how professional identities are gendered, and 
how this may lead to differences in women‘s and men‘s decisions to remain in 
professions in the short and long-term.   This chapter contributes an in-depth examination 
of the contributions of professional identity development to gendered persistence in 
engineering.  As I argue, gendered professional identities are an important mechanism in 
the self-expressive edge of sex-segregation because of their intimate connections to self-
conceptions.  
I next describe the four professional identity dimensions I investigate.  I then 
explore how these dimensions are gendered: how men‘s and women‘s adoption of these 
professional identity dimensions differs, and, more interestingly, how the development of 
these professional identity features is filtered by their self-conceptions.  Finally, I show 
how these gendered professional identities lead to gendered persistence in this male-
dominated field.  
5.3 Professional Identity in Engineering 
 Engineering students must not only learn to do engineering work—to wield the 
competencies and skills of a professional—but they must also learn to be engineers (Cech 
2010; Porcello 2004).   Initiates are expected to commit to and find personal meaning in 
the role of a professional in their field.  Explicitly and implicitly, students learn what it 
means to embody the role of the engineer—in values, in dress, speech, mannerisms, and 
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styles of interaction—through professional socialization.  Those who can seamlessly 
incorporate the role of the professional into their own identity should be more likely to 
remain in engineering and enjoy the field. 
 Professional identities can vary from individual to individual.  Some people‘s 
professional identities may emphasize the ethical and societal contributions of 
engineering work, while others‘ identities may relish the rapid technical change 
facilitated by engineering design.  The ideologies that underlie such professional 
identities can be found within the culture of engineering, but some have more prominence 
in the professional culture than others.  Ethical practice is certainly a part of engineering 
culture, but it is far less emphasized in engineering culture than technological innovation 
(Cech 2010).  Most engineering colleges, for example, require only a one-semester 
course on engineering ethics.  As I argue below, those who develop professional 
identities that most closely align with the values systems within engineering will be more 
likely to finish an engineering degree, enter an engineering career track after college, and 
intend to be an engineer in the future.   
 I examine four professional identity dimensions in engineering.  Each are based 
on deeply-held ideologies within the professional culture of engineering, and are thus 
likely to be transmitted through professional socialization.   The measures I use tap 
characteristics that respondents believe are important to a ―successful career‖ or ones that 
they hold ―personally important.‖  Each dimension, measured as latent variables in 
SEMs, consists of several manifest variables. After defining each dimension, I note the 
manifest variables that comprise that dimension and the results of the latent measure‘s 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
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 The first dimension is math and science prowess—respondents‘ identification 
with the math and science competence that is assumed to underlie engineering work.  The 
application of math and science to ―real world problems‖ is the basis of engineers‘ claim 
to expertise and is deeply engrained in its professional culture (Hughes 2005).  Most 
engineers take great pride in their math and science abilities, and displaying such prowess 
is seen as a marker of engineering competence par excellence (Florman 1994).  
Identifying with the math and science prowess of engineering is likely important to 
staying in the field.   This dimension is captured by a latent measure that is predicted by 
the following three manifest variables ―What, in your opinion, makes a successful 
career?‖ ―Math skills,‖ ―Strong background in math and science,‖ and ―understanding 
machines‖ (1=very unimportant to 5=very important; all variables in the CFA are 
significant at the .000 level).
59
   
Related to math and science prowess, I examine respondents‘ identification with 
the role of engineers as technological innovations.  Is it important to them to be 
personally involved in inventing new technologies and being part of scientific 
breakthroughs? Technological leadership, like math and science prowess, is exalted in 
the value system of engineering and, for many, is the most exhilarating aspect of their 
work (Dryburgh 1999; Faulkner 2007).  This dimension is comprised of three manifest 
variables:  ―Importance to me of:‖ ―Creating or managing future technologies,‖ ―making 
                                                 
59
 Fit statistics for year 1 measure of Math and Science Prowess:  χ2 =0, df=0, RMSEA=.000, and CFI=1.00 
for men and for women. Fit statistics for year 3 measure of Math and Science Prowess: χ2 =0, df=0, 
RMSEA=.000, and CFI=1.00 for men and for women. 
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important scientific discoveries,‖ and ―inventing new technologies‖ (1=very unimportant 
to 4=very important; all variables in the CFA are significant at the .000 level).  
60
 
 Two other dimensions of professional identity are less exalted in the culture of 
engineering than math and science prowess and technological leadership.  Commitment to 
managerial and communication skills captures respondents‘ identification with a career 
that emphasizes management, writing, leadership and social skills.  Such skills are 
important to the everyday work of engineers, particularly of engineers who work as 
project leaders, but they are seen as ―social‖ skills and thus have less value in the 
professional culture (Faulkner 2007, 2000).
61
  Compared to the numerous math, science, 
and technical lab courses required to earn an engineering degree, engineering students 
have far less training in communication and management skills (National Academy of 
Engineering 2004).  The latent measure of commitment to managerial and 
communication skills is predicted by the following four manifest variables ―What, in 
your opinion, makes a successful career?‖ ―Management skills,‖ ―writing and speaking 
skills,‖ ―social skills,‖ and ―leadership skills‖ (1=very unimportant to 5=very important; 
all variables significant at the .000 level).
62
 
 Finally, I investigate respondents‘ social consciousness. This dimension taps into 
an ideology in engineering culture that the profession exists to ―improve society‖ (NAE 
                                                 
60
 Fit statistics for year 1 measure of Technological Leadership:  χ2 =0, df=0, RMSEA=.000, and CFI=1.00 
for men and for women. Fit statistics for year 4 measure of Technological Leadership: χ2 =0, df=0, 
RMSEA=.000, and CFI=1.00 for men and for women. 
61
 While managerial work is seen as a masculine activity in most other realms of the labor market 
(Dinovitzer et al. 2009), managerial work is identified as social and thus within the purview of women‘s 
assumed expressiveness and communicative skills (Cech 2011; Faulkner 2000). 
62
 Fit statistics for year 1 measure of Managerial and Communication Skills:  χ2 =8.5, df=2, RMSEA=.078, 
and CFI=.965 for women; χ2 =8.4, df=2, RMSEA=.062, and CFI=.976 for men.  Fit statistics for year 3 
measure of Managerial and Communication Skills: χ2 =8.2, df=2, RMSEA=.075, and CFI=.965 for women; 
χ2 =7.8, df=2, RMSEA=.078, and CFI=.969 for men. 
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2004). While social consciousness underlies engineering‘s code of ethics and is 
recognized as important in the abstract, social consciousness is usually not a salient part 
of day-to-day engineering practice. In fact, concerns for social consciousness are usually 
bracketed as ―political‖ or ―irrelevant‖ to on-the-ground engineering work (Faulkner 
2000; Cech & Waidzunas 2010).   I include the following manifest variables in my latent 
measure of social consciousness: ―Importance to me of:‖ ―improving society,‖ ―being 
active in my community,‖ ―promoting racial understanding,‖ and ―helping others in 
need‖ (1=very unimportant to 4=very important; all variables in the CFA are significant 
at the .000 level).
63
  All professional identity dimensions were asked in year 1.  Math and 
science prowess and managerial and communication skills measures were asked again in 
year 3, while the technological leadership and social consciousness measures were 
repeated in year 4.  Tests for discriminant validity between these four latent measures 
were significant at the .000 level for both men and women in years 1 and years 3 and 4.
64
 
Professional Socialization and Professional Identity Dimensions 
 To demonstrate that these professional identity dimensions are at least partially 
determined by students‘ professional socialization experiences, I predict these dimensions 
with several measures of the cultural emphases of students‘ engineering programs.  
Specifically, engineering students were asked in year 1, ―how important does your 
engineering program consider each of the following:‖  (1) ―Scientific advancement and 
knowledge,‖ (2) ―innovation, inventions and industrial applications,‖ (3) ―basic 
                                                 
63
 Fit statistics for year 1 measure of Social Consciousness:  χ2 =1.5, df=2, RMSEA=.000, and CFI=1.00 for 
women; χ2 =2.4, df=2, RMSEA=.027, and CFI=.999 for men.  Fit statistics for year 4 measure of Social 
Consciousness Skills: χ2 =8.1, df=2, RMSEA=.071, and CFI=.984 for women; χ2 =4.6, df=2, 
RMSEA=.068, and CFI=.989 for men. 
64
 None of the manifest measures in these latent measures are more highly correlated with one of the 
variables in a different latent group than it is correlated with the variables in its own latent group. 
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research,‖ (4) ―entrepreneurship,‖ (5) ―willingness to take risks,‖ (6) ―business practice,‖ 
(7) ―economic development,‖ (8) ―teamwork,‖ (9) ―leadership,‖ (10) ―policy implications 
of engineering,‖ (11) ―ethical and/or social issues,‖ and (12) ―general education in the 
humanities and social sciences.‖ If these professional identity dimensions are the result of 
the professional socialization process, then they should be sensitive to students‘ 
perceptions of what their programs emphasize.
65
  My intent is to show broadly that these 
professional identity dimensions are partially derived from their socialization 
experiences, rather than to describe each relationship in detail.   
 I ran SEMs predicting each professional identity dimension using each of these 
twelve programmatic emphases measures (included in the model one at a time).  In the 
interest of space, I present only the estimated relationships between each latent 
professional identity dimension and each programmatic emphasis measure (Table 5.1). 
All models control for school, race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores, and are 
ran separately for men and women (coefficients for the controls are not shown). Table 5.1 
illustrates that each professional identity dimension is predicted by several programmatic 
emphasis measures. I do not offer particular hypotheses about these relationships, except 
that the suite of programmatic emphases should generally be positively related to these 
professional identities since they both stem from the culture of engineering.  This table 
shows that the emphasis of respondents‘ programs do matter to how they develop their 
professional identities.  The analysis in Table 5.1 suggest that the professional 
                                                 
65
 It is more useful to capture students‘ interpretations of their programs‘ cultural emphases rather than the 
programs‘ perceptions of what they emphasize, as students are the ones whose professional identity 
develops in response to what they interpret from their socialization experiences (Cech 2010).  
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socialization in respondents‘ programs has a direct and widespread effect on students‘ 
professional identities.  
Gendered Professional Identities 
 Men and women are not blank slates onto which professional socialization 
imprints professional identities.  They navigate this professional socialization experience 
with pre-existing self-conceptions and that may filter professional socialization. As noted 
above, neophytes in the process of professional socialization try on ―provisional selves‖ 
that correspond to their developing understandings of the professional role (Ibarra 1999).  
Experimenting with these profession-related provisional selves gradually leads to the 
internalization of a corresponding professional identity. However, only those provisional 
selves that are congruent with men‘s and women‘s pre-existing self-conceptions are 
likely to be internalized and incorporated into their professional identities (Howard 2000; 
Rosenthal et al. 2011).  Professional identity dimensions that are discordant with 
respondents‘ self-conceptions may either cause respondents‘ self-conceptions to change 
(which is inconsistent with my findings in chapter 2 about the relative stability of these 
self-conceptions over time), or those provisional selves will be discarded.  As a result of 
this filtering process, neophytes may emerge from the professional socialization process 
with quite different professional identities.  
Gender is an important axis along which such filtering may occur. Because men 
and women enter engineering with different self-conceptions, different ―provisional 
selves‖ are likely to be consistent with men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions.  They may, 
then, internalize different groups of professional identity dimensions from among those 
that are peddled in the professional socialization process.   
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Given that women are more likely to have more feminine (vs. masculine), 
unsystematic (vs. systematic), and more people-oriented (vs. things-oriented) self-
conceptions, women should be more likely to develop professional identities in 
engineering that are consistent with feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented self-
conceptions.  In particular, the dimensions of management and communication skills and 
social consciousness should be stronger in women‘s professional identities than in men‘s, 
since the self-conceptions of women are consistent with normative social conceptions of 
femininity and with an emphasis on work that engages with people rather than things.  
This is consistent with other research that has found that women are more engaged with 
and interested in questions of the ethical implications of science and engineering than 
men (Dryburgh 1999; Eccles 2007).  
On the other hand, men‘s professional identities may be more likely to emphasize 
math and science prowess and technical leadership, as these are consistent with 
systematic, masculine, and things-oriented self-conceptions.  This link is supported by 
cultural ideologies within the engineering profession, such as the ―technical/social 
dualism,‖ associate masculinity with technical competence (Faulkner 2000).  
To examine the gender differences in professional identities, I predict the four 
professional identity dimensions with gender (female=1) and controls for school, 
race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores.  Table 5.2 presents the SEMs for each 
corresponding dimension of professional identity.  The patterns in this table are 
consistent with my expectations:  math and science prowess and technological leadership 
are stronger in the professional identities of men than of women, while women‘s 
                                                    201 
 
 
 
professional identities are more likely than men‘s to emphasize managerial and 
communication skills and social consciousness.    
These results suggest that men and women emerge from their socialization 
experiences with different notions of what it means to be a professional engineer.  I 
examine later in this chapter whether these gendered professional identity differences 
translate into differences in men‘s and women‘s likelihood to persist in the field.  I next 
attempt to explain how these professional identities come to be gendered.
66
   
5.4 Self-Conceptions and the Development of Gendered Professional Identities 
 My data allow me to go further than merely speculating about the filtering process 
discussed above to actually empirically investigate whether self-conceptions predict 
professional identity development over time. I am interested in both whether these self-
conceptions predict men‘s and women‘s adoption of these professional identity 
dimensions, and whether self-conceptions predict the changes in the salience of these 
dimensions in respondents‘ self-conceptions over time.  First, I predict the four 
dimensions of professional identity (measured in year 3 or 4) with the three self-
conceptions I introduced in previous chapters: perceptions of self as feminine, 
unsystematic, and people-oriented (measured in year 2).  I then use self-conceptions to 
predict the change in these dimensions between years 1 and 3 or 4.  I expect that 
dimensions consistent with respondents‘ self-conceptions would increase in strength over 
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 An interesting question outside the scope of this dissertation is whether these differences in professional 
identity lead to differences in professional practice.  Do men and women who internalize the professional 
role differently also practice engineering differently?  Such research may find that, consistent with the 
common assumption that women bring something different to the table, women may indeed have a 
different prospective and different professional priorities than men.  However, my research suggests that 
such differences are due not to some innate, essential differences between men and women, but rather 
differences in men‘s and women‘s culturally –informed self-conceptions. 
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time, while those that are contradictory to their self-conceptions would decrease over 
time.  In this way, I can show the over-time process by which self-conceptions lead to the 
emphasis or de-emphasis of certain dimensions of professional identity. 
 Table 5.3 presents the SEMs that predict the importance of math and science 
prowess in respondents‘ professional identities, using feminine, unsystematic, and 
people-oriented self-conceptions, plus controls for school, race/ethnicity, and SAT math 
and verbal scores.  I run models separately for men and women, since I expect the 
relationships between self-conceptions and the professional identities to differ by gender.  
I find that men who perceive themselves as more people-oriented than other men in their 
engineering programs are less likely to have professional identities that emphasize math 
and science prowess.  On the other hand, the professional identities of men who perceive 
themselves as things-oriented are more likely to value such prowess.  Interestingly, I find 
that the relationship between unsystematic self-conceptions and math and science 
prowess is positive for women—those who perceive themselves as unsystematic are more 
likely to find math and science prowess an important part of their professional identity.  
This result is net of their math ―ability,‖ as measured by their SAT math and verbal 
scores.  Past research on women in science and engineering has shown that women hold 
lower perceptions of their math abilities than men (net of performance or preparation) 
(Correll 2001).  This finding may thus result from women who perceive themselves as 
unsystematic being sensitive to their perceived weakness, inflating the importance of 
math and science prowess for success in engineering in their minds.  unsystematic self-
conceptions are not a significant predictor of the importance of math and science prowess 
for men.   
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 The next table (5.4) predicts the change in the importance to respondents of math 
and science prowess by adding year 1 measures of this professional identity dimension to 
the models in Table 5.3. The inclusion of year 1 variables effectively indexes the change 
in the importance of math and science prowess between year 1 and year 3 results, and 
shows whether this change is significantly determined by respondents‘ self-conceptions.    
Consistent with the pattern in the previous table, women who perceive themselves as 
more unsystematic think math and science prowess are increasingly important to a 
successful career.  For men, less masculine and more people-oriented self-conceptions 
are related to a decrease in the importance to them of math and science prowess.   
 Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show technological leadership is predicted by feminine, 
unsystematic, and people-oriented self-conceptions.  Here, I find that women who 
perceive themselves as people-oriented are less likely to think that technological 
leadership important, compared to women who consider themselves things oriented.   
Also, women with unsystematic self-conceptions are likely to find technological 
leadership less important over time. None of the three self-conceptions predict the 
importance that men give to technological leadership.   
 I showed earlier that math and science prowess and technological leadership are 
more prominent in men‘s professional identities than in women‘s.  Two other 
dimensions, managerial and communication skills and social consciousness, are more 
prominent in the professional identities of women.  The first of these, managerial and 
communication skills, is predicted by models in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.  Here, among 
women, those who perceive themselves as feminine are more likely to believe that 
managerial and communication skills are important to a successful career than women 
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with more masculine self-conceptions (Table 5.7).  Such self-conceptions among women 
are also positively related to the changes in the importance they give to managerial and 
communication skills between year 1 and 3 (Table 5.8); people-oriented self-conceptions 
also marginally predict this change among women.  Similarly, men with less masculine 
and more people-oriented self-conceptions are more likely to consider managerial and 
communication skills important (Table 5.7) and men with more feminine and people-
oriented self-conceptions are also increasingly likely to see these skills as important as 
they progress through their professional socialization experiences (Table 5.8).   
 Finally, for men, perceiving themselves as less masculine and more people-
oriented leads them to be more interested in social consciousness than men with more 
masculine and things-oriented self-conceptions (Table 5.9).  Women with more things-
oriented self-conceptions are also more likely to become even less interested in social 
consciousness over time (Table 5.10).   
 These results illustrate that self-conceptions play an important role in how 
professional identities develop among men and women engineering students.  Women 
who exhibit self-conceptions stereotypical of women are more likely to develop 
professional identities that emphasize managerial and communication skills and less 
likely to emphasize technological leadership.  Men with stereotypically male self-
conceptions are more likely to have professional identities that emphasize math and 
science prowess, and less likely to emphasize managerial and communication skills and 
social consciousness.  It seems that these gendered self-conceptions filter the 
socialization process through which men and women develop professional identities.  
Only those identity dimensions that are consistent with their self-conceptions ―stick,‖ 
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while those that are discordant diminish in importance over time.  Gendered self-
conceptions, in other words, mediate the professional socialization experiences where 
men and women ―try on‖ these professional identity dimensions, helping to produce 
gendered professional identities among men and women. 
5.5 Gendered Professional Identities and Persistence in Engineering 
This gendered professional identity development is interesting in its own right and 
deserves further investigation in engineering and in other professional fields.  For my 
purposes, these gendered professional identity dimensions are interesting in the extent to 
which they affect sex segregation.  Do certain professional identity dimensions tend to 
reproduce engineering as male-dominated?  Are men and women with these gendered 
professional identities differentially likely to stay in engineering?  These are the questions 
to which I now turn.  
 Following previous work (Cech et al. 2011), I examine two different types of 
persistence.  The first, behavioral persistence, is a measure of whether men and women 
actually remain in the engineering field.  I measure both respondents‘ behavioral 
persistence through an engineering degree program and their behavioral persistence in 
engineering through career launch.  Completing a major in engineering or even entering 
the workforce as an engineer does not guarantee that respondents plan to remain in the 
field for their career, however.  Intentional persistence is respondents‘ expectation in year 
4 of the likelihood that they will be an engineer in five years.   The baseline sample in all 
these analyses are students who entered engineering programs as freshman. 
I am interested in whether gendered professional identities are significantly 
related to behavioral and intentional persistence. Specifically, I use the four professional 
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identity dimensions to predict behavioral and intentional persistence measures.  (I run 
each combination of professional identity dimensions and persistence measures 
separately.)  Using this same sample, my colleagues and I (Cech et al. 2011) have shown 
that men‘s and women‘s confidence in their abilities to wield the competencies and skills 
of engineering (―expertise confidence‖) and their confidence that engineering is the right 
―fit‖ for them  (―career-fit confidence‖) helps explain gendered persistence.  This latter 
factor, career-fit confidence, is a direct measure of respondents‘ assessment of whether 
engineering is a self-expressive career option for them.  My analysis here of gendered 
professional identity development helps explain why that career confidence is different 
for men and women.
67
  
Table 5.11 predicts behavioral and intentional persistence with math and science 
prowess (plus controls for institution, race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores).  
Among men, the salience of math and science prowess in their professional identities is 
positively related to their behavioral persistence through an engineering major and into an 
engineering career launch activity, and their intentions to persist in engineering in five 
years. For women, those whose professional identities emphasize math and science 
prowess are also significantly more likely to intend to persist in engineering in five years.  
Belief in the importance of technological leadership is also a strong predictor of 
persistence.  Women whose professional identities emphasize technological leadership 
are more likely to persist in engineering through their engineering major, into career 
launch and to intend to persist in engineering in five years (Table 5.12). Men‘s technical 
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 Further research (perhaps in a separate paper) will investigate the relationship between professional 
identities and career-fit confidence. 
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leadership emphasis also leads them to be more likely to persist into an engineering 
career and intend to be an engineer in the future. 
The remaining two professional identity dimensions have quite different effects 
on persistence.  Managerial and communication skills are not related to persistence for 
women, but they are negatively related to persistence for men: men who are committed to 
managerial and communication skills are marginally less likely to persist through an 
engineering major, and to choose an engineering field at career launch (Table 5.13). 
Finally, social consciousness has a different relationship to persistence for women 
and men. For women, emphasis on social consciousness in their professional identities is 
positively related to behavioral persistence through an engineering major and their 
intentional persistence (Table 5.14).  For men, however, commitment to social 
consciousness is negatively related to intentional persistence.   
 These professional identity measures do indeed predict both men‘s and women‘s 
actual persistence in engineering through their degrees and into the labor force, and their 
intent to persist in the profession in the future.  As I discuss below, these gendered 
professional identities play in important role in the reproduction of engineering as a male-
dominated field. 
5.6 Conclusions 
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine intra-field cultural processes of sex-
segregation—specifically, how gendered professional identities influenced men‘s and 
women‘s decisions to persist in this male-dominated field. My analysis proceeded in 
several steps.  First, I identified four dimensions of professional identity in engineering 
(math and science prowess, technological leadership, commitment to managerial and 
                                                    208 
 
 
 
communication skills, and social consciousness) and showed these to be (at least in part) 
the outcome of men‘s and women‘s professional socialization experiences.  I then 
showed that these professional identity measures are gendered: women and men, on 
average, develop professional identities that emphasize different dimensions.  Men‘s 
professional identities are more likely to emphasize math and science prowess and 
technological leadership, while women‘s professional identities are more likely to 
emphasize managerial and communication skills and social consciousness. 
  I argued that this gendering of professional identities partly arises out of a process 
by which men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions filter their professional identity 
development—only those dimensions that are consistent with students‘ self-conceptions 
will be incorporated into their professional identities.  I illustrated this process by 
examining the relationship between the four professional identity dimensions and three 
self-conception measures: perceptions of self as feminine, unsystematic, and people-
oriented.  I found that there are strong relationships between these self-conception 
measures and respondents‘ professional identities.  In some cases, I was able to show this 
filtering in action, whereby self conceptions predicted a change in the salience of certain 
dimensions of respondents‘ professional identities over time.  Finally, I demonstrated that 
these gendered professional identities predict behavioral and intentional persistence in 
engineering. 
 In several of these cases, I was able to trace self-conceptions acting through 
professional identities to affect persistence.  For men, those with masculine and things-
oriented self-conceptions are more likely to value math and science prowess, a 
professional identity dimension that is positively related to men‘s behavioral persistence.  
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Similarly, those same self-conceptions reduce the chances that men will value managerial 
and communication skills and social consciousness—two dimensions of professional 
identity that diminish men‘s likelihood of persisting in engineering.  For women, being 
people-oriented reduces the likelihood that they will find technical leadership 
important—a professional identity measure that is particularly important for women‘s 
persistence in engineering. 
 Thus, men who exhibit traits stereotypical of men (masculine, things-oriented) are 
likely to develop professional identities that are conducive to persistence in engineering.  
This is not true for women.  Women with self-conceptions typical of women (feminine 
and people-oriented) are more likely to find managerial and communication skills 
important, but this professional identity dimension is irrelevant to their persistence.  
Women who are people-oriented (and thus less likely to have technological leadership be 
prominent in their self-conceptions) are less likely to persist.   
It is quite easy, in other words, for men to harmonize societal norms of self-
conceptions and professional identity dimensions that are conducive to persistence in 
engineering.  This is less the case for women.   The self-conceptions that are stereotypical 
of women (feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented) in some cases are dissonant with 
the professional identity dimensions that are most conducive to their persistence in 
engineering.  These findings also suggest that women may face a disconnect between 
their gendered self-conceptions and the identities they are supposed to develop as a result 
of their professional socialization experiences.  Women who develop alternative or 
marginal professional identities (e.g. those that exalt managerial and communication 
skills) are less likely to remain in the field.    
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 Intra-profession mechanisms reproducing sex-segregation are complex but 
important. Men and women, in the process of becoming professionals, are expected to 
internalize the role of a professional, and to identify with that role.  They are expected not 
only to do professional work, but to be professionals.  If the professional identities that 
men and women develop are not consistent with either the intra-profession cultural ideals 
of what it means to be a professional, or with the day-to-day work of that profession, than 
those individuals are less likely to persist in the profession.  What I have shown here is 
that, partly the result of these gendered self-conceptions, the very process of developing 
those professional identities in engineering is gendered. Men and women emerge from 
their socialization process as slightly different professionals.  Because these professional 
identities are important determinants of persistence, these gendered professional identities 
translate into gendered persistence in engineering. 
 Obviously, there are many demand-side factors (such as chilly climates, 
marginalization, etc) that push women out of male-dominated fields like engineering, and 
many other social-psychological factors that lead them to leave the field (e.g. expertise 
and career fit confidence, Cech et al. 2011).  Here, I am concerned with how the self-
expressive edge of sex segregation might get played out in the intra-professional level—
how self-expression and professional cultures might intersect to reproduce sex 
segregation. The development of a professional identity is a very self-expressive process.  
Ideally, men and women develop professional identities that blend seamlessly with their 
self-conceptions and the role of the professional becomes part of them.  The work of the 
professional, then, becomes an extension of their self-expression. Men and women who 
either do not develop the identity features emphasized most in a profession, or develop 
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alternate or marginal professional identities are more likely to sense a mismatch between 
their professional identities and the work of a professional, are less likely to stay.  
Alternately, they may be judged by others as having the wrong approach or the wrong 
priories and are channeled out of the profession. 
The gendering of these professional identities is not determined by these three 
self-conceptions only; these are merely examples of the ways in which self-conceptions 
could filter professional development.  There are many other self-conceptions that could 
act as relevant filters which would help to produce these gender differences.  I have not 
attempted here to capture the entirety of this filtering process, with all its relevant 
dimensions.  Rather, I have sought to show examples of this process at work.  
 Although I analyzed engineering students only, I expect that similar processes 
exist in other professional fields.  Professional cultures are part of all high-skilled 
occupations (Weeden & Grusky 2005) and professional socialization and professional 
identity development are integral parts of the education and credentialing processes of 
those occupations (Becker et al. 1961).  In each field, women and men must rectify their 
professional identity development with their self-conceptions.  To the extent that the 
professional identity features promoted within a particular professional culture are 
dissonant with the self-conceptions typical of men or women, the sex-typing of that field 
will be reproduced through similar processes as those as I describe for engineering.  In 
nursing, for example, culturally valued professional identities may not coalesce with most 
men‘s self-conceptions, leading men to develop alternate nursing identities, compared 
with their women peers.  Such alternate professional identities may lead men to be less 
likely to persist in nursing education or a nursing career.   
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 Male-typed and female-typed occupations are more likely to have professional 
identities that are easiest to reconcile with the self-conceptions typical of men and 
women, respectively.  Previously male-dominated fields such as law that are still 
culturally male-typed may still reproduce segregation through these intra-profession 
mechanisms.  Even through women and men enter law school in equal proportions, 
women‘s long-term persistence in this occupation may be undermined in the process of 
professional identity development.  Among gender-neutral fields such as business, where 
the professional culture seems to emphasize both stereotypically male and female 
characteristics, men and women may cobble together different professional identities, but 
those professional identities may be equally likely to encourage persistence.  
These intra-occupational processes are likely most salient at credential 
acquisition, when professional socialization is most intense.  For professional occupations 
that require graduate and professional degrees (e.g. medical school), these processes will 
be most important after one‘s undergraduate education, compared to fields such as 
nursing and engineering where one can practice in the profession with a bachelor‘s 
degree.  For fields where further education is encouraged or expected (e.g. in chemistry), 
such intra-field processes may happen at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. 
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of Chapter 5 Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional Socialization 
Importance to my program of: 
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 Policy implications 
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 Math & Science Prowess (latent) 
- Math skills 
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       - Understanding machines 
 
 Technological Leadership (latent) 
- Creating/managing future 
technologies 
       - Making important sci discoveries 
       - Inventing new technologies 
 
 Managerial and Communication 
Skills (latent) 
       - Managerial Skills 
       - Writing and speaking skills 
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       - Leadership skills 
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Self-conceptions 
 Feminine 
 Unsystematic 
 People-Oriented
  
 
                                                    214 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
 
 
 
      Table 5.1: Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates Between Professional Identity Dimensions and Cultural Emphasis of   
      Respondents’ Engineering Program 
+ p<.10   * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Separate structural equation models were ran for each professional identity dimension-cultural emphasis pair.  Each model 
included controls for institution, race/ethnicity, and SAT math and verbal scores. Cultural Emphases questions asked respondents 
to report the importance to their engineering program of the following: Scientific advancement and knowledge, innovation, 
inventions and industrial applications, basic research, entrepreneurship, willingness to take risks, business practice, economic 
development, teamwork, leadership, policy implications of engineering, ethical and/or social issues, and general education in the 
humanities and social sciences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sci 
Adv 
Innov- 
ation 
Basic 
Research 
Entrepre 
-neurship 
Risks 
Business 
Practice 
Economic 
Developmt 
Teamwk Lead Policy 
Ethical 
Social 
Issues 
Gen 
Edu 
              
Math/ Science 
Prowess 
Women .161* .029 .021 .033 .141+ .066 .086 -.093 -.024 .028 .184** .122+ 
Men .179* .238* .083 .174* .161* .172* .149+ .021 .141+ .244* .189* .186* 
              
Technological 
Leadership 
Women .100 .205* .079 -.321 .115 -.026 .017 .051 .140+ .022 -.021 .214* 
Men .017 .143 .060 .170+ .280** .125 .209* -.120 .073 .256* .065 .099 
              
Management & 
Communication 
Women .222* .144 .147 .152 .204 -.028 .025 .094 .044 .023 .272** .140 
Men -.052 .024 .124 .121+ -.066 .110 .096 -.004 .166* .068 .083 .182 
              
Social 
Consciousness 
Women .151+ .102 .259** .135* .072 .161* .213** .303** .153* .192** .215* .284*** 
Men -.029 .048 .163 -.082 .209** .034 .029 .019 .109 .208* .245*** .226** 
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Table 5.2: SEMs Predicting 5 Dimensions of Professional Identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dimensions of 
Professional Identity: 
Math & Science  
Prowess 
 
Technological 
Leadership 
 
Managerial & 
Comm. Skills 
 Social 
Consciousness 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Female - .086 .046 * -.545 .088 *** .143 .069 * .213 .059 *** 
MIT .110 .068 
 
.271 .133 * -.081 .102  -.045 .090  
Olin -.120 .089 
 
.289 .170 + .112 .133  -.018 .115  
Smith -.041 .061 
 
-.004 .115 
 
.079 .092  .004 .078  
African-American .016 .096 
 
.081 .182 
 
.013 .146  .164 .124  
Hispanic or Latino/a .067 .071 
 
-.069 .134 
 
.053 .107  -.155 .091 + 
Asian or Asian-American -.075 .049 
 
.074 .092 
 
.034 .074  -.006 .062  
SAT Math .001 .000 *** .001 .001 
 
-.001 .000  -.001 .000 * 
SAT Verbal -.001 .000 ** -.001 .001 ** .000 .000  .001 .000  
    χ2  (df) 29.4 (18) 
  
63.9 (18) 
  
74.8 (29)   79.2(29)   
   RMSEA .028 
 
 
.057 
 
 
.045   .047   
   CFI .994 
 
 
.982 
 
 
.977   .977   
   R
2 
.147  .194  .074   .100   
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Table 5.3: SEM Predicting Math & Science Prowess with Self-Conception (SC) Measures, by Gender   (N=188) 
 
 
   
MATH & SCIENCE With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
PROWESS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est S.E.  Unst.Est S.E.  
Feminine SC  .361 .307   .058 .106       
Unsystematic SC             .128 .057 * -.030 .064  
MIT -.146 .218   .163 .111   -.063 .201  .155 .294  
Olin -.481 .240 + -.061 .142   -.429 .220 * -.094 .329  
Smith -.198 .192   
  
  -.068 .179     
African-American -.065 .157   -.192 .723   .144 .136  .095 .428  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.127 .179   .206 .136   -.114 .165  -.233 .307  
Asian or Asian-American .022 .102   -.005 .094   .020 .095  .159 .205  
SAT Math .000 .001   .001 .001   .001 .001  -.001 .001  
SAT Verbal -.001 .001   -.001 .001   -.001 .001 * -.001 .001  
    χ2  (df) 70.5 (66) 
 
 
101.9 (60) 
 
 
57.2(29)   47.8(26)   
   RMSEA .022 
 
 
.050 
 
 
.062   .021   
   CFI .992 
 
 
.911 
 
 
.920   .933   
   R
2 
.093  .066  .306   .063   
MATH & SCIENCE With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions  
PROWESS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. Est. S.E.  Unst.Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .034 .026  -.072 .033 * 
MIT -.110 .206  .091 .157  
Olin -.340 .222  -.085 .179  
Smith -.113 .185     
African-American .050 .133  -.609 .390  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.185 .168  -.200 .161  
Asian or Asian-American .031 .096  .148 .115  
SAT Math .000 .001  -.001 .001  
SAT Verbal -.001 .001  .000 .001  
    χ2  (df) 36.7(18)   19.4(16)   
   RMSEA .072   .036   
   CFI .967   .988   
   R
2 
.103   .144   
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Table 5.4: SEM & OLS Predicting Change In Math & Science Prowess with Self-Conception Measures (Yr 1 to 3), by Gender   
 
  
Δ MATH & SCIENCE With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
PROWESS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst.Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .385 .283 
 
-.374 .148 **       
Unsystematic SC 
      
.124 .053 * -.002 .100  
Yr 1 M/S Prowess (latent) .332 .209 + .691 .246 ** .286 .156 + .875 .285 ** 
MIT -.239 .246 
 
.057 .158 
 
-.174 .202  .178 .195  
Olin -.602 .273 * .016 .189 
 
-.495 .220 * .202 .225  
Smith -.238 .207 
    
-.100 .173     
African-American -.146 .194 
 
.066 .122 
 
.085 .131  .424 .299  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.239 .199 
 
-.251 .179 
 
-.225 .168  -.040 .191  
Asian or Asian-American .058 .110 
 
-.255 .175 * .034 .091  .093 .134  
SAT Math -.001 .001 
 
-.001 .001 
 
.001 .001  -.000 .001  
SAT Verbal -.001 .001 
 
.000 .001 
 
-.001 .001  .001 .001  
    χ2  (df) 103.3(101) 
 
 
119.7(93) 
 
 
87.1(55)   44.6(50)   
   RMSEA .013 
 
 
.042 
 
 
.063   .054   
   CFI .996 
 
 
.942 
 
 
.950   .937   
   R
2 
.470  .495  .427   .321   
Δ MATH & SCIENCE With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions  
PROWESS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. Est. S.E.  Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .045 .028  -.181 .059 ** 
Yr 1 M/S Prowess (latent) .363 .206 + 1.109 .279 *** 
MIT -.141 .209  .284 .344  
Olin -.068 .189  .254 .401  
Smith .044 .097     
African-American -.228 .171  -1.028 .796  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.009 .138  -.281 .335  
Asian or Asian-American .045 .028  .323 .237  
SAT Math -.001 .001  -.001 .001  
SAT Verbal -.311 .224  -.001 .001  
    χ2  (df) 62(41)   49.2(37)   
   RMSEA .059   .034   
   CFI .965   .980   
   R
2 
.325   .394   
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Table 5.5: SEM Predicting the Importance of Technical Leadership with Self-Conception Measures, by Gender 
 
  
TECHNICAL  With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
LEADERSHIP WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst.Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst. Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  1.678 1.455   .124 .080         
Unsystematic SC             -.001 .143  -.168 .113  
MIT -.848 .384 * .086 .303   -1.292 .512 * .249 .398  
Olin -.759 .384 * .046 .342   -1.163 .525 * .116 .442  
Smith -.497 .320         -.684 .449       
African-American .172 .234   1.336 1.443   .378 .339  -1.298 .536 * 
Hispanic or Latino/a -.007 .278   -.685 .291 * -.064 .406  -.993 .351 ** 
Asian or Asian-American .282 .178  .066 .190   .446 .243 + .146 .244  
SAT Math .001 .001   -.003 .002   .002 .001  -.004 .002  
SAT Verbal .001 .001   .002 .001   .001 .001  .002 .001 + 
    χ2  (df) 87.4(66)   80.3 (60) 
 
 
50.0(29)   31.7(26)   
   RMSEA .052 
 
 
.066 
 
 
.071   .036   
   CFI .917 
 
 
.909 
 
 
.964   .985   
   R
2 
.141  .165  .099   .126   
TECHNICAL  With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions 
LEADERSHIP WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. Est. S.E.  Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC -.071 .033 * .023 .047  
MIT -.602 .283 * .102 .276  
Olin -.644 .295 * .029 .311  
Smith -.400 .230 +      
African-American .151 .154  -.512 .611  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.075 .183  -.694 .266 ** 
Asian or Asian-American .250 .127 * .067 .173  
SAT Math .000 .001  -.003 .002  
SAT Verbal .001 .001  .002 .001  
    χ2  (df) 26.0(18)   19.7(16)   
   RMSEA .053   .067   
   CFI .987   .965   
   R
2 
.224   .139   
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Table 5.6: SEM Predicting the Change In Importance of Technical Leadership with Self-Conception Measures (Yr 1 to 4) 
    
     
  
Δ  TECHNICAL  With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
LEADERSHIP WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst.Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .296 .386 
 
.188 .175 
 
      
Unsystematic SC 
      
-.186 .111 + -.068 .104  
Y1Tech Lead (latent) .427 .097 *** .345 .104 ** .500 .099 *** .363 .103 *** 
MIT -.599 .346 + .027 .265 
 
-.581 .362  .064 .261  
Olin -.686 .359 + -.061 .303 
 
-.798 .376 * -.043 .295  
Smith -.425 .292 
    
-.361 .316     
African-American -.055 .234 
 
-3.070 2.470 
 
.173 .238  -.655 .368 + 
Hispanic or Latino/a .040 .265 
 
-.457 .253 + .045 .289  -.648 .279 * 
Asian or Asian-American .210 .158 
 
-.006 .167 
 
.171 .172  -.013 .166  
SAT Math .000 .001 
 
-.001 .002 
 
.003 .002  -.002 .002  
SAT Verbal .000 .001 
 
.002 .001 
 
.000 .001  .002 .001  
    χ2  (df) 108.9(101) 
 
 
109.7(93) 
 
 
92.6(55)   67.9(50)   
   RMSEA .023 
 
 
.040 
 
 
.069   .031   
   CFI .990 
 
 
.983 
 
 
.955   .970   
   R
2 
.478  .227  .537   .235   
Δ  TECHNICAL  With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions (OLS) 
LEADERSHIP  WOMEN MEN 
 
 Unst.Est. S.E.        Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC  -.036 .041  .059 .044  
Y1Tech Lead (latent)  .403 .099 *** .373 .103 *** 
MIT  -.600 .338 + .092 .262  
Olin  -.705 .354 * .018 .296  
Smith  -.473 .296     
African-American  .047 .207  -.162 .477  
Hispanic or Latino/a  -.044 .261  -.445 .248 + 
Asian or Asian-American  .249 .157  -.026 .166  
SAT Math  .000 .001  -.002 .001  
SAT Verbal  .001 .001  .002 .001  
    χ2  (df)  61.5(41)   58.4(37)   
   RMSEA  .059   .071   
   CFI  .974   .921   
   R
2 
 .462   .245   
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Table 5.7: SEM Predicting the Importance of Managerial & Communication Skills with Self-Conception Measures  
  
 
 
  
MANAGERIAL & With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
COMM. SKILLS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst.Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst.Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .230 .097 * .268 .125 *       
Unsystematic SC             .055 .089  -.093 .231  
MIT -.243 .149   -.149 .167   -.307 .315  -.157 .182  
Olin -.191 .194 
 
-.064 .189   -.161 .319  -.129 .203  
Smith -.012 .110        -.115 .278       
African-American -.103 .157   -1.323 .572  * -.002 .207  -.044 .280  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.047 .133  -.044 .161   -.184 .254  -.207 .284  
Asian or Asian-American -.103 .157 
 
-.029 .116   .199 .152  -.052 .131  
SAT Math .000 .001  .001 .001   .001 .001  .002 .001  
SAT Verbal -.002 .001  .000 .001   -.001 .001  .000 .001  
    χ2  (df) 13.5 (81) 
 
 
82.4(74) 
 
 
63.6(41)   48.1(37)   
   RMSEA .036 
 
 
.026 
 
 
.062   .059   
   CFI .964 
 
 
.975 
 
 
.960   .961   
   R
2 
.135  .207  .105   .070   
MANAGERIAL & With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions 
COMM. SKILLS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.      Unst. Est. S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .076 .043  .075 .032 * 
MIT -.354 .355  -.132 .166  
Olin -.081 .367  -.050 .188  
Smith -.073 .317      
African-American -.039 .230  .859 .439 * 
Hispanic or Latino/a -.206 .285  -.047 .160  
Asian or Asian-American .218 .168  -.088 .116  
SAT Math .001 .001  .001 .001  
SAT Verbal      -.002 .001 + .000 .001  
    χ2  (df) 52.7(29)   22.3 (26)   
   RMSEA .075   .000   
   CFI .956   1.00   
   R
2 
.093   .198   
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Table 5.8: SEM Predicting the Change In Importance of Managerial & Comm. Skills with Self-Conception Measures (Y1 to 3)   
  
 
 
 
 
  
Δ  MANAGERIAL & With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
COMM. SKILLS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst.Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .283 .106 ** .088 .049 *       
Unsystematic SC 
      
.190 .137  .123 .170  
Y1 MgrComm (latent) -.136 .270 
 
.367 .132 *** .273 .209  .697 .284 ** 
MIT -.335 .356 
 
-.203 .162 
 
-.225 .343  -.253 .375  
Olin -.278 .361 
 
-.189 .186 
 
-.252 .345  -.380 .547  
Smith -.091 .313 
    
-.049 .300     
African-American -.169 .249 
 
1.648 1.061 
 
.150 .232  .424 .369  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.133 .290 
 
-.141 .159 
 
-.111 .283  .590 .262  
Asian or Asian-American .221 .167 
 
.003 .112  .180 .165  .115 .376  
SAT Math .002 .001 + .002 .001 + .002 .002  .004 .005  
SAT Verbal .000 .001 
 
.000 .001 
 
-.001 .001  .001 .002  
    χ2  (df) 221(137) 
 
 
177.5(127) 
 
 
160.1(85)   98.3(78)   
   RMSEA .065 
 
 
.049 
 
 
.078   .040   
   CFI .879 
 
 
.915 
 
 
.893   .959   
   R
2 
.440  .369  .178   .444   
Δ  MANAGERIAL & With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions 
COMM. SKILLS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. Est. S.E.  Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .095 .027 + .066 .030 * 
Y1 MgrComm (latent) .170 .133  .401 .131 ** 
MIT -.207 .220  -.190 .162  
Olin -.091 .225  -.175 .186  
Smith -.041 .195     
African-American .035 .141  .545 .426  
Hispanic or Latino/a -.113 .179  -.144 .158  
Asian or Asian-American .144 .106  -.040 .113  
SAT Math .001 .001  .002 .001 + 
SAT Verbal -.001 .001 + .000 .001  
    χ2  (df) 136.7(69)   83.1(63)   
   RMSEA .079   .044   
   CFI .899   .959   
   R
2 
.186   .391   
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Table 5.9: SEM Predicting the Importance of Social Consciousness with Self-Conception Measures  
    
  SOCIAL With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
CONSCIOUSNESS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst. Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .972 .903   .424 .202 *       
Unsystematic SC             -.044 .067  .040 .080  
MIT -.168 .249   .033 .317   -.224 .250  .004 .213  
Olin -.193 .253 
 
.184 .358   -.153 .253  .052 .239  
Smith -.058 .212        -.126 .217     
African-American .041 .166   .748 .500 + .126 .162  .309 .285  
Hispanic or Latino/a .127 .199   -.182 .295   .013 .195  -.179 .219  
Asian or Asian-American .069 .115 
 
.041 .198   .102 .117  .035 .133  
SAT Math -.001 .001  -.002 .002   -.001 .001  -.001 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001   .001 .001   .001 .001  .001 .001  
    χ2  (df) 121.4(81) 
 
 
82.4 (74) 
 
 
68.4(41)   55.6(36)   
   RMSEA .059 
 
 
.026 
 
 
.068   .067   
   CFI .931 
 
 
.978 
 
 
.954   .941   
   R
2 
.111  .159  .076   .067   
SOCIAL With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions 
CONSCIOUSNESS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .032 .029  .111 .035 ** 
MIT -.164 .247  .048 .201  
Olin -.075 .252  .155 .228  
Smith -.018 .215      
African-American .133 .159  1.297 .438 ** 
Hispanic or Latino/a .093 .193  -.078  .185  
Asian or Asian-American .082 .114  -.003  .126  
SAT Math -.001 .001  -.001  .001  
SAT Verbal .000 .001  .001  .001  
    χ2  (df) 48.9(29)   22.4(26)   
   RMSEA .069   .000   
   CFI .964   1.00   
   R
2 
.095   .224   
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Table 5.10: SEM Predicting the Change In Importance of Social Consciousness with Self-Conception Measures (Y1 to Y4)   
Δ  SOCIAL With Feminine Self-Conceptions With Unsystematic Self-Conceptions 
CONSCIOUSNESS WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E. 
 
Unst. Est. S.E.  Unst. Est. S.E.  
Feminine SC  .313 .583 
 
-.122 .216 
 
      
Unsystematic SC 
      
-.019 .053  .234 .051  
Y1 Soc Consc (latent) .799 .264 ** .747 .196 *** .880 .220 *** 1.056 .527 * 
MIT -.044 .206 
 
-.198 .205   -.046 .200  -.508 .617  
Olin -.111 .213 
 
-.276 .240   -.087 .203  -.592 .678  
Smith -.079 .172 
    
-.105 .173     
African-American -.057 .137 
 
.812 .906 
 
-.045 .134  .424 .707  
Hispanic or Latino/a .309 .169 + -.343 .218 
 
.276 .167 + .561 .758  
Asian or Asian-American .029 .094 
 
-.016 .125 
 
.022 .094  .036 .292  
SAT Math -.001 .001 
 
.000 .001  -.001 .001  .003 .005  
SAT Verbal .000 .001 
 
.001 .001   .000 .001  .001 .002  
    χ2  (df) 204.2 (137) 
 
 
129.6 (127) 
 
 
107.4(85)   68.0 (78)   
   RMSEA .058 
 
 
.008 
 
 
.043   .000   
   CFI .919 
 
 
.998 
 
 
.972   1.00   
   R
2 
.546  .437  .526   .431   
Δ  SOCIAL With People-Oriented Self-Conceptions 
CONSCIOUSNESS WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst.Est. S.E.  Unst. Est.  S.E.  
People-Oriented SC .046 .025 * .044 .037  
Y1 Soc Consc (latent) .980 .247 *** .599 .152 ** 
MIT -.011 .196  -.152 .199  
Olin -.143 .200  -.174 .225  
Smith -.158 .172     
African-American .042 .090  -.019 .123  
Hispanic or Latino/a .251 .161  -.209 .186  
Asian or Asian-American .059 .132  .702 .611  
SAT Math -.001 .001  .000 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001  .001 .001  
    χ2  (df) 88.8(69)   58.5(63)   
   RMSEA .045   .000   
   CFI .974   1.00   
   R
2 
     .575   .432   
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Table 5.11: SEM predicting Persistence with Math & Science Prowess, by Gender 
 a= Olin Students not included Behavioral Persistence in Majors because they cannot leave engineering without leaving Olin 
 
 
  
 
Behavioral Persistence (Major) 
N=168 
Behavioral Persistence (Career Launch) N=188 Intentional Persistence N=179 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E. Unst. 
Est. 
SE.  
Y3 M&S Prowess 
(latent) .159 .143 
 
.339 .116 ** .105 .221  .345 .114 ** .590 .230 ** .480 .121 *** 
MIT .078 .117 
 
-.188 .095 * .092 .214  .136 .119  .141 .213  .039 .117  
Olina 
  
 
  
 
.314 .275  .424 .153 ** .163 .275  .226 .151  
Smith .102 .112 
    
.172 .155     .314 .155 *    
African-American -.104 .143 
 
.025 .260
 
-.061 .220  -.040 .255  .222 .221  -.085 .251  
Hispanic or Latino/a .140 .178 
 
-.208 .145 
 
.216 .189  -.143 .143  -.077 .190  .013 .141  
Asian or Asian-Amer -.018 .107 
 
-.056 .100 
 
-.160 .128  -.070 .098  .222 .221  -.236 .096 * 
SAT Math .001 .100 
 
.000 .001 
 
.001 .001  -.001 .001  -.001 .100  .000 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001 + .000 .000 
 
-.001 .000  .000 .001  .001 .001 * .000 .000  
    χ2  (df) 25.6 (16) 
 
13.7(14) 
 
24.6 (18)  16.2(16)  30.1 (18)  18.7(16)   
   RMSEA .064 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.028   .007   .037   .024   
   CFI .972 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
.994   .999   .989   .993   
   R2 .096  .133  .063   .184   .160   .258   
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Table 5.12: SEM predicting Persistence with Technological Leadership, by Gender 
 a= Olin Students not included Behavioral Persistence in Majors because they cannot leave engineering without leaving Olin 
 
  
 
Behavioral Persistence (Major) N=168 Behavioral Persistence (Career Launch) N=188 Intentional Persistence N=179 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
SE.  
Y4 Tech Leadrsp 
(latent) .135 .065 * .018 .041 
 
.154 .061 * .169 .054 ** .264 .059 *** .202 .052 *** 
MIT .130 .111 
 
-.080 .069 
 
.167 .207  .109 .122  .350 .201 + -.004 .122  
Olina 
   
    
 
.152 .150  .345 .156 * .210 .258  .065 .155  
Smith .113 .110 
 
    
 
.353 .265     .359 .146 *    
African-American -.112 .140 
 
.176 .189 
 
-.074 .214  .099 .255  .119 .210  .092 .251  
Hispanic or Latino/a .101 .175 
 
-.110 .104 
 
.217 .183  -.006 .141  -.213 .179  .112 .140  
Asian or Asian-Amer -.063 .108 
 
.034 .072 
 
-.177 .122  -.045 .098  .046 .120  -.233 .096 * 
SAT Math      .000 .001 
 
.000 .001 
 
.000 .001  .000 .001  -.001 .001  .001 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001 * .000 .000 
 
-.001 .001  -.001 .001  .000 .001  -.001 .001  
    χ2 (df) 29.7(16) 
 
16.7(14) 
 
60.9(18) 26.1(16)     57.8(18)  23.7(16)   
   RMSEA .071 
 
 
.026 
 
 
.070   .047   .068   .986   
   CFI .958 
 
 
.994 
 
 
.972   .982   .974   .041   
    R2 .127  .025  .118   .160   .247   .153   
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Table 5.13: SEM predicting Persistence with Managerial & Communication Skills, by Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
a= Olin Students not included Behavioral Persistence in Majors because they cannot leave engineering without leaving Olin 
 
 
  
 
Behavioral Persistence (Major) 
N=168 
Behavioral Persistence (Career Launch) 
N=188 
Intentional Persistence N=179 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
SE.  
Y3 Mgmt & Com 
(latent) 
 
.100 
 
.105 
 
 
-.100 
 
.065 + 
 
-.127 
 
.114  
 
-.177 
 
.088 + 
 
.050 
 
.117  
 
.100 
 
.092  
MIT .128 .114 
 
-.090 .068 
 
.076 .214  .179 .122  .201 .220  .066 .124  
Olina 
   
    
 
.284 .272  .424 .160 ** .064 .281  .112 .163  
Smith .134 .112 
 
    
 
.151 .154     .332 .159 *    
African-American -.096 .142 
 
.184 .188 
 
-.056 .220  .039 .264  .223 .228  -.090 .264  
Hispanic or Latino/a .128 .178 
 
-.116 .104 
 
.169 .188  -.082 .147  -.160 .195  .008 .148  
Asian or Asian-Amer -.028 .109 
 
.033 .072 
 
-.139 .126  -.042 .102  .027 .131  -.193 .101 + 
SAT Math .001 .001 
 
.000 .001 
 
.000 .001  -.001 .001  .000 .001  .000 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001 + .000 .000 
 
-.001 .001  -.001 .001  .000 .001  .000 .001  
    χ2 (df) 79(26) 
 
34.8(23) 
 
71.7(29)  42.6(26)  70.8(29)  46.6(26)   
   RMSEA .059 
 
 
.043 
 
 
.055   .047   .055   .053   
   CFI .956 
 
 
.963 
 
 
.966   .962   .967   .953   
   R2 .101  .081  .073   .110   .085   .057   
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Table 5.14: SEM predicting Persistence with Social Consciousness, by Gender 
  
a= Olin Students not included Behavioral Persistence in Majors because they cannot leave engineering without leaving Olin
 
Behavioral Persistence (Major) 
N=168 
Behavioral Persistence (Career Launch) 
N=188 
Intentional Persistence N=179 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 
WOMEN  MEN  WOMEN MEN 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst. 
 Est. 
S.E. 
 
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  
Unst.  
Est. 
S.E.  Unst.  
Est.  
SE
. 
Y4 Soc Consc 
(latent) 
.245 .130 
* 
-.045 .090 
 
.117 .102 
 
-.121 .094 
 
.309 .100 
*
* 
-.184 .089 
* 
MIT .121 .112 
 
-.067 .079 
 
.113 .213  .186 .122  .288 .211  .065 .123  
Olina 
   
    
 
.179 .154  .409 .158 * .144 .270  .147 .159  
Smith .130 .111 
 
    
 
.302 .272     .372 .153 *    
African-American -.126 .141 
 
.141 .187 
 
-.092 .220  .048 .264  .170 .220  -.026 .261  
Hispanic or Latino/a .091 .176 
 
-.133 .122 
 
.206 .188  -.127 .149  -.145 .188  -.035 .148  
Asian or Asian-Amer -.023 .107 
 
.039 .089 
 
-.170 .126  -.044 .101  .029 .126  -.208 .100 * 
SAT Math .001 .001 
 
.000 .001 
 
.000 .001  -.001 .001  .000 .001  .000 .001  
SAT Verbal .001 .001 
 
.000 .000 
 
-.001 .001  -.001 .001  .000 .001  .000 .001  
    χ2 (df) 48.5(26) 
 
22.1(23) 
 
76.0(29)   38.6(26)   75.2(29)  36.5(26)   
   RMSEA .077 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.058   .041   .057   .038   
   CFI .934 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
.965   .974   .966   .978   
   R2 .136  .033  .076   .108   .177   .086   
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This project was driven by a particular puzzle: why, despite the rise and broad 
dissemination of egalitarian legal and cultural mandates over the last four decades, is 
occupational sex segregation so resilient in the U.S.? Occupational sex segregation 
declined steadily from the 1960s through the 1980s, but changed little after the mid-
1990s (Cotter et al. 2011).  The continued segregation men and women into different 
occupations disadvantages women in prestige, pay, and power. 
I argued that institutional-level factors (such as queuing and organizational 
practices) and interactional-level factors (such as cognitive biases and discrimination) are 
not the only social forces reproducing inequality.  Individual-level cultural 
mechanisms—particularly women‘s and men‘s decisions about college majors and 
careers—play an important role in reproducing sex segregation. Existing literature on 
individual-level decision-making processes, however, is inadequate to explain how these 
decisions are gendered.  Both the human capital (e.g. Becker 1993) and role expectations 
literatures (e.g. Eccles 1994, 1987) make the flawed assumptions that female-dominated 
fields are more ―family friendly‖ than male-dominated fields, and that men and women 
actually have access to such information when they are making critical career decisions.   
Socialization literature, on the other hand, tries to explain the gendering of 
interests in the tasks stereotypically associated with male- and female-typed occupations 
by tying such interests to men‘s and women‘s childhood socialization experiences 
(Chodorow 1978; Bem 1993).  While boys and girls are certainly encouraged to develop 
different types of skills and interests, there is little connection between these childhood 
interests and their adult careers (Jacobs 1989).  Interests and identities do not remain 
stagnant after being internalized at an early age (West & Zimmerman 1987); it is more 
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accurate to understand career decisions as a function of past and present constraints and 
identities over the life course.   
Finally, recent social-psychological literature has demonstrated that women and 
men develop gendered understandings of their abilities, net of their actual skills and 
performance (Correll 2001, 2004; Spencer et al. 1999; Steele 1997).  While positive self-
assessments on the core intellectual tasks (e.g. math) of an occupation is likely necessary 
for men and women to even consider it as a career option, perceived ability is not a 
sufficient condition for selection of academic majors or careers.   
A more salient individual-level factor in the reproduction of occupational sex 
segregation among college-educated men and women is self-expression.  Young men and 
women are encouraged and expected to select fields of study and career activities that are 
self-expressive.   Recent gender literature has suggested that self-expressive career 
decisions are an important site for the reproduction of sex segregation (e.g. Charles & 
Bradley 2009; Cotter et al. 2011, England 2010), but have not explored these insights 
theoretically or empirically at the individual level.  Charles and Bradley (2009) have 
shown that national contexts—both economic and cultural—influence whether men and 
women have the latitude to ―indulge their gendered selves.‖  In developing countries, 
women‘s representation in high-paid, male-dominated fields is higher because personal 
economic security is of central importance.  In affluent, post-materialist societies like the 
United States, women and men (at least those in the middle class) can afford to ―indulge‖ 
their gendered interests in less lucrative, but still economically secure, careers.  Using 
country-level data, Charles and Bradley illustrate that cultural and economic latitude for 
gendered decision-making facilitates occupational sex segregation.  Their research 
                                                                      231 
 
 
 
provides the structural and cultural context for my individual-level analysis of the self-
expressive edge of inequality.   
This project shows how this ―indulgence‖ actually happens by using individual-
level data from a single national context that encompasses variation both between and 
among men and women. Specifically, I follow a sample of young men and women as 
they enter college at one of four institutions (MIT, Smith, Olin and UMass), earn their 
undergraduate degrees, and enter a graduate program or the workforce.  This is an ideal 
stage in the life course to examine the process of self-expressive career decision-making 
because it is a time of great flexibility (compared to once people have been in the 
workforce for awhile), and it is also a time when men and women are expected to explore 
their interests and identities.  These data also allow me to see whether self-expression 
matters for career decisions even net of the structural constraints imposed by their degree 
certification.  
This project developed a theoretical framework for understanding the process by 
which self-expression is co-constructed with the cultural structure of gender, and how 
that gendered self-expression, in turn, comes to reproduce occupational sex segregation.  
The foundation of this self-expression is individuals‘ self-conceptions—the theories they 
hold about themselves as experiencing, functioning, unique individuals within a deeply 
individualistic culture.  Rather than expressing a group membership (e.g. gender or 
religion), self-expression is seen as a fundamentally individualistic process whereby 
respondents express their conceptions of themselves in their career decisions.  In the 
process of this self-expression, women and men make career decisions that maximize the 
congruence between their beliefs, values, and identity features and their college major or 
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occupation.  In this way, being a member of an occupation, and engaging in occupational 
tasks, becomes self-expressive. 
People‘s conceptions of themselves are, however, deeply gendered.  As I review 
below, self-conceptions are co-constructed with beliefs about the gender structure.  As 
the basis for self-expressive career decision-making, these gendered self-conceptions can 
reproduce occupational sex segregation.
68
  
These self-conceptions do not necessarily appear gendered to their holders, 
however; they may just appear individualistic.  The very notion of individuality that 
underlies post-WWII notions of the ―self‖ means that self-conceptions are supposed to be 
one‘s ―own bit of space‖ where they are ―utterly free to be an individual.‖   The cultural 
meanings surrounding self-conceptions and their tie to individuality, in other words, 
mask the gendering of these concepts. Self-expressive career decision-making is thus 
encouraged and exalted without appearing as a mechanism for inequality reproduction.   
I want to reiterate that my focus on self-expressive major and career decision-
making is not the same as ―blaming the victim.‖  I do not argue that these decisions are 
somehow innate to men and women, nor do I suggest that women are responsible for the 
disadvantages in wages, power, etc. that accompany their selection of female-dominated 
fields.  On the contrary, I show that seemingly self-expressive decisions are deeply 
influenced by cultural gender beliefs.  If I ―lay blame,‖ it is on those unequal cultural 
gender beliefs such as essentialism, traditional gender role beliefs, and hegemonic 
masculinity and femininity that men and women internalize.  My key finding is that 
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 As noted elsewhere, I plan to include a separate chapter that uses the qualitative interview and diary data 
to show that respondents are using logics of self-expression (rather than, say, personal economic security) 
to explain their college major decisions and to talk about their career plans. 
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cultural beliefs act through self-expressive decisions to reproduce occupational sex 
segregation.  My focus on individual-level cultural processes elucidates a part of the 
gender structure that is less well-understood than institutional or interactional-level 
processes.  This does not mean that I disregard broader structural or discriminatory 
factors. 
This chapter briefly reviews my findings and ties them back to my theoretical 
framework.  I then discuss the theoretical and policy implications of this work.  I end by 
speculating on how this might be applicable to gender inequality more broadly—whether 
their might be a ―self-expressive edge of inequality‖ and what theoretical and empirical 
questions that approach might suggest.  
6.1 Review of Findings 
 The self-expressive edge of inequality is the mechanism by which cultural gender 
beliefs reinforce occupational sex segregation by acting through men‘s and women‘s self-
expressive career decisions.  In order to claim that self-expression is really culturally-
informed, I needed to show examples of cultural gender beliefs informing the self-
understandings on which such expression is based.  Chapter 2 did this by examining the 
relationship between self-conceptions and gender schemas, the shared cultural models 
about the role of men and women in society.  Specifically, I used a measure of feminine 
(vs. masculine) self-conceptions and three measures of gender schemas: gender role 
beliefs, gender category beliefs, and gender essentialist beliefs.  I found that self-
conceptions and gender schemas are gendered in expected ways:  women have more 
feminine self-conceptions, have less traditional gender role beliefs, and are more likely to 
believe that other members of their gender category are feminine.  In contrast, men 
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perceived themselves as more masculine, were more likely to agree with traditional 
gender role beliefs, and perceived members of their gender category to be masculine.  
Self-conceptions were less polarized between men and women than gender schemas, 
suggesting  that, consistent with Epstein (1999), the perception of differences is more 
extreme than the actual differences between men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions.  
 I theorized and found evidence for mechanisms by which gender schemas 
influence self-conceptions and vice versa.  First, beliefs about one‘s gender category can 
be extrapolated into men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions. For example, women who 
perceive their gender category to be hegemonically feminine also perceive themselves as 
feminine. Through biological fatalism, men and women who adhere to gender essentialist 
beliefs see themselves as more hegemonically masculine and feminine, respectively, then 
their peers who reject gender essentialism.  Third, for men only, traditional gender 
schemas prescribe identity features that are assumed appropriate for what men ―ought‖ to 
be like.  The prescription process does not operate for women, likely because they have 
cultural alternatives (such as the ―separate but equal‖ ideology) that allow them to reject 
the explicit hierarchies in traditional gender role beliefs while still maintaining 
hegemonically feminine self-identities.  
The relationship between self-conceptions and gender schemas is not 
unidirectional; self-conceptions influence people‘s adherence to gender schemas.  Gender 
stereotypical (or astereotypical) self-conceptions can reinforce (or subvert) individuals‘ 
beliefs in traditional gender roles and in gender essentialism.  I find this process, for 
example, in the positive relationship between women‘s feminine self-conceptions in year 
2 and their gender essentialism in year 5.  I also found evidence of an iterative process 
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between gender schemas and self-conceptions over time.  For example, women‘s 
adherence to essentialist beliefs leads them to be more likely to see themselves as 
feminine, and women‘s feminine self-conceptions, in turn, lead them to adhere to 
essentialist beliefs more strongly.  I speculate on just what this means below.  
Interestingly, I found no evidence for a generalization process whereby men and women 
generalize their self-conceptions to other members of their gender category.  The fact that 
men and women can uphold ideologies of hegemonic masculinity or femininity in their 
gender category—even if they themselves are exceptions to those ideologies—helps us 
understand the resilience of these hegemonic categories. 
 These findings suggest that co-constitutive relationships may exist between 
gender schemas and many other types of self-conceptions.  I analyzed only one measure 
of self-conceptions in chapter 2.  This co-construction illustrates that self-conceptions are 
not the individualistic, agentic notions they are popularly understood to be.  Self-
conceptions cannot be disentangled from the gender structure—the gender schemas 
people hold become part of how they understand themselves.   
 Next, I wanted to show that these culturally-informed self-conceptions help to 
reproduce occupational sex segregation.  Specifically, I examined how self-conceptions 
affect decisions about college majors and career launch.  In chapter 3, I showed that 
women who perceived themselves as feminine (vs. masculine), unsystematic (vs. 
systematic) and people-oriented (vs. things-oriented) were more likely than other women 
to earn female-dominated degrees, while men who perceive themselves as systematic 
were more likely than other men to earn male-dominated degrees.  These effects are not 
driven by one or two majors, as I showed through an analysis of six individual majors, 
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but seem to be spread throughout the spectrum of male- and female-dominated degrees.  
Not only do men and women with self-conceptions stereotypical of men and women, 
respectively, reproduce the demographic sex typing of male- and female-dominated 
majors, they also reproduce the cultural sex typing of these occupations as culturally 
masculine and feminine domains.  
 Similar processes exist for career launch decisions.  As men and women decide 
what jobs or graduate school programs to pursue after graduation, gendered self-
conceptions lead to gendered self-expressive decisions that reproduce occupational sex 
segregation.  Specifically, women with feminine, unsystematic, and people-oriented self-
conceptions enter female-dominated career-launch occupations, while men with 
masculine and more systematic self-conceptions enter male-dominated fields.  Obviously, 
the reverse relationship holds:  women with more masculine, things-oriented and 
systematic self-conceptions are more likely to enter male-dominated fields, while men 
with less masculine and unsystematic self-conceptions are more likely to enter female-
dominated fields.  These results hold net of the sex segregation of respondents‘ college 
degree field: men and women with stereotypically male and female self-conceptions are 
likely to enter an even more male- or female-dominated career launch fields, respectively, 
than the ones in which they earned their degree.  Career launch seems to represent a 
degree of freedom where individuals‘ careers can be tailored to their self-conceptions.  
This suggests that self-conceptions may influence career decisions at degrees of freedom 
in individuals‘ career paths long after college.  
 The influence of gendered self-conceptions is important for understanding the 
distribution of men and women across the spectrum of male and female-dominated fields, 
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and my later analysis of qualitative data will explore how this self-expression works on 
the micro level.  However, selection of gendered career fields is only one part of the 
process; gendered persistence issues are also important.  Once men and women have 
selected career fields, do gendered self-conceptions influence their persistence in those 
occupations?  I illustrate that, among a subsample of engineering students, gendered self-
conceptions filter professional identity development and help produce gendered 
professional identities.  These gendered professional identities, in turn, predict women‘s 
and men‘s persistence.  Men are more likely than women to develop professional identity 
dimensions that encourage behavioral and intentional persistence.  
 Through both inter- and intra-occupational processes, I find that culturally-
informed self-conceptions influence whether men and women choose sex-segregated 
fields, and whether they choose to remain in those fields once there.  By being imbedded 
in individual‘s self-conceptions, cultural gender beliefs come to be a mechanism for the 
reproduction of inequality at the individual level. 
Effects of Educational Institution 
 The four schools in my sample are very different: UMass is a large, public land-
grant university, Smith is a small, private, women-only liberal arts college, Olin is a new 
small university offering only engineering degrees, and MIT is a private, science and 
engineering-focused college.  Given this diversity of institutions and the variety in their 
student bodies, I expected more institutional differences in these mechanisms than I 
actually found.  Perhaps consistent with literature on institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer 1977; Seron & Silbey 2009), the effects for students at 
these schools were relatively homogeneous.  Women at MIT and Smith have more 
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neutral self-conceptions and less traditional gender schemas than UMass women, which 
is likely an indication of selection effects into these schools.  The differences decrease by 
year 5 (see Appendix 1 for more extensive discussion of these differences).  Olin women 
have more male-dominated degrees and career-launch occupations than women at 
UMass.  Olin women are also more likely than their UMass peers to enter male-
dominated occupations, controlling for their degrees.  In this way, Olin is living up to its 
mission to foster women‘s entrance into science and engineering fields.  I do not find 
institutional affects on men‘s career outcomes, except that Olin students are more likely 
to move into more male-dominated fields at career launch. Men‘s institution of higher 
education does not affect whether they enter male- or female-dominated occupations after 
graduation.   
 I expected that, as attendees of a liberal, single-gender college, Smith women 
would be more empowered (both ideologically and in terms of the prestige of their 
educational credential) to enter more male-dominated occupations than women at UMass.  
However, Smith women were not significantly more likely to earn male-dominated 
degrees or enter male-dominated occupations, compared to UMass women.  Smith 
women have slightly more progressive gender schemas and more neutral self-conceptions 
than their peers at UMass in year 2, but these differences largely diminish by year 5.  The 
exception is that Smith women continue to be more likely than UMass women to reject 
essentialist gender beliefs.  It is hard to make any attributions without more information, 
but it in this case, it does not appear that the single-sex context of Smith curtails the self-
expressive processes that reproduce sex segregation at the other institutions.   
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As I stated in chapter 4, the elite status of these institutions work to my advantage:  
Olin and MIT pride themselves in graduating leaders of the science and engineering 
occupations.  Women especially are encouraged to persist in these fields, so it becomes a 
harder case to show that gendered self-conceptions matter to career selection among 
students of these institutions.  Students at less elite universities, who fill the rank-and-file 
positions in professional occupations, are likely to feel less pressure to enter the most 
prestigious (male-dominated) occupations.  However, I find that gendered self-
conceptions do influence the major selection and career launch decisions among MIT and 
Olin graduates, over and above any pressure that may come from being a graduate of 
these programs.  In short, the great diversity of institutional structures of these schools 
did not translate into diversity in the ways that gendered self-conceptions influence sex 
segregation. The overall lack of institutional effects also suggests that these processes 
happen at other colleges and universities in the U.S.   If they are not different at UMass 
and Smith, for example, then they should also exist across less extreme institutional 
forms of higher education.  I encourage further research across a nationally-representative 
sample of colleges. 
Racial/Ethnic Differences 
  I found relatively few differences by race/ethnicity.  I did not find any consistent 
patterns in the self-conceptions of men and women by race/ethnicity—something I might 
see in a less selected group or in a larger sample (see Appendix 1). Consistent with 
literature on racial/ethnic differences in gender beliefs, African-American women have 
less traditional gender role beliefs, while their male counterparts have more traditional 
gender role beliefs (Davis & Robinson 1991; Dane 2000).  African-American women are 
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more likely to choose the two male-dominated fields (engineering and physical sciences) 
than their white peers, and African-American men are more likely to enter male-
dominated fields.  This may be an effect of the lower average socio-economic status 
(SES) of the under-represented minority students rather than a racial/ethnic effect per se. 
Other research has found that students that come from lower SES backgrounds, 
regardless of their race/ethnicity, are more likely to choose male-dominated fields.   This 
literature presumes that this is due to lower-SES students having more incentive to ensure 
their future economic security (Ma 2009).  However, among my sample, family income 
was not related to selecting more male-dominated fields.  Perhaps non-economic factors 
of class status (i.e. cultural or social capital) affect major selection and career launch 
decisions more than family income.  For example, some female-dominated fields such as 
art history may require students to have a certain type of cultural capital to select them—
cultural capital more likely among white middle-class students. 
Regarding career launch, and consistent with their greater adherence to traditional 
gender role beliefs, Asian women are more likely to enter female-dominated fields than 
ones in which they earned their degree.  Hispanic and African-American men, consistent 
with their more traditional gender beliefs and the SES argument above, are more likely to 
move into even more male-dominated occupations than their college degree fields (see 
Appendix 1 and 2).  
 Careful research is needed to understand how these self-expressive processes 
might work differently for members of under-represented minorities.  Due to the elite 
status of three of the four schools I study, this sample likely has a higher average SES 
than the population of U.S. college students as a whole.  Future qualitative research might 
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investigate how lower-class students, both racial/ethnic minority and white students, 
balance self-expressive norms with seeking economic security. Beyond identifying 
interesting racial/ethnic differences in the self-expressive edge of sex segregation, a 
parallel investigation could examine how the expression of racial/ethnic identities might 
reproduce occupational racial/ethnic segregation.    
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
This project sought to understand how occupational sex segregation is reproduced 
at the individual level.  Much progress has been made in understanding the institutional- 
and interactional-level factors that constrain men‘s and women‘s career opportunities and 
encourage them to pursue some career paths and not others.  But, the common cultural 
assumption about career choice is that it is, actually, about choice.  As described in 
chapter 1, social scientists understand that this agency is constrained in myriad ways by 
the structural and interactional factors.  Nonetheless, there is clear cultural valuation of 
what are seen as free and independent choices.
69
   
  For college-educated men and women in the U.S., college decisions are supposed 
to be self-expressive; they are expected to choose occupations that fit with and express 
their ―true selves.‖  However, self-expression has been understudied in the existing 
individual-level sociological literature on occupational sex segregation.  But, it is an 
important sociological issue because cultural gender ideologies are folded into this self-
expressive decision-making:  when men and women choose careers that ―fit them,‖ they 
reproduce the gender structure. 
                                                 
69
 The rhetoric about removing organizational or educational barriers is based around a belief that anyone 
should be whomever they want to be and nothing should stand in their way, rather than around a belief in 
the need for equal representation of men and women in each sector of society (see, e.g. National Science 
Foundation 2007).   
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 There is much to be explored about the self-expressive edge of sex segregation: 
does it continue to be salient once men and women have been in the workforce for five or 
ten years? Do similar processes exist among community college students? Do salient life 
demands like parenthood trump self-expressive career decision-making, especially 
among women, or are these decisions actually self-expressive because they are couched 
in women‘s culturally-informed self-conceptions as ―mothers?‖ Is self-expression an 
option for working-class men and women, and does it help to reproduce sex segregation 
of lower-paid work in the same way?  Can self-expression reproduce vertical sex 
segregation as well as horizontal segregation?  Finally, to what extent do people 
incorporate structural obstacles into their self-conceptions and tell self-expressive stories 
to justify those obstacles?  These are questions that would help us understand the extent 
and operation of gendered self-expression in occupational sex segregation.  
  Chapter 2 was key in demonstrating that self-conceptions and the self-expressive 
decisions based on these self-conceptions are informed by cultural gender beliefs.  That 
chapter also illustrated something of broader theoretical importance: that gender schemas 
and self-conceptions are actually co-constructed over time.  The turn in gender literature 
recognizes that gender is not simply a stable identity feature; it is enacted on a daily basis 
in everyday life (West & Zimmerman 1987).  This enactment is heavily structured.  
―Gender involves cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro level, 
patterns of behavior and organizational practices at the interactional level, and selves and 
identities at the individual level‖ (Ridgeway & Correll 2004, 510).  The possibility of 
alteration from this enactment is countered by structural forces at the macro and 
interactional levels.  Beyond this enacting-constraining process whereby men and women 
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enact their gender within a structured environment, the structure penetrates ―selves‖ and 
―identities‖ in a much more fundamental way: the gender structure is actually built into 
these selves and identities.  Through their everyday enactment of gender, men and 
women reproduce the gender structure.  The gender structure and the gendered 
individual, in other words, are co-constructed. 
Understanding the power and resilience of the gender structure requires 
understanding the co-construction of the gender structure and the gender individual.  I 
attempted to examine this co-construction empirically and theorize specific mechanisms 
(e.g. gender schemas prescribing certain self-conceptions that lead women to be more 
likely to choose a female-dominated college degree) though which it helps to produce 
inequality. I found that culture is embedded in both the complex, messy and iterative 
development of self-conceptions and in the very purposeful, thought-out and important 
life decisions.   
 Gender isn‘t merely a coercive social structure built into social institutions and 
interactions, it is internal and meaningful to social actors. As part of the socially –
constructed ―self,‖ gender is embedded in our deepest understandings of our and can 
motivate even our most self-expressive actions.  Not only do men and women 
enthusiastically and voluntarily respond to social structures, through their expression of 
gendered self-conceptions, they may enthusiastically and voluntarily reproduce them.   
 Furthermore, the very idea that self-conceptions are co-constructed with societal 
gender beliefs is incongruous with the cultural ideology of individuality.  Unlike other 
mechanisms (e.g. discrimination) reproducing occupational sex segregation, the cultural 
meanings about self-expression prevent it from being a site for social action.  Perhaps not 
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coincidentally, the place where the gender structure may be most strongly reproduces is 
also the site where it is most socially unacceptable for policy-makers and social activists 
to meddle.   
 Although I focus on how this co-construction creates an iterative process that 
reproduces the gender structure, it also has the potential to undermine that structure.  My 
findings in chapter 2 suggest that we are not fully determined by our cultural beliefs.  
What cultural beliefs we choose to adhere to, and those we choose to reject, is shaped by 
our self-understandings.  When men and women have more neutral perceptions of 
themselves, they are less likely to adhere to traditional gender role beliefs and are less 
likely to believe in gender essentialism.  As I showed with the case of engineering 
students, self-conceptions also filter the cultural ideologies such that men and women are 
less likely to accept beliefs that are dissonant with their self-conceptions.  Expanding 
Blair-Loy‘s (2003) and Sewell‘s (1992) work on schemas, these self-conceptions may be 
an additional resource through which schemas may change.  The potential for self-
conceptions to be an agent of cultural change deserves further investigation. 
6.3 The Self-Expressive Edge of Inequality? 
 This project sought to understand how gendered self-conceptions are the basis of 
career decisions that reproduce segregation.  But, are there self-expressive mechanisms in 
the reproduction of other types of inequality?  Ones that appear to be much less about 
―choice?‖  There are many situations where people‘s responses to the inequities they 
experience are important to the perpetuation or remediation of these inequalities.  For 
example, whether women negotiate for salary raises or confront colleagues who do not 
treat them fairly.  It is not, of course, the responsibility of disadvantaged groups to 
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remedy their own disadvantage, but many employers take advantage of women‘s 
hesitancy to negotiate or push back.  Many scholars simply attribute this to their gender, 
broadly-speaking (e.g. Dinovitzer et al. 2009).  Self-conceptions and self-expression may 
help us to understand how this operates.  For example, women‘s hesitancy to negotiate 
may be driven by the dissonance between such behaviors and their self-conceptions.  
They may believe, ―it is just not ‗me‘ to negotiate.‖  This may cause a particular problem 
for those trying to solve the discrepancy between men‘s and women‘s negotiation 
strategies.  It is not enough to point out to women that members of their gender category 
tend to negotiate less forcefully than men.  If such behaviors go against their self-
conceptions because they have internalized cultural beliefs that women are not to be 
―pushy‖ or ―immodest,‖ such training is unlikely to help.   
 Secondly, chapter 5 shows that some professional identities promote persistence 
in engineering more than others.  A more basic process may occur where the daily 
activities of occupational or organizational settings that are discordant with women‘s or 
men‘s self-conceptions may lead them to leave.  Constantly being expected to act in ways 
that contradict with one‘s self-conceptions may lead people to seek other occupations.  In 
short, self-conceptions and self-expression may interact with the institutional and 
interactional-level factors to reproduce other inequalities in salary, advancement, and 
leadership.  
 This attention to self-expression suggests the need to understand more broadly 
what role individual identities play in the reproduction of inequality.  Unequal structures 
are not only reproduces by the actions and beliefs of wealthy white men.  Women, to a 
large extent, adhere to and internalize the same unequal cultural structures as men and 
                                                                      246 
 
 
 
organize their selves and beliefs around those structures (Jost et al. 2004). ―When a group 
or system distributes resources unequally among its members, those members (or most of 
them) must also view the system as fair‖ (Olson & Hafer 2001:157). Thus, inequalities 
can be perpetuated even when those who are disadvantaged do not recognize that 
disadvantage, and the beliefs and actions of members of disadvantaged groups can 
reproduce that disadvantage for themselves and other members of their group (Cech & 
Blair-Loy 2010; Jost et al. 2004). 
 The trick to avoid ―blaming the victim‖ in this sort of research is to constantly 
stress the socially constructed nature of these beliefs and identities, and to suggest policy 
actions that do not put the burden on the disadvantaged individuals to simply ―change.‖  
On the empirical front, examining the self-expressive edge of inequality requires detailed 
individual-level data.  Qualitative analysis would be helpful to document men‘s and 
women‘s underlying explanations for the decisions they make.  Preferably, both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses would use over-time data to help with issues of 
causality. I hope such research would be expanded to other types of inequality, not just 
gender.  
6.4 Policy Implications 
 In a society where male-dominated and female-dominated occupations were 
equally rewarded and respected, and where the cultural ideologies that informed career 
choices were not gender biased, such self-expression would be interesting sociologically 
but would not play a role in reproducing inequality.  The reason such gendered self-
expression is an issue of inequality is because people are not fully free to define 
themselves as they choose—women and men internalize the biased cultural ideologies 
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that devalue both women‘s contributions to work and the worksites that are dominated by 
women.  Because the dominant cultural ideologies that inform these self-conceptions are 
biased, and because the fields in which women crowd are devalued in prestige, pay, and 
power, this gendered self-expression reproduces the unequal status of women. 
 As discussed above and in chapter 1, the self-expressive edge of inequality is 
particularly resistant to social change.  The most obvious solution—to limit self-
expressive freedoms or to change people‘s self-conceptions—are culturally unacceptable.  
Cultural gender beliefs that are embedded within self-conceptions could also be 
challenged, but such widespread cultural change is difficult.  
 What can be done? There are two pragmatic policy issues that could be addressed: 
whether young men and women are given the opportunity or encouragement to develop 
more gender-neutral self-conceptions, and whether the sex-typing of occupations is being 
adequately undermined. First, the trend of giving secondary students and college students 
increasing freedom over the courses they take means that gendered self-expression gets 
translated into sex-segregation at an earlier stage—coinciding with the moment when 
young women and men feel the most pressure to live up to stereotypical expectations of 
men and women.   If young men and women were required to take a variety of courses 
(auto mechanics class and family and consumer science, for example), such self-
expressive specialization would be reduced and young men and women would have 
exposure to more activities which may expand their self-conceptions beyond those 
stereotypical to members of their gender.  Similarly, career counseling and even the 
occupational interest tests often given to high-school students should be examined to 
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make sure that their encouragement of self-expressive career decision-making does not 
artificially limit individuals‘ possible choices based on their gender. 
 Second, boys and girls could be encouraged to expand their self-conceptions and 
to incorporate more gender-neutral or gender-opposite dimensions during the time when 
their self-conceptions are most pliable.  This could be done through exposure to opposite-
gender toys and activities in a judgment-free setting (letting boys play with barbies and 
girls with trucks) or by explicitly challenging commonly-held stereotypes about men‘s 
and women‘s ―natural‖ abilities.   
 Third, reducing the cultural sex-typing of occupations would help reduce the 
patterns of gendered decision-making.  Primary education might teach students about a 
broad range of male- and female-typed occupations and practice role-playing opposite-
sex-typed occupations.  Explicit discussion of the sex typing of occupations may bring 
consciousness to this process.  Finally, there are an increasing number of summer 
programs that offer young girls exposure to male-dominated fields such as math and 
science, but there is little opportunity for boys to attend summer camps to learn about 
nursing or elementary education.  To the extent that this expansion of self-conceptions 
happens, it should include both men and women.  
________________________ 
 The self-expressive edge of sex segregation points to one of the most difficult 
conundrums of social inequality:  disadvantaged groups sometimes internalize their 
disadvantaged status and build meanings and identities around that status.  Awakening 
recognition of this disadvantage may require challenging meanings and identities that 
members of those groups hold dear.  Although such intrusion may reduce inequality in 
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the long term, it may further burden these groups with emotional and identity work in the 
short-term.  How is inequality to be addressed once it has become part of disadvantaged 
groups‘ identities, without further disadvantaging those groups?  The only equitable 
answer is to change the social environment that responds to such identities.  Gender 
essentialism and separate but equal ideologies perpetuate a complacence about the 
continued presence of occupational sex segregation.  Challenging these ideologies may 
be the first step toward changing that social environment.  Even when gender differences 
are self-expressive and meaningful, different is never equal for unequal groups in society.  
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 This appendix explores variances in self-conceptions and gender schemas by 
gender, race/ethnicity, and other social categories.  These results are summarized in part 
one of Chapter 2.  As the intersectionality literature argues (Bettie 2003; Hill Collins 
1991), there is not a monolithic experience of being a ―man‖ or a ―woman‖—gender 
expectations and beliefs vary in important ways along other axes of social difference.  
This appendix explores this variation.  I also present tables representing the change in 
self-conception and gender schema measures over time. 
Gender Differences 
 Chapter 2 presents the univariate and bivariate statistics by gender and provides a 
summary of the multivariate models that I present below.  Table A1.1 presents the OLS 
regressions predicting year 2 and year 5 values on each of the individual self-conception 
measures using gender and the other key demographic variables.  I combine several of 
these variables together to make the latent self-conception measures of 
masculine/feminine, more/less logical, and things-oriented/people-oriented used in 
chapters 2-5. 
Here, I am interested in the extent to which gender is a significant predictor of 
these measures controlling for other demographic factors.  Among the self-conception 
measures, the significant gender differences that I found in the bivariate statistics 
discussed in Chapter 2 are also present in the OLS regression results: women are 
significantly more likely to see themselves as less logical, more feminine, and more 
emotional in both year 2 and 5.   
The gender category belief measures (Tables A1.2) also echo the bivariate 
statistics in Chapter 2: for all but the unsystematic measure, women see members of their 
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gender category as more stereotypically feminine (cooperative, social, less logical, 
emotional, people-oriented, friendly, and feminine) than men saw other men. The same 
comparative polarization exists for men‘s perceptions of other men as well.  
 The gender differences remain for most of the other gender schema beliefs as well 
(Table A1.3). Women are significantly less likely to have traditional beliefs about gender 
roles than men: Women are more likely than men to disagree that a wife should take her 
husband‘s name at marriage (year 2 and 5) and that some jobs are better suited for men 
(year 2 and 5).  Women are more likely to agree that women should not let having kids 
stand in the way of a career (year 2 and 5), and that women can live a full and happy life 
without marrying (year 5).  Women are also more likely to consider themselves a 
feminist in both years 2 and 5. However, when other demographic variables are 
controlled, gender is not a significant predictor of gender essentialist views.  
Interestingly, overall, men see other men as having less hegemonically masculine traits 
over time.  Women‘s perceptions of other women does not follow a clear pattern: Women 
see other women as more social by year 5, but they see women as less cooperative, more 
systematic, and less emotional in year 5 than in year 2. It appears that men‘s experiences 
in college and as they leave college and enter the workplace or graduate school 
challenges their perceptions of men as stereotypically masculine and they begin to see 
members of their gender category as being more neutral.   
Differences by Race/Ethnicity 
 Beliefs about and experiences of gender are not monolithic across groups of 
―men‖ and ―women‖ (Kane 1992, 2000; Ransford & Miller 1983).  Although my sample 
is relatively homogeneous (all college students around the same age), I still expect to see 
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differences in self-conceptions and gender schemas across categories of race and 
ethnicity.  
I control for differences across four race/ethnic groups: Black or African-
American respondents, Asian or Asian-American respondents, Hispanic or Latino 
respondents, and white respondents. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 gives the percent men and 
women who identify as a member of these categories.  Tables A1.1-A.13 use these 
categories to predict self-conceptions and gender schemas variables.  I discuss instances 
where race/ethnic categories are significant predictors of self-conceptions and gender 
schemas measures, net of the other variables in the model. (Race/ethnicity variables are 
dichotomous variables, 1=yes, 0=no. Comparison category: white respondents.)  
It is also unclear from existing literature how self-conceptions might differ by 
race/ethnicity.  We might expect that white respondents would have the most 
stereotypically masculine or feminine self-conceptions since normative views of women 
and hegemonic masculinity are predominantly white performances of gender. 
 In regards to self-conceptions, I find a few differences across the racial/ethnic 
groups in my sample, but no clear patterns are evident.  Hispanic respondents (and 
Hispanic men in particular, when compared to other men) see themselves as significantly 
more emotional than white students. This difference disappears by year 5.  Asian and 
Asian-American respondents see themselves as less logical and more people-oriented in 
year 5, compared to white students.  No racial differences emerged between Black 
respondents and white respondents‘ self-conceptions.   
The literature that discusses racial/ethnic differences in gender beliefs shows that 
African-American and Hispanic men and women tend to be more likely to recognize 
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inequalities in general (Davis & Robinson, 1991; Kane, 2000).  African-Americans tend 
to have less traditional gender schemas and Hispanic and Asian-American men and 
women tend to have more traditional beliefs about men‘s and women‘s gender roles than 
white men and women (Kane, 2000).  It is unclear what these patterns might be regarding 
the gender category and gender essentialist variables.    
Asian-American students and Hispanic women are more likely to disagree that 
women can live a full and happy life without marrying.  Interestingly, African-American 
men are less likely than white men to agree that women should take their husband‘s name 
at marriage, but African-American women were more likely than white women to agree 
with this sentiment.  African-American respondents are more likely to reject essentialist 
notions that men and women are ―naturally different,‖ but Asian/Asian-American 
respondents (particularly women) are more likely to adhere to gender essentialist beliefs 
than white respondents. 
 Some differences emerge in the gender category measures, but again, exhibit little 
trending. Hispanic or Latino students see other members of their gender category as more 
individualistic than white students, particularly among men.  Hispanic women see other 
women as more unsystematic than white women perceive members of their gender 
category in year 2, but by year 5, this effect has disappeared. Hispanic women see their 
gender category as more logical than white women see other women.  Asian and Asian-
American women see members of their gender category as both more logical and more 
systematic than white women see other women.  
Overall, responses on the gender schemas and self-conceptions measures were 
fairly consistent across demographic groups.  There are no discernable patterns on when 
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race/ethnic identities play a strong part in these beliefs—some differences appear in year 
2, others only in year 5.  A larger sample with more non-white respondents is needed to 
trace these patterns more clearly.   
Differences by Nativity 
 Although Western cultural beliefs about gender are diffusing throughout the 
world (Inglehart & Norris 2003), there are still strong differences in beliefs about gender 
across national borders. Respondents who grew up of outside of the US may have 
significantly different self-conceptions and gender schemas than those that grew up in the 
U.S. In particular, the ideal of rugged individualism (Bellah et al., 1985) may mean that 
men‘s and women‘s self-conceptions are less gendered than among those born outside the 
US. While there are plenty of countries that have much more progressive gender role 
beliefs than the US (Norway and Sweden in particular) (Baxter & Kane, 1995), the 
sending countries of immigrants to the United States  (e.g. Latin American and Asian 
countries) often have less progressive beliefs about gender (Charles & Cech, 2010).  
Therefore, I expect those born inside the U.S. to have more progressive beliefs than those 
who were born elsewhere.  
 Nativity is not the perfect measure of enculturation, but being born elsewhere 
makes it more likely that one‘s socialization experiences, where early beliefs and 
understandings about gender are formed (Bem, 1993), occurred outside the U.S. as well. 
 Not surprisingly, respondents born inside the US perceive themselves as more 
individualistic (in both Year 2 and year 5) than those born elsewhere.  This is particularly 
true among women. Among men, those born in the U.S. perceive themselves as more 
logical than those born elsewhere.  Respondents born in the US see members of their 
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gender category as more social than those born elsewhere, and women born in the US see 
other women as more people-oriented than foreign-born women.  Consistent with the 
expectation stated above, students born inside the US hold more progressive gender role 
beliefs than others: U.S.-born respondents are more likely to be feminists and to reject 
that some jobs are better suited for men rather than women.  
Differences by Family’s Income 
 Much gender belief trend analyses based on nationally-representative samples 
illustrate that wealthier individuals often hold less traditional gender role beliefs than 
lower or working-class individuals (Ransford & Miller 1983).  Also, class-based 
experiences of identity formation may mean working-class men and women develop 
different self-conceptions than their wealthier peers.   Income differences often lead to 
educational differences that promote different sorts of beliefs about gender and oneself 
(see, e.g. Kane 2000; Willis 1981). 
 Among all students, the higher respondents‘ parents‘ income, the more 
independent they perceive themselves to be (year 5), particularly among women. It 
appears that parents‘ income is positively related to seeing oneself in a less gender-
stereotypic manner: women with high-income parents are less likely to perceive 
themselves as feminine than women with low-income parents, and men with high-income 
parents are less likely to see themselves as masculine than men with lower-income 
parents (year 2 and 5). 
 Interestingly, the higher the income of women‘s parents, the less likely they are to 
see members of their gender category as systematic and logical, but friendly (year 5).  
There were no significant differences by parents‘ income in year 2. Finally, the higher 
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respondents‘ parents‘ income, the more likely they are to reject the notion that women 
should take husband‘s name at marriage (year 2). 
Overall, there were little differences in gender schemas and self-conceptions by 
parents‘ income in year 2.  As expected, respondents whose parents had lower incomes 
had more traditional gender role beliefs about wives taking their husband‘s name, but this 
difference disappeared by year 5.  
Differences by Political Beliefs  
It is no surprise that political conservatism affects gender role beliefs.  
Considering oneself politically conservative is accompanied by cohesive sets of beliefs 
about other non-political realms of society, such as gender (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). I 
expect that students who consider themselves to be politically conservative will have 
more traditional beliefs about gender roles, be less likely to recognize gender inequality, 
and be more likely to adhere to essentialist beliefs about men and women.  But it is an 
open question whether such effects would emerge net of religiosity, nativity, and 
race/ethnicity.  Also, we know little about how perceptions of self might differ by 
political beliefs.  
 Conservative men‘s and women‘s perceptions of themselves and their perceptions 
of their gender category are more stereotypically masculine or feminine, respectively.  
Conservative men see themselves as less emotional (year 2 and 5) and more logical (year 
2) than more politically liberal men.  Conservative women see themselves as more social 
and less systematic (year 2) than other women.  Similarly, conservative men see other 
members of their gender category as more independent than more liberal men (year 5), 
and conservative women see members of their gender category as more feminine than 
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more liberal women (year 2 and 5). Conservative men and women see members of their 
gender category as more systematic and logical than more liberal men and women (year 
2). 
As expected, conservative students hold more traditional gender role beliefs than 
more politically liberal students. They are more likely than politically liberal students to 
agree that a wife should take her husband‘s name at marriage (year 2 and 5) and less 
likely to see themselves as feminists (year 2 and 5).  They are also much more likely to 
adhere to gender essentialist beliefs: conservative students are more likely to believe that 
some jobs are better suited for men than women (year 2 and 5), to expect men and 
women will act differently at work, that men and women are naturally talented at 
different things, and believe that men and women deserve equal rights but are different 
by nature (in year 5).  The resilience of the effect of conservatism as a predictor of these 
gender schema beliefs is telling; conservatism is the most powerful predictor of gender 
schemas and self-conceptions, second only to gender. This is in important area of 
research: conservative political beliefs appear to be a powerful vehicle for the 
reproduction of traditional and essentialist gender beliefs.  
Differences by Religiosity 
 Respondents were asked in year 1 to rank how ―religious‖ they are in relation to 
their peers: in the top 10%, above average, average, below average, or in the bottom 10%.  
As with political conservatism, religiosity is often accompanied more traditional beliefs 
about gender (although certainly not in every denomination) (Edgell & Tranby, 2007).   
 Unsurprisingly, men and women who perceive themselves to be highly religious 
are more likely to see themselves as less logical (year 2 and 5), more emotional (year 5) 
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and more interested in working with people (year 2).  There are no significant differences 
between how highly religious and less religious respondents perceive members of their 
gender categories.   
 In regard to gender beliefs, the highly religious are more likely to agree that 
women should take husband‘s name at marriage (year 2 and 5), disagree that women 
should not let having children stand in the way of a career if they want one (year 2 and 5), 
and disagree that women can life a full and happy life without marrying (year 2 and 5).  
The highly religious are also more likely to expect men and women to act differently at 
work.  There are no differences by religiosity in perceptions of gender inequality 
 These results are particularly interesting because they exist even after controlling 
for political conservatism.  In other words, the effects of religiosity on gender role beliefs 
is not completely encompassed within political conservatism.  Something about being 
religious leads to traditional beliefs about gender, which is likely due in part to the 
general traditionalism found among many religious institutions and organizations (Kane 
2000). 
Differences by Sexual Identity 
 Although sexual identity is not usually controlled for in quantitative studies of 
gender, it is an axis along which beliefs about gender (and gendered beliefs about the 
self) may vary.  Sexual identity is often discussed in the language of gender, and 
dominant stereotypes of non-heterosexual individuals are cast in gendered language.  The 
common portrayal of lesbian and bisexual women as ―masculine‖ and gay and bisexual 
men as ―feminine‖ (Yoshino, 2006) means that beliefs about gender and self-conceptions 
may differ markedly from heterosexual men and women.   
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 Little quantitative research exists on lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individuals‘ 
perceptions of themselves and their beliefs about gender in comparison with heterosexual 
individuals.  Although a more representative sample would be useful to explicate these 
processes more broadly, I offer here, perhaps for the first time, descriptions of how LGB 
individuals‘ self-conceptions and gender schemas significantly differ from their 
heterosexual peers.  
 Overall, LGB students have more neutral and less gender stereotypical 
perceptions of themselves than heterosexual students.  LGB women see themselves as 
less social (year 5), less friendly (year 5), and less feminine (year 2 and 5) than straight 
women.  LGB men see themselves as less logical (year 5) and less masculine (year 5) 
than other men (Yoshino, 2006).  These differences in self-conceptions appear most 
strongly in year 5.  It may be that, as LGB students progress through college and develop 
their identity, they come to develop understandings of themselves that are divergent from 
heterosexual men and women. 
 In year 2, gay and bisexual men see other men as less social than heterosexual 
men see members of their gender category, but this difference goes away by year 5.  
Lesbian and bisexual women see other women as less feminine than do heterosexual 
women.  
 I find strong evidence to suggest that LGB respondents have much more 
progressive beliefs about gender than their heterosexual peers.  LGB men and women are 
less likely to agree that women should take their husband‘s name at marriage (year 2 and 
5) and are much more likely to be feminists (year 5). They are also much more aware of 
gender inequality: they are more likely to recognize income inequality (year 2) and 
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discrimination against women by men (year 5) than heterosexual students.  Finally, LGB 
men and women are less likely to hold gender essentialist beliefs that others: they 
disagree that some jobs are better suited for men more than their heterosexual peers, and 
they disagree that women and men are different by nature.  Gender schemas among 
individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, and bisexual are an interesting and important 
site for further study.  
Different Schools, Students with Different Beliefs? 
 Students attending the four schools (MIT, Olin, Smith and UMass) may differ in 
their self-conceptions and gender schemas in a couple of ways.  First, selection effects 
may lead students with certain self-conceptions and gender schemas to choose one school 
rather than the others.  As a single-sex institution, Smith has a certain liberal brand and 
character (although not as liberal as other Seven Sister schools in the area such as 
Wellesley and Mt. Holyoake (Horowitz, 1984) that may attract women who perceive 
themselves as more progressive and hold more progressive beliefs about gender. MIT is 
nationally-recognized as an elite technical institution, but its student body is often 
portrayed as ―nerdy‖ or ―geeky‖.  Olin was only a year old by the time this cohort of 
students entered its doors, so it scarcely had time to develop a rich collective identity.  
Olin students entered a school that was brand new, that had a strong commitment to 
innovative curriculum, and was free to attend. This combination of innovativeness and 
newness likely attracted a certain kind of intellectually adventurous student.  In addition, 
it is likely that only a certain percentage of U.S. high school students who were interested 
in pursuing engineering had heard about Olin, and though Olin provided a ―free‖ 
education, that percentage is likely skewed socio-economically advantaged.  Students 
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may have required a certain kind of cultural capital to have access to knowledge about 
this new program (Lareau & Weininger 2003). 
 Secondly, the four schools could differentially affect the ways men‘s and 
women‘s gender schemas and self-conceptions develop over time.  Smith students, for 
example, encounter much more awareness of gender issues in their curriculum than most 
other schools (Horowitz 1984).  Masculinities dominant at MIT, where technical and 
mathematical prowess are expected (Sinclair 1986) may be different than masculinities 
dominant at UMass, which has an avid sports program and displays of hegemonic 
masculinities are more likely.  Thus, it is interesting to look at how students differ in year 
2, when they are at the beginning of their education, and year 5, when they have finished 
their education and have left school.  
 Since UMass is the most representative of the schools where most of the students 
in the U.S. are educated, I use it as the comparison category.  I examine how MIT, Olin, 
and Smith students‘ gender schemas and self-conceptions significantly differ from 
UMass students‘ beliefs in year 2 and year 5. 
 First, MIT students‘ self-conceptions in year 2 are not significantly different from 
students at UMass.  By year 5, however, MIT graduates perceive themselves to be less 
feminine (marginally significant in year 2) and less interested in working with people 
than UMass students.  MIT women graduates also perceive themselves as less social.  
This is somewhat consistent with the ―nerdy‖ stereotype of MIT students; students may 
relish this stereotyped persona and come to see themselves in this way as an identity 
marker (Faulkner 2000, 2007).  MIT men perceive members of their gender category to 
be less social than UMass students in year 2.  MIT women, however, perceive other 
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women to be more friendly than do UMass women in year 2.  Men continue to perceive 
men of their gender category as more masculine and women continue to see other women 
as more friendly by year 5.  
 MIT students appear to hold slightly more progressive gender beliefs than UMass 
students: in year 2, they are more likely to consider themselves to be feminists.  This 
difference continues in year 5, when MIT students are also more likely to reject the belief 
that women should take their husband‘s name in marriage.  
 Second, Olin students‘ self-conceptions are very similar to those of UMass 
students.  Olin students are less people-oriented in year 2, although this difference 
disappears by year 5. There are several differences in perception of gender category, 
however.  Olin men in year 2 are more likely to perceive their gender category is more 
systematic and more logical.  Women at Olin in year 2 are also more likely than UMass 
women to see their gender category as logical.  (This makes sense in light of the fact that 
all Olin students are engineers.  It is interesting, however, that Olin students did not see 
themselves as significantly more logical and systematic than UMass students.)  Olin 
students in year 2 also perceive members of their gender category to be more friendly 
than how UMass students perceive their gender category. Olin men perceive other men to 
be more emotional that UMass men perceive other men in year 2, but this difference goes 
away by year 5. Olin also differs in their gender role and essentialist beliefs.  In year 2, 
Olin students are more likely to believe that women can live a full and happy life without 
marrying, and Olin women are more likely than UMass women to consider themselves 
feminists.  Though, both of these differences disappear by year 5.  In year 5, Olin women 
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graduates are more likely to disagree that some jobs are better suited for men than for 
women, and that disagree that women should take her husband‘s name at marriage. 
 Third, Smith students show several significant differences in self-conceptions, 
compared to UMass women in year 2: they perceive themselves to be less social, less 
systematic and less logical than UMass women.  This difference is in an unexpected 
direction—because of their more progressive beliefs overall, one might expect that 
women would perceive themselves to be systematic and logical to a greater extent than 
UMass women.  These differences disappear by year 5.  The only self-conception 
difference in year 5 is that Smith women graduates perceive themselves to be less 
emotional than UMass women graduates.  Smith women‘s perceptions of their gender 
category are more gender neutral than UMass students‘ perceptions in year 2: Smith 
students see other women as less cooperative, less social, more systematic and more 
logical than Umass women perceive other women.  Smith graduates continue to see 
women as more logical than UMass women graduates perceive members of their gender 
category.  The rest of the year 2 differences in perceptions of other women disappear. 
 As expected, Smith students have more progressive gender schema beliefs than 
UMass women, and Smith women become more progressive in comparison with UMass 
students by year 5.  Smith women are more likely to consider themselves feminists in 
year 2 and 5. By year 5, Smith women also more likely to reject gender essentialist 
beliefs (about some jobs being better suited for men, and about the natural talents of men 
and women) and are more likely to recognize gender inequality (both income inequality 
and discrimination).  They are also more likely than UMass women graduates to reject 
that women should take their husband‘s name at marriage.  
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Overall, MIT students are slightly different than UMass students: they have 
slightly less gendered self-conceptions and slightly more progressive gender schemas. 
Olin students start out slightly different than UMass students, especially in perceptions of 
one‘s gender category, but these differences largely disappear by year 5.  Smith students 
have several significant differences in their self-perceptions and their beliefs about 
themselves, but these differences largely disappear by year 5.  Smith students do retain 
their more progressive gender role beliefs through college, and their beliefs become even 
more progressive in year 5, compared to UMass students.  
Change Scores of Gender Schemas and Self-Conceptions over Time 
Figure A1.1 illustrate the change scores of men and women on each of the self-
conception, gender category, and gender role and essentialist beliefs.  I calculated change 
scores by subtracting year 2 values from year 5 values.  A positive score means there was 
a positive average change in that belief between years 2 and 5.  The horizontal dotted 
lines in each chart are visual benchmarks for 5% change in the positive and negative 
directions.   
The figure indicates stability of self-conceptions over time. Only one of the mean 
change scores for self-conceptions (―people-oriented‖) is above the 5% change mark in 
either direction. More consistent trends emerge in the change scores on gender role 
beliefs.  On average, respondents‘ gender role beliefs become more progressive over 
time.  Women—but not men—are more likely to reject essentialist beliefs over time
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ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 4.658 *** 4.255 *** 4.785 *** 4.155 *** 4.533 *** 3.947 ** 4.022 *** 3.458 *** 5.300 *** 5.884 *** 5.688 *** 6.047 ***
Female -0.075 --- -0.282 0.353 + 0.161
MIT student 0.073 -0.208 0.408 0.219 0.071 0.198 -0.297 -0.357 -0.177 -0.252 -0.726 * 0.290
Olin student 0.037 0.093 -0.067 0.328 0.051 0.399 -0.159 -0.338 -0.064 0.006 -0.115 0.146
Smith student -0.203 -0.275 0.404 0.106 -0.724 -0.545 * -0.621 * 0.147 -0.122 -0.244
Hispanic or Latino -0.475 -0.283 -0.556 -0.241 -0.224 0.278 0.452 0.135 -0.339 -0.147
Black or African American 0.927 + 1.060 + 0.128 0.624 -1.817 0.382 0.280 -0.475 -0.559 0.096
Asian or Asian-American -0.255 0.028 -0.631 + 0.042 -0.174 0.325 -0.221 -0.260 -0.179 0.192 0.329 -0.180
R Was born in US -0.519 * -0.769 ** -0.044 -0.643 * -1.028 ** -0.028 0.228 0.368 0.068 0.281 0.415 + -0.044
Family Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.258 0.387 -0.104 -0.230 0.531 -1.341 -0.028 0.059 -0.082 -0.496 * -0.635 ** -0.127
Political Conservatism 0.004 0.066 -0.131 0.046 0.032 0.114 + 0.033 0.161 * -0.161 -0.020 -0.018 0.004
Religiosity 0.098 0.109 0.102 0.131 + 0.098 0.191 0.087 0.159 * -0.023 -0.037 -0.022 -0.080
r2 0.017 .032 + 0.008 .034 * .073 ** 0.013 0.004 .045 * -0.332 0.013 .076 ** -0.042
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 3.801 *** 2.772 ** 4.558 *** 3.199 *** 2.309 ** 3.882 ** 1.827 ** 1.771 * 2.578 ** 1.596 ** 1.559 * 1.627 *
Female -0.178 -0.347 * 0.375 * 0.317 *
MIT student -0.266 -0.054 -0.440 -0.319 + -0.069 -0.632 + -0.002 -0.091 0.044 -0.070 -0.138 -0.046
Olin student -0.020 0.380 -0.432 -0.016 0.369 -0.419 0.173 0.299 0.005 -0.129 -0.178 -0.061
Smith student 0.305 0.580 * 0.198 0.454 + 0.217 * 0.170 0.129 + 0.122 -0.070
Hispanic or Latino -0.434 -0.192 -0.640 -0.041 0.168 -0.354 0.006 0.130 -0.185 0.028 0.267
Black or African American 0.115 0.085 0.346 0.415 -0.135 -0.008 0.018 0.497 0.352 1.425 *
Asian or Asian-American -0.062 0.046 -0.156 0.312 + 0.343 0.346 0.120 0.171 0.041 0.317 * 0.413 + 0.022
R Was born in US -0.060 -0.052 0.020 -0.112 -0.016 -0.231 -0.082 0.092 -0.350 -0.175 -0.025 -0.525 *
Family Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.073 -0.093 0.559 0.072 0.019 0.042 0.043 0.199 -0.439 0.214 0.191 0.687 *
Political Conservatism -0.073 -0.007 -0.217 * -0.059 -0.041 -0.115 -0.027 0.018 -0.101 0.005 -0.008 0.075
Religiosity 0.066 0.055 0.101 -0.085 -0.129 * -0.011 0.115 * 0.098 0.149 * 0.100 * 0.037 0.201 *
r2 0.013 0.002 0.040 .023 + 0.022 0.006 .031 * 0.019 0.008 .060 ** 0.003 .117 **
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 2.746 *** 4.618 *** 3.167 ** 2.394 *** 4.861 *** 1.826 ** 2.836 *** 4.203 *** 2.011 + 3.904 *** 4.134 *** 4.143 **
Female 2.568 *** 2.472 *** 0.997 *** 0.897 ***
MIT student -0.314 + -0.533 + -0.331 -0.356 * -0.452 + -0.341 + -0.002 -0.261 0.283 -0.277 -0.454 -0.050
Olin student -0.144 -0.062 -0.461 -0.190 -0.347 -0.452 + 0.214 0.052 0.271 0.079 -0.087 0.105
Smith student 0.135 0.165 -0.041 -0.009 -0.270 -0.364 -0.029 * -0.144
Hispanic or Latino -0.058 0.208 -0.134 0.118 0.253 0.094 0.798 ** 0.437 1.585 ** 0.079 0.330 0.221
Black or African American 0.380 0.022 1.379 0.400 0.321 0.327 -0.026 0.027 -0.304 -0.348 -0.282
Asian or Asian-American 0.088 -0.076 0.299 0.060 -0.129 0.203 -0.226 0.003 -0.550 + 0.234 0.200 0.145
R Was born in US 0.051 0.211 -0.127 + 0.181 0.138 0.394 + -0.095 0.184 -0.378 -0.151 -0.019 -0.453
Family Income 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual -0.135 -0.398 * 0.587 + -0.246 -0.733 *** 1.218 *** 0.468 + 0.400 0.707 0.243 0.433 0.854 +
Political Conservatism 0.038 0.109 * -0.079 0.019 0.029 0.017 -0.112 * 0.000 -0.321 ** -0.066 0.048 -0.256 **
Religiosity 0.026 0.030 0.024 0.062 0.087 0.020 0.082 0.027 0.167 0.141 * 0.073 0.256 *
r2 0.618 *** 0.061 * 0.016 0.603 *** 0.101 *** 0.167 ** .114 *** -0.017 .100 ** .127 *** 0.012 .076 *
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 6.101 *** 6.712 *** 5.635 *** 5.666 *** 5.806 *** 5.679 *** 4.291 *** 3.544 ** 5.374 *** 5.667 *** 6.183 *** 5.215 **
Female 0.181 0.191 + -0.148 0.222
MIT student -0.090 -0.165 0.051 -0.231 -0.412 + -0.052 0.242 0.330 0.149 -0.691 * -1.185 ** -0.242
Olin student -0.014 0.064 -0.133 0.029 -0.030 -0.011 -0.926 ** -1.414 ** -0.512 -0.303 -0.829 + 0.146
Smith student -0.221 -0.302 0.077 -0.070 -0.015 -0.089 -0.243 -0.685 +
Hispanic or Latino -0.281 -0.540 + 0.039 0.040 0.035 0.129 -0.141 -0.025 -0.355 -0.569 -0.658 -0.329
Black or African American 0.626 0.544 -0.241 -0.439 0.392 -0.207 -0.209 0.069 -0.165 1.388
Asian or Asian-American 0.054 0.013 0.049 0.228 + 0.171 0.242 0.064 0.145 -0.147 0.739 ** 0.875 ** 0.427
R Was born in US 0.139 0.068 0.293 0.077 0.128 0.021 0.272 0.439 -0.029 0.328 0.459 0.124
Family Income 0.000 0.000 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.132 0.419 + -0.476 -0.342 * -0.345 * -0.443 -0.594 + -0.254 -1.618 * -0.156 0.015 -0.417
Political Conservatism -0.014 0.026 -0.089 -0.051 -0.021 -0.082 -0.100 -0.021 -0.185 -0.063 -0.049 -0.025
Religiosity 0.028 0.085 -0.028 0.041 0.075 -0.009 0.168 * 0.163 + 0.186 0.092 0.120 0.060
r2 -0.006 0.024 -0.037 .023 + 0.025 -0.043 .038 ** .052 * 0.015 .019 + .042 * 0.062
Y2 Iam Coop Y5 Iam Coop Y2 Iam Social Y5 Iam social
Y2 Iam Les Systematic Y5 Iam Less Systematic Y2 I am Less Logical Y5 I am Less Logical
Y2 I am Feminine Y2 Iam Emotional Y5 Iam Emotional
Y2 Iam Friendly Y5 Iam Friendly Y2 I am People-Oriented Y5 I am People-Oriented
Y5 I am Feminine
   
Table A1.1: Self-Conception Variables Predicted by Demographic Variables 
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ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 4.7206 *** 5.2723 *** 5.20433 *** 3.55944 *** 4.9435 *** 2.5638 ** 4.88276 *** 5.9952 *** 4.6897 *** 4.93339 *** 5.8486 *** 5.47131 ***
Female 0.7894 *** 0.93461 *** 0.98152 *** 1.00904 ***
MIT student 0.2705 0.0304 0.4419 0.06433 0.5982 + -0.2718 -0.2174 -0.359 -0.0728 * 0.1208 0.1461 0.10627
Olin student 0.3599 0.2345 0.41194 -0.3671 -0.0797 -0.5474 + 0.39468 + -0.094 0.7774 0.06034 0.1592 0.03612
Smith student -0.611 * -0.719 * 0.01024 0.4312 -0.5446 *** -0.722 ** -0.247 -0.243
Hispanic or Latino -0.6658 * -0.446 -1.0201 * -0.0508 -0.4987 0.5988 -0.2074 -0.195 -0.1795 0.02667 -0.039 0.03603
Black or African American 0.5557 0.783 + -0.4429 -0.4257 -0.3517 -0.7823 0.45698 0.5463 + -0.0129 -0.0087 0.2074 -1.05083
Asian or Asian-American -0.3258 + -0.216 -0.4177 -0.1608 0.0022 -0.4102 0.05948 -0.065 0.2226 -0.1526 -0.161 -0.07914
R Was born in US -0.0175 -0.076 0.08353 -0.2429 -0.3812 0.0629 0.35726 * 0.2124 0.6498 * 0.07578 0.2306 -0.26478
Family Income 6E-07 5E-07 1.3E-06 -8E-07 -5E-07 -1E-06 8.7E-08 6E-07 -9E-07 -6E-07 -3E-07 -2E-06
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.2206 0.1778 0.29053 -0.1257 0.0314 -0.5038 0.04707 0.1903 -0.3308 -0.3599 * -0.255 -0.71569 *
Political Conservatism -0.0307 -0.019 -0.0627 -0.0119 0.0577 -0.1814 * -0.0105 0.0556 -0.1166 -0.0011 0.0196 -0.05713
Religiosity 0.0753 0.0554 0.10296 0.05327 0.0052 0.1693 + -0.0076 -0.036 0.0488 -0.0878 + -0.106 + -0.05797
r2 .077*** .044* .053+ 101*** .006 .075* .122*** .042* .041 .160*** .047* -.017
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 2.925 *** 2.4537 *** 3.38465 ** 3.69623 *** 3.5903 *** 4.4532 *** 2.17447 *** 2.2963 ** 2.505 * 4.162 *** 3.7188 *** 6.05932 ***
Female 0.1613 0.20067 0.54109 *** 0.73561 **
MIT student -0.1807 0.1393 -0.3937 0.06018 -0.0146 0.1229 -0.3424 + -0.169 + -0.4374 -0.017 0.0212 -0.22358
Olin student -0.5582 -0.259 -0.7083 * 0.12446 0.0443 0.2965 -0.8969 *** -0.608 -1.09 ** -0.3327 -0.528 * -0.24101
Smith student -0.1031 * 0.1431 -0.25 -0.3905 -0.2951 -0.184 * -0.5436 * -0.639 *
Hispanic or Latino 0.4127 0.6088 * 0.31475 -0.0108 0.237 -0.443 0.6722 ** 0.7587 0.6798 -0.4858 + 0.1263 -1.41993 **
Black or African American 0.0011 -0.101 0.66359 0.30162 0.225 0.5305 0.23936 0.074 1.0455 0.45626 0.1934 0.93768
Asian or Asian-American 0.1538 0.1266 0.13506 -0.2131 -0.4342 * 0.2098 0.29563 + 0.1728 0.4205 -0.2347 -0.594 ** 0.49653 +
R Was born in US -0.0736 -0.189 0.09187 -0.1192 -0.3452 + 0.1867 0.1112 0.1259 0.1013 -0.0998 -0.252 0.17959
Family Income 1E-06 3E-06 ** -2E-06 9.2E-07 2E-06 + -9E-07 8.5E-07 2E-06 + -1E-06 2.4E-06 ** 2E-06 * 2.8E-06 +
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.0692 0.0996 -0.1924 0.22112 0.2846 -0.1909 -0.2855 -0.187 -0.6352 0.10371 0.1073 -0.23688
Political Conservatism -0.1151 * -0.106 + -0.1263 -0.0104 -0.0377 0.0317 -0.1042 * -0.077 -0.1441 0.01947 0.0661 -0.0541
Religiosity 0.0395 0.0095 0.07418 -0.084 -0.0431 -0.1753 + 0.04984 0.0358 0.0665 -0.03 0.0127 -0.11746
r2 .029* .044* .004 .001 .031+ -.041 .090*** .015 .067* .096*** .078** .072+
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 4.01113360538752*** 4.8 55 *** 3.87915 *** 4.51273 *** 4.9158 *** 4.8596 *** 3.4967 *** 5.4344 *** 4.2544 *** 1.8687 *** 4.4755 *** 2.38371 ***
Female 0.6027 *** ** 0.51418 *** 2.06058 *** 3.13896 ***
MIT student 0.288 + 0.6273 *** 0.03414 0.35789 * 0.4974 * 0.2155 0.09938 0.0864 0.0575 0.1507 0.2724 0.01842
Olin student 1.1279 *** 1.311 + 0.94731 ** 0.15616 0.1822 0.1092 0.08052 0.1549 -0.0155 0.19764 0.0538 0.22318
Smith student 0.2308 0.41 0.12215 0.2133 -0.1838 -0.213 -0.1386 -0.034
Hispanic or Latino 0.0317 -0.177 0.13684 -0.0077 -0.0723 -0.0092 -0.1097 -0.249 -0.0773 0.14435 0.3976 + -0.09236
Black or African American 0.3703 0.2871 0.22869 0.03847 0.2249 -0.8592 0.37581 0.5528 -0.6953 0.38943 + 0.3672 0.11444
Asian or Asian-American -0.0451 -3E-04 -0.1968 -0.0497 -0.0056 -0.0623 0.18892 0.2187 0.22 -0.0313 -0.209 0.1654
R Was born in US 0.114 -0.031 0.31131 -0.0511 0.0186 -0.142 0.12107 0.4857 * -0.5106 + 0.18627 0.1328 0.21401
Family Income 2E-07 -1E-06 2.1E-06 -2E-06 * -2E-06 * -1E-06 3.4E-07 -1E-07 3E-07 -5E-07 -6E-08 -8.3E-07
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 0.0418 0.3516 -0.8286 + -0.0495 0.0285 -0.2587 -0.0893 0.0137 -0.3417 -0.1455 -0.392 ** 0.36108
Political Conservatism 0.0352 0.0386 0.02431 0.04581 0.0847 + -0.0354 0.07775 + 0.1096 * 0.0164 0.04554 0.0815 * -0.00753
Religiosity -0.0186 0.0527 -0.0732 -0.0004 -0.0057 0.0131 -0.0867 + -0.074 -0.1006 0.00964 -0.007 0.03223
r2 .104*** .062* .127** .050* .021 -.068 .458*** .046* .002 .797*** .113*** -.007
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) 2.459 *** 5.2319 *** 2.39926 *** 2.79656 *** 5.8628 *** 1.2463
Female 2.6435 *** 2.13189 ***
MIT student -0.0116 -0.286 0.20245 0.0229 -0.0439 0.1912
Olin student 0.146 -0.504 + 0.62611 * -0.1116 -0.376 0.1304
Smith student 0.0199 -0.266 -0.3174 + -0.3457
Hispanic or Latino 0.2271 0.2258 0.24729 0.19159 -0.0928 0.6797 +
Black or African American 0.2495 0.2938 0.04646 -0.071 0.1085 -0.5571
Asian or Asian-American 0.1091 0.0321 0.21936 0.00961 -0.0673 -0.0165
R Was born in US 0.1799 0.2365 0.1576 0.1104 -0.0808 0.3892
Family Income 2E-07 3E-07 -5E-08 -2E-07 5E-07 -1E-06
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual -0.252 -0.138 -0.5152 -0.0498 -0.2152 0.3774
Political Conservatism 0.0111 0.0846 + -0.089 0.06979 + 0.0445 0.0998
Religiosity -0.0265 -0.06 0.02798 0.01472 -0.0286 0.0941
r2 .603*** -.003 .015 .512*** .013 .036
Y2 SmSex Friendly Y5 SmSex Friendly Y5 SmSex People-Oriented Y5 SmSex Feminine
Y2 SmSex Less Logical Y5 SmSex Less Logical
Y2 SmSex Coop Y5 SmSex Coop Y2 SmSex Social Y5 Sm Sex Social
Y2 Sm Sex Less Systematic
Y2 SmSex Emotional Y5 SmSex Emotional
Y5 Sm Sex Less Systematic
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Gender Role Beliefs
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) -3.737 *** -4.255 *** -3.751 *** -4.288 *** -4.384 *** -4.773 *** -3.806 *** -3.708 *** -4.265 *** -4.592 *** -5.115 *** -4.275 ***
Female -0.432 *** -0.555 *** -0.181 -0.225 *
MIT student -0.063 -0.227 0.108 -0.279 -0.745 ** 0.141 -0.086 -0.121 -0.089 0.151 0.072 0.148
Olin student -0.379 + -0.277 -0.480 + -0.471 * -0.950 ** -0.108 -0.829 *** -0.810 ** -0.864 ** -0.266 -0.204 -0.377
Smith student -0.245 -0.240 -0.553 ** -0.915 *** -0.384 * -0.384 * -0.091 -0.124
Hispanic or Latino 0.039 0.054 0.121 0.128 0.017 0.380 -0.011 -0.183 0.250 0.130 0.333 * -0.086
Black or African American 0.209 0.461 -0.460 * 0.890 ** 1.218 *** -0.322 0.168 0.105 0.565 0.237 0.336 -0.105
Asian or Asian-American -0.052 0.241 -0.458 -0.179 -0.135 -0.225 0.190 0.376 * -0.074 0.308 * 0.336 0.327
R Was born in US 0.069 0.077 0.073 0.021 0.163 -0.204 -0.125 0.054 -0.334 -0.272 -0.204 -0.357
Family Income 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual -0.561 ** -0.596 ** -0.520 -0.559 ** -0.517 ** -0.634 + -0.284 -0.241 -0.459 -0.327 * -0.287 + -0.403
Political Conservatism 0.234 *** 0.248 *** 0.199 ** 0.218 *** 0.260 *** 0.132 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 0.023 0.048 -0.029
Religiosity 0.165 *** 0.147 ** 0.181 * 0.141 ** 0.095 + 0.230 * 0.103 * 0.066 0.166 * 0.072 + 0.019 0.159 *
r2 .212*** .178** .150*** .288*** .335*** .072+ .097*** .072** .078* .118*** .092** .090*
Gender Role Beliefs
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) -4.685 *** -4.539 *** -5.277 *** -4.726 *** -5.251 *** -4.011 *** -2.929 *** -3.223 *** -2.749 ** -2.781 *** -3.564 *** -2.184 *
Female -0.362 ** -0.342 ** -0.350 ** ** -0.487 ** **
MIT student 0.206 0.003 0.346 0.122 0.204 -0.021 -0.447 ** -0.665 + -0.219 -0.486 * -0.693 + -0.295
Olin student -0.141 -0.307 -0.033 -0.179 -0.347 0.060 -0.310 -0.494 *** -0.105 -0.436 + -0.621 *** -0.171
Smith student -0.181 -0.333 -0.190 -0.189 -1.008 *** -1.137 + -1.216 *** -1.387
Hispanic or Latino 0.276 0.086 0.512 0.166 0.294 -0.227 0.135 0.103 0.171 0.141 0.342 -0.089
Black or African American 0.190 0.217 0.291 0.149 0.395 -0.823 0.339 0.615 -0.591 0.315 0.422 0.024
Asian or Asian-American -0.033 0.112 -0.236 -0.007 -0.004 0.038 0.009 0.132 -0.182 0.050 0.060 -0.0178
R Was born in US 0.017 0.132 -0.110 -0.123 -0.147 -0.185 0.028 0.062 -0.092 -0.359 * -0.298 -0.595 +
Family Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual -0.191 -0.088 -0.525 -0.091 -0.013 -0.437 -0.437 * -0.493 * -0.329 -0.409 * -0.412 * -0.513
Political Conservatism 0.018 0.009 0.033 0.049 0.023 0.106 0.199 *** 0.180 *** 0.233 ** 0.183 *** 0.168 ** 0.224 *
Religiosity 0.210 *** 0.189 *** 0.249 *** 0.192 *** 0.176 *** 0.207 * 0.042 0.064 -0.026 0.062 0.047 0.070
r2 .109*** .059* .069* .117*** .098* .056+ .231*** .201*** .047* .301*** .261*** .083*
Essentialism
ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men ALL Women Men
(Constant) -2.646 *** -3.281 *** -2.319 ** -3.569 *** -5.057 *** -2.031 + -4.310 *** -4.594 *** -3.375 ** -3.626 *** -3.749 *** -3.711 ** -2.368 *** -2.662 * -2.416 **
Female -0.536 *** -0.571 *** -0.035 -0.177 -0.163
MIT student -0.080 -0.287 0.055 0.115 -0.217 0.331 0.140 0.035 0.165 -0.015 -0.142 0.155 0.024 -0.219 0.293
Olin student -0.358 -0.430 -0.279 0.433 + -0.876 * -0.196 0.132 0.142 0.175 0.058 -0.064 0.221 -0.153 -0.523 0.089
Smith student -0.403 * -0.496 * -0.501 * -0.754 ** 0.241 0.110 -0.510 * -0.574 * -0.220 -0.362
Hispanic or Latino -0.217 -0.054 -0.484 0.316 0.622 + -0.077 0.092 0.209 -0.219 -0.045 -0.056 0.046 0.120 0.213 0.160
Black or African American -0.216 -0.005 -0.722 -0.187 -0.019 -1.239 -0.092 0.164 -1.247 -0.489 -0.256 -1.253 -0.530 -0.245 -1.649 *
Asian or Asian-American 0.229 0.382 + 0.036 0.162 0.371 -0.132 0.055 -0.005 0.295 0.392 * 0.529 * 0.128 -0.035 0.159 -0.376
R Was born in US -0.126 -0.114 -0.184 -0.267 0.021 -0.738 * -0.343 + -0.217 -0.615 + -0.202 -0.166 -0.335 -0.255 -0.304 -0.151
Family Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual -0.137 -0.184 -0.183 -0.498 ** -0.500 * -0.397 0.030 0.202 -0.552 -0.218 -0.219 -0.190 -0.596 ** -0.631 ** -0.406
Political Conservatism 0.281 *** 0.244 *** 0.341 *** 0.238 *** 0.309 *** 0.153 0.114 * 0.125 * 0.075 0.187 ** 0.188 ** 0.186 + 0.122 * 0.172 ** 0.035
Religiosity 0.024 -0.009 0.052 -0.032 0.024 -0.129 0.126 * 0.105 0.153 0.010 -0.017 0.051 0.018 0.009 0.037
r2 .204*** .097*** .176*** .230*** .246*** .022+ -.003 .054+ .137*** .138*** .001 .084*** .098*** -.007
Y5 Separate but Equal
Y2 Stand in Way Y5 Stand in Way Y2 Not Feminist Y5 Not Feminist
Y2 SomeJobs Y5 SomeJobs Y5 ActDifferently Y5 Naturally Talented, Different Things
Y2 Wifename Y5 Wifename Y2 Marry Y5 Marry
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(ALL) Female--all years
FemaleMale
M
e
a
n
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
^Usually I am: wk w/ 
things (1) --> wk w/ ppl 
(7) (y5-y2)
^Usually I am: Systematic 
(1) --> Unsystematic (7) 
(y5-y2)
^Usually I am: Logical (1) 
--> Illogical (7) (y5-y2)
^Usually I am: friendly (y5-
y2)
^Usually I am: unemotional 
(1) --> emotional (7) (y5-
y2)
^Usually I am: Asocial (1) 
--> Social (7) (y5-y2)
^Usually I am: Individ (1) --
>Cooperative (7) (y5-y2)
Iam_fem_delta5
(ALL) Female--all years
FemaleMale
M
e
a
n
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
^Usually others of my 
same sex are: friendly 
(y5-y2)
^Others of Same Sex: 
unemotional (1) --> 
emotional (7) (y5-y2)
^Others of Same Sex: 
Systematic (1) --> 
Unsystematic (7) (y5-y2)
^Others of Same Sex: 
Logical (1) --> Illogical (7) 
(y5-y2)
^Others of Same Sex: 
Asocial (1) --> Social (7) 
(y5-y2)
^Others of Same Sex: 
Individ (1) -->Cooperative 
(7) (y5-y2)
(ALL) Female--all years
FemaleMale
M
e
a
n
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
Genbelief_somejobs_delta
Genbelief_Feminist_RC_delta
Genbelief_nomarry_RC_delta
Genbelief_kidinway_RC_delta
^Gender Belief: Wife should 
take husband
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Figure A1.1 Self-Conceptions and Gender Schemas Change Scores 
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 This appendix provides information on the process I used to calculate the percent 
women in respondents‘ degrees (the degree sex segregation score), provides the 
distribution of the sample across academic measures over time, and the demographic 
measures that predict individual majors. 
Calculation of Percent Women in Respondents’ Degrees 
 The analysis used in chapter 3 and the regressions in the sections below use 
measures of the percent women in students‘ year 1 majors, the percent women in their 
degree field, and the difference (or change) in percent women between students‘ initial 
majors and the fields in which they earn their degrees. The primary source of this 
information was students‘ transcripts.  In the year 5 survey, the FuturePaths team asked 
respondents‘ permission to have access to their college transcripts.  The registrar at each 
institution sent the FuturePaths team the transcripts for those student who granted 
permission.  I took students‘ major and degree information directly from their transcripts.  
For those who did not grant access to their transcripts (22.1% of the year 5 respondents), 
I relied on the year 5 question that asked students to name the degree they graduated 
with.  For respondents who did not take the year 5 survey, but did take the year 4 survey 
(108 respondents), I took their degrees in year 4 as a proxy for the degree they earned.  I 
ran supplemental analyses with a dichotomous indicator of whether year 4 data was used 
for the degree they earned, and this indicator was never significant.  I also found no 
significant differences between the analyses that used transcript data only and those that 
used the combined measure.   
 Many students majored in more than one field or earned more than one 
undergraduate degree.  I do not know which major or degree students think is their 
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―primary‖ field, nor would it be legitimate to guess at such a distinction in each student‘s 
case.  For example, a graduate with an industrial engineering degree and a psychology 
degree is differently qualified than a student with just an industrial engineering degree: he 
or she shows different interests and has a wider range of career or graduate students 
available to him or her.  It is important to capture students‘ complete educational 
portfolio when calculating the percent women measures.  Thus, I created a percent 
women value for each of students‘ majors and degrees and averaged these values.  These 
averaged values, in turn, populate the percent women in students‘ majors and degrees in 
the analyses in chapters 3 and 4.  I also ran key analyses with only those with a single 
major and found no difference in the results. 
 For the percent women in respondents‘ year 1 majors and degree fields, I matched 
the most detailed majors information available in the data (e.g. ―ocean engineering‖ or 
―molecular biology‖) with national data on the percent women among graduates in those 
majors.  In most cases, the national data were taken from the National Science 
Foundation‘s Division of Science Resource Statistics70 or the U.S. Department of 
Education Institute for Education Sciences‘ National Education Data Resource Center.71   
I matched the statistics on these sites as closely as possible to the specific major or degree 
for each respondent.  Occasionally, I could not located national-level data on certain field 
(e.g. Classics).  In those cases, I used the percent women in the broad category of major 
(i.e. Humanities for the classics major; general engineering for nuclear engineering).   
                                                 
70
 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ 
71
 http://nces.ed.gov/quicktables/ 
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To calculate the change in percent women from respondents‘ year 1 major to the 
field in which they earned their degree, I simply subtracted the latter from the former.  
Students who did not change majors had a percent women change score of zero.  
Demographics of Men and Women Predicting Year 1 Major Selection, College 
Degree, and Changing Majors 
In order to understand which of the demographic factors predict students‘ choice 
of majors and the degree the eventually earn, I present pooled OLS regression models 
predicting the percent women in students‘ majors and degrees, and their likelihood of 
choosing individual majors, with the following demographic variables: gender 
(women=1), school (UMass as comparison category), race/ethnicity (white as comparison 
category), nativity (respondents born in the US=1), family income, sexual identity 
(LGB=1), political conservatism (1 =very liberal to 7=very conservative), and religiosity 
(1=bottom 10% of peers; 5=top 10% of peers).   
 Table A2.1 predicts the percent women in respondents‘ major in year 1 with the 
descriptives listed above, ran pooled and separately by gender. Students at Olin and MIT 
are more likely to have male-dominated majors than UMass students, and Smith students 
are more likely than UMass students to be enrolled in female-dominated majors at year 1.  
As expected, women are more likely than men to be enrolled in a female-dominated 
major.  Running the models separately for men and women, I find that, among men, those 
who are more religious are more likely to be enrolled in a male-dominated field than 
those who are less religious. 
 Table A2.2 presents the regression models used to predict the degrees that 
respondents earn at the end of their college career with demographic measures.   Again, 
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Olin and MIT graduates are more likely than UMass graduates to have a male-dominated 
degree.  The percent women in the fields in which Smith and UMass graduates earn their 
degree are not significantly different.  Women are more likely than men to graduate with 
a female-dominated degree.  
 Finally, Table A2.3 predicts the change in percent women between respondents‘ 
year 1 majors and the degrees they eventually earn. Interestingly, women are not more 
likely than men to change into more female-dominated degrees.  Smith and Olin students, 
however, were more likely than UMass students to move into a more male-dominated 
field between their freshman and senior years.  No other demographic measures predict 
whether students move into more male- or female-dominated majors over time.  
Distribution of Sample across Academic Majors over Time 
 Table A2.4 through A2.9 present the percent of the sample in each academic 
major category in year 1, year 2, year 3, and the degree they eventually earn.  Since Olin 
students are all engineers, I present these frequencies separately with and without Olin 
students.  A2.4 and A2.5 includes both men and women, A2.6-7 presents the frequencies 
for men only, and A2.8-9 presents them for women only.  The sample sizes are relatively 
small because I included only those people who took all four years of surveys.   
 Given the engineering and science emphases of two of the schools, it is not 
surprising that engineering is the largest group in the sample.  (I use this to my advantage 
in the intra-occupation analysis in chapter 5.)  As expected, men are more represented in 
engineering, physical sciences, and technical fields than women, while women are more 
represented in humanities, education and social sciences than men. Women are quite well 
represented in the biological sciences. 
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Demographic Measures Predicting Likelihood of Choosing Individual Degree Fields 
 Table A2.10 presents logit models predicting the likelihood of choosing 
individual majors with gender, race/ethnicity, institution and other demographic 
variables.  Corresponding with the individual majors analyzed in chapter 3, I predict the 
likelihood of choosing two female-dominated majors (humanities and social sciences), 
two gender-balanced majors (business and biology) and two male-dominated majors 
(physical sciences and engineering). 
The first set of models in table A2.10 predicts whether students graduate with a 
humanities degree (vs. any other type of major).  Students from Smith are more likely to 
have a humanities degree than UMass students. Those with high verbal SAT scores, low 
math SAT scores, and high GPAs also are more likely to graduate with a degree in 
Humanities.  The GPA measure is an important control, but the causal direction is 
potentially misleading: a ―good‖ GPA depends on the degree field in which it was 
earned.  What is considered an excellent GPA in Humanities and the social sciences is 
often much higher than what is considered excellent in the sciences, largely assumed to 
be due to grade inflation. Thus, it is likely that those who are in humanities have higher 
GPAs because the grading norms are shifted higher than in the sciences.  Because of this 
ambiguous causality, I do not include GPA in the structural equation models.  
 Among women, those who attend Smith, and those with high verbal SAT scores 
are more likely to earn a degree in humanities; women with high SAT math scores are 
more likely to choose other majors in lieu of humanities.  Men with high verbal SAT 
scores are more likely to choose humanities degrees than other fields.  The second set of 
models predicts the likelihood of choosing a social science major.  Among women, those 
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who attend MIT and who perceive themselves as highly religious are less likely to earn a 
degree in the social sciences; women who identify as lesbian or bisexual are marginally 
more likely to choose a social science degree than other fields. 
 The next row of models in Table A2.10 predicts the likelihood of earning two 
gender-neutral degrees: business and biology.  Men are less likely to select a business 
major than other fields of study, and MIT students are more likely to have non-business 
majors than UMass students.  While biology is often considered part of the male-
dominated STEM fields, and it is certainly a previously male-dominated field, women 
have reached gender parity with men in most subfields of biology in the last ten years.  
Those with high SAT math scores are more likely to choose a field outside of biology, 
and biology degrees are correlated with lower GPAs than other majors. 
  The male-dominated fields of physics and engineering are represented in Table 
A2.10  Students with high verbal SAT scores are likely to choose fields other than 
physics, and graduating with a degree in physics corresponds to a higher-than-average 
GPA.  African-American women are more likely than non-Hispanic white women to 
graduate with a degree in physics.  It may seem surprising that gender is not a significant 
predictor of choosing physics or engineering degrees.  However, these models predict the 
likelihood of choosing these fields in lieu of other fields that have both more and less 
women than that particular field. 
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Table A2.1: Basic Descriptives Predicting Percent Women in Year 1 Major  
 ALL  WOMEN  MEN  
(Constant) 0.368 *** 0.506 *** 0.395 ** 
Women 0.099 ***     
MIT -0.106 *** -0.188 *** -0.027 ** 
Olin -0.223 *** -0.325 *** -0.131  
Smith  0.092 ** 0.020    
Hispanic or Latino -0.018  -0.018  -0.023  
Black or African American  -0.076  -0.070  -0.113  
Asian or Asian-American 0.030  0.009  0.047  
Born in US 0.002  0.009  -0.027  
Family income 0.000  0.000 + 0.000  
LGB -0.001  -0.022  0.041  
Conservatism 0.000  -0.007  0.018  
Religiosity 0.001  0.014  -0.025 * 
 
Table A2.2:  Basic Descriptives Predicting Percent Women in College Degrees 
 ALL 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 (Constant) 0.461 *** 0.556 *** 0.460 ** 
Women 0.071 ** 
    MIT -0.128 *** -0.183 *** -0.068 *** 
Olin -0.295 *** -0.375 *** -0.222 
 Smith  0.023 
 
-0.023 
   Hispanic or Latino -0.033 + -0.034 
 
-0.019 
 Black or African American  -0.092 
 
-0.074 
 
-0.174 
 Asian or Asian-American 0.010 
 
-0.003 
 
0.013 
 Born in US 0.002 
 
0.014 
 
-0.040 
 Family income 0.000 
 
0.000 + 0.000 
 LGB 0.040 
 
0.017 
 
0.089 + 
Conservatism 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.008 
 Religiosity -0.007 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.014 
  
Table A2.3: Basic Descriptives Predicting CHANGE IN Percent women, Year 1 
Major to Degree 
 ALL 
 
WOMEN 
 
MEN 
 (Constant) 0.089 
 
0.044 
 
0.067 
 Women -0.025 
     MIT -0.022 
 
0.005 
 
-0.046 
 Olin -0.070 * -0.051 
 
-0.095 * 
Smith  -0.066 * -0.039 
   Hispanic or Latino -0.017 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.001 
 Black or African American  -0.016 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.053 
 Asian or Asian-American -0.020 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.031 
 Born in US 0.004 
 
0.006 
 
0.004 
 Family income 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 LGB 0.040 + 0.036 
 
0.048 
 Conservatism 0.003 
 
0.009 
 
-0.012 
 Religiosity -0.008 
 
-0.018 * 0.010 
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Table A2.4: Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years 
(with Olin)  
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and Humanities 37 12.46 33 12.13 26 8.90 29 10.14 
2  Biological Science 39 13.13 36 13.24 37 12.67 35 12.24 
3  Business 12 4.04 13 4.78 18 6.16 18 6.29 
4  Education 4 1.35 2 0.74 2 0.68 1 0.35 
5  Engineering 126 42.42 119 43.75 122 41.78 118 41.26 
6  Physical Science 41 13.80 28 10.29 46 15.75 46 16.08 
7  Professional 1 0.34 1 0.37 3 1.03 1 0.35 
8  Social Science 23 7.74 24 8.82 27 9.25 30 10.49 
9  Technical 6 2.02 5 1.84 3 1.03 1 0.35 
10  Other Fields 8 2.69 11 4.04 8 2.74 7 2.45 
TOTAL 297 100.00 272 100.00 292 100.00 286 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.5:  Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years 
(without Olin) 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and Humanities 37 14.5 33 14.3 26 10.4 29 11.9 
2  Biological Science 39 15.3 36 15.7 37 14.8 35 14.3 
3  Business 12 4.7 13 5.7 18 7.2 18 7.4 
4  Education 4 1.6 2 .9 2 .8 1 .4 
5  Engineering 85 33.3 78 33.9 80 32.0 76 31.1 
6  Physical Science 41 16.1 28 12.2 46 18.4 46 18.9 
7  Professional 1 .4 1 .4 3 1.2 1 .4 
8  Social Science 23 9.0 24 10.4 27 10.8 30 12.3 
9  Technical 5 2.0 4 1.7 3 1.2 1 .4 
10  Other Fields 8 3.1 11 4.8 8 3.2 7 2.9 
TOTAL 255 100.00 255 100.00 255 100.00 286 100.00 
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Table A2.6:  Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years 
(with Olin)—MEN only  
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and 
Humanities 0 0.00 1 1.04 1 0.99 1 1.01 
2  Biological Science 8 7.69 12 12.50 9 8.91 8 8.08 
3  Business 5 4.81 8 8.33 10 9.90 10 10.10 
4  Education 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
5  Engineering 61 58.65 57 59.38 58 57.43 55 55.56 
6  Physical Science 16 15.38 9 9.38 19 18.81 19 19.19 
7  Professional 1 0.96 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
8  Social Science 5 4.81 2 2.08 2 1.98 3 3.03 
9  Technical 4 3.85 4 4.17 1 0.99 0 0.00 
10  Other Fields 4 3.85 3 3.13 1 0.99 3 3.03 
TOTAL 104 100.00 96 100.00 101 100.00 99 100.00 
Table A2. 7: Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years 
(without Olin)—MEN only 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and Humanities 0 0.00 1 1.40 1 1.30 1 1.30 
2  Biological Science 8 9.80 12 16.20 9 114.00 8 10.40 
3  Business 5 6.40 8 10.80 10 12.70 10 13.00 
4  Education 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
5  Engineering 40 48.80 36 48.60 36 45.60 33 42.90 
6  Physical Science 16 19.50 9 12.20 19 24.10 19 24.70 
7  Professional 1 1.20 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
8  Social Science 5 6.10 2 2.70 2 2.50 3 3.90 
9  Technical 3 3.70 3 4.10 1 1.30 0 0.00 
10  Other Fields 4 4.90 3 4.10 1 1.30 3 3.90 
TOTAL 82 100.00 74 100.00 79 100.00 82 100.00 
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Table A2.8:  Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years (with Olin)—
WOMEN only 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and Humanities 37 19.17 32 18.18 25 13.09 28 14.97 
2  Biological Science 31 16.06 24 13.64 28 14.66 27 14.44 
3  Business 7 3.63 5 2.84 8 4.19 8 4.28 
4  Education 4 2.07 2 1.14 2 1.05 1 0.53 
5  Engineering 65 33.68 62 35.23 64 33.51 63 33.69 
6  Physical Science 25 12.95 19 10.80 27 14.14 27 14.44 
7  Professional 0 0.00 1 0.57 3 1.57 1 0.53 
8  Social Science 18 9.33 22 12.50 25 13.09 27 14.44 
9  Technical 2 1.04 1 0.57 2 1.05 1 0.53 
10  Other Fields 4 2.07 8 4.55 7 3.66 4 2.14 
TOTAL 193 100.00 176 100.00 191 100.00 187 100.00 
Table A2.9:  Year 1 through 4 Majors, Only People Who Took All Four Years (without 
Olin)—WOMEN only 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 BS Major (Y5) 
 
Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% Freq  
Valid 
% 
1  Arts and Humanities 37 21.39 32 20.5 25 14.6 28 16.8 
2  Biological Science 31 17.92 24 15.4 28 16.4 27 16.2 
3  Business 7 4.05 5 3.2 8 4.7 8 4.8 
4  Education 4 2.31 2 1.3 2 1.2 1 0.60 
5  Engineering 45 26.01 42 26.9 44 25.7 43 25.7 
6  Physical Science 25 14.45 19 12.2 27 15.8 27 16.2 
7  Professional 0 0.00 1 .6 3 1.8 1 .6 
8  Social Science 18 10.40 22 14.1 25 14.6 27 16.2 
9  Technical 2 1.16 1 .6 2 1.2 1 .6 
10  Other Fields 4 2.31 8 5.1 7 4.1 4 2.4 
TOTAL 193 100.00 176 100.00 191 100.00 187 100.00 
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FEMALE-DOMINATED
All WOMEN MEN All     WOMEN         MEN
Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig
Constant .101 -0.104 -.358 .480 + .558 .471
Gender (1=women) -.006 .086
MIT Student .317 .002 -.113 -.186 * -.274 * -.092
Smith Student -.127 *** .338 ** -.078 -.151
Hispanic or Latino/a -.248 .036 -.019 .052 -.024
Black or African-American .083 .148 -.008 -.016 .013 .008
Asian or Asian-American .065 .015 .075 .048 .114 -.010
Born in the US .034 .045 .018 -.042 -.009 -.046
Family Income .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual .092 -.003 .431 .102 .147 + -.011
Political Conservatism -.007 .000 -.019 .013 .018 .005
Religiosity -.002 .003 -.017 -.051 * -.056 * -.038
SAT Verbal .001 ** .001 * .001 * .000 .000 .000
SAT Math -.001 *** -.002 ** .000 .000 -.001 .000
GPA .128 * .239 ** -.029 .008 -.037 .025
                               R-squared 0.356 *** 0.329 *** 0.473 *** 0.097 ** 0.082 * 0.03
GENDER-NEUTRAL
All WOMEN MEN All     WOMEN         MEN
Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig
Constant .091 0.242 -.242 .993 ** .831 + 1.252 *
Gender (1=women) -.125 * .060
MIT Student -.155 + -.162 -.192 .097 .140 .092
Smith Student -.104 -.106 -.075 -.018
Hispanic or Latino/a .054 .031 .111 .028 -.052 .045
Black or African-American -.047 -.062 .082 -.250 -.296 -.215
Asian or Asian-American .064 .078 -.006 -.028 -.075 .004
Born in the US .018 .013 -.027 -.103 -.102 -.131
Family Income .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual .046 .046 .122 -.061 -.100 -.016
Political Conservatism .017 .010 .037 .010 .011 -.003
Religiosity .004 -.001 .019 .025 .024 .030
SAT Verbal .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001
SAT Math .000 .000 .001 -.001 ** -.001 -.002
GPA -.113 -.078 -.216 -.132 * -.105 -.064
                               R-squared 0.024 0.04 0.1 0.038 + 0.02 0.048
MALE-DOMINATED
All WOMEN MEN All     WOMEN         MEN
Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig Unst. Coeff Sig
Constant -.280 -0.247 -.347 -.299 -.131 -.382
Gender (1=women) -.109 + -.078
MIT Student .126 .166 .059 .198 .240 .141
Smith Student .074 .099 -.001 .013
Hispanic or Latino/a .033 .249 -.217 .057 .050 .106
Black or African-American .471 ** .603 *** -.437 -.030 -.190 .815
Asian or Asian-American -.096 -.116 -.033 .096 .093 .140
Born in the US -.070 -.086 -.089 .101 .084 .157
Family Income .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual .034 -.055 .319 -.052 -.013 -.091
Political Conservatism .018 .017 .010 -.022 -.029 .007
Religiosity .009 .003 .007 -.026 -.010 -.057
SAT Verbal -.001 ** -.001 * -.001 .000 .000 -.001
SAT Math .001 .000 .001 .001 * .001 * .002
GPA .197 ** .101 .346 ** -.042 -.085 -.068
                               R-squared 0.116 ** 0.124 ** 0.102 0.151 *** 0.146 ** 0.018
HUMANITIES SOCIAL SCIENCES
BUSINESS BIOLOGY
PHYSICAL SCIENCES ENGINEERING
 
 
Table A2.10:  Individual Majors Predicted by Demographics 
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Appendix 3: Proposed Outline of Book Manuscript Chapters 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Chapter 2: Review of institutional, interactional, and individual-level factors 
reproducing occupational sex segregation  
 
Chapter 3: Qualitative chapter exploring the self-expressive explanations respondents 
give for their college major selection and their plans for career launch. 
 
Chapter 4: Co-construction of self-conceptions and gender schemas (same as current 
chapter 2)* 
 
Chapter 5: College degree decisions (same as current chapter 3) 
 
Chapter 6: Career launch decisions (same as current chapter 4) 
 
Chapter 7: Case study of engineering students (same as current chapter 5) 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
*Note: I plan to revise this co-construction chapter and submit as a stand-alone article in 
late summer or early fall 2011. 
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